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You can consent to whatever you want, as long as you get it right

Let me put this in different words:

It is possible for the ruler to oppose the common good, in which case he is a tyrant.

It is possible for the masses to oppose the common good, in which case they are a wicked and rebellious people.

In neither case does consent determine the legitimacy of government authority. The ruler either conforms his will to the good, or he is in the wrong. The masses either conform their will to the good, or they are in the wrong.

Folks may have all sorts of theories about necessary conditions of the legitimacy of government authority. But one thing we know can't be a necessary condition of the legitimacy of government authority is "consent of the governed." We know that because sometimes the masses of people are in the wrong.

Masses of people up in arms against their government may well be a sometime empirical indicator of tyranny. (It may also be an indicator of a corrupt and stubborn people; or both, for that matter). But that doesn't make "consent of the governed" into a necessary condition for the legitimacy of government authority.

Comments (95)

Just to clarify: did you mean "necessary condition" in that last sentence? Or "sufficient condition"?

I fail to see how replacing "consent" with "conform one's will to the good" does anything useful here. If "consent" can't be a necessary component of legitimate government on the grounds that people can be wrong, then neither can "conformance of one's will to the good" since that has the same issue and would need to be rejected for the same reason.

Or to put the problem a simpler way, "consent" and "conform" are synonyms.

I know you're trying to do some jujitsu where you move from a supposed subjective psychological state to an objective one ("the good"), but I don't think you're going to succeed. Not least because "consent" in the traditional understanding in this context wasn't divorced from the good to begin with as you wish to imply.

But as we saw in an earlier brief exchange, Zippy, the ruler may be illegitimate even if he is just making relatively neutral rules about things like traffic laws, and he may be illegitimate because, inter alia, he lacks the consent of the governed. Not everything is reducible to the common good, because not all laws are readily convertible into "the common good." Moreover, I would go farther: Let's suppose that Moe has neither ordinary legal legitimacy (inheritance or being elected according to the laws or whatever) nor the consent of the people. And let's suppose that he plans to keep all the laws the same after he's in charge except for one law, which he plans to change to be _somewhat wiser_ than the previous version. Make this law something like, I dunno, setting up a smarter plan for taxes.

Then, Moe's ideas for laws and his plans are in that sense preferrable from the perspective of the common good. But that doesn't mean that his government is legitimate when he and his Boys just take the place over, against the will of the people and without any previous excuse in law, so that they can improve the tax situation!

So, no. It doesn't all just reduce to the common good. Moe is still a tyrant.

Now, again, I'm not saying that consent of the governed is a "necessary condition" for governmental legitimacy, full stop. I'm saying that it is a necessary condition ceteris paribus--that is, in the absence of some other of a relatively small number of sources of legitimacy, such as ordinary succession or election under law.

If Moe lacks all of these, the fact that his government might in theory be better for the common good doesn't cut it.

Let's change the example a little, to up the ante still further. Imagine some wonderful Catholic gentleman who is just fed up with the situation in America and who manages (I don't know how) to find the military might to cast down the present form of government altogether and take over the country. He has _lots_ of good ideas for improving things "for the common good." He's a great guy in a lot of ways. Born in another age and with inheritance, he would probably have made a really good king. So he sets himself up with the title of King Frank the Just over America, makes Catholicism the official state church, etc., etc., etc., and an overwhelming majority of the people completely hate his rule. Plus he didn't come into power in any normal way. It was just a coup. But somehow, he has all the guns, and he hasn't (yet) been assassinated. He's a tyrant. He may be a _well-intentioned_ tyrant, but his government is not legitimate. Sez me, anyway.

I want to play a bit off of what Lydia is saying here, by going back to a Step 2 quote from the previous post:

To use a current example, I think the Tea Party's insistence that raising the debt ceiling be exclusively tied to deep entitlement cuts is harmful to the public good and economically uninformed (assuming they are willing to raise the ceiling at all), what I don't think is that it is unjust or illegal.

I actually think this is an interesting quote from Step 2 that highlights what I think is actually relevant about the idea of consent -- how can the government know what the common good is unless it asks the people and when it asks, doesn't it then imply that it seeks their consent to enact policy X or Y? More specifically, to bring the discussion back to Step 2's quote, many of us don't agree on what the common good should be. If we have a government that governs by consent, via a republican form of government (maybe a "red republican" form, just to make Zippy's "cosmic irony" start tingling), then folks can vote on their vision of the common good and the interesting question becomes what happens when we disagree on the great national questions. Of course, if subsidiarity is working well (which I agree in America, given federalism's slow death, it is not always working well) folks in Vermont will vote for a vision of the common good that will look different from the folks in Texas.

But in all of these examples, it seems strange to me to separate the common good from the consent of the governed -- yes, sometimes people don't know what is good for them. But in many cases, we just disagree about how best to live together -- in those cases isn't it best to have a mechanism (via consent) to gauge public opinion and have our leaders act on the public will (e.g. whether or not a community wants red light cameras, or dense zoning, or public money spent on bike lanes, etc.)

If Moe lacks all of these, the fact that his government might in theory be better for the common good doesn't cut it.

You would have to say that the ends justify the means to support Moe on the basis of the common good.

I'm not so sure about your examples, Lydia. It seems to me that although a rebellion to bring Moe or Frank into power is likely unjust, and unjust precisely because it is imprudent, that has little bearing on the legitimacy of their governments once established. In Moe's case, he is fomenting a rebellion for the sake of changing a minor tax law, which is grossly imprudent and obviously not conformed to the common good. There's a distinction between how to evaluate the legitimacy of an unrivaled government, and how to determine the legitimate government in a state of conflict, and I think the common good can be used to evaluate both. But in the second case, the state of conflict arose from some sort of government's decision, and one can't just take that government's policy positions, declare them oriented towards the common good, and therefore they are the legitimate government.

Note that this has historical relevance as well. In my opinion, the American Revolution was similarly an immoral rebellion against legitimate government, and for precisely the same reason as Moe's Revolution: it was a gross overreaction to the defects of the legitimate British government, and the war itself caused damage to the common good that can be laid at the foot of the Colonial governments. But that doesn't mean that, once the Revolution was won, that the U.S. government is not legitimate, and that we should all be agitating for the return of the British Crown. They're no longer in power, and to the extent that the U.S. government protects the common good, it is legitimate, though it was not when it was still in contention.

A judge is a ruler in the courtroom, by analogy, but suppose he misjudges a case and will not listen to those who know the truth. Does he still hold authority in that affair? There is a difference between holding the station of authority and being authorized to do something. Ultimately, a person is authorized to do something only to the extent that it oes not violate the laws of God (and in some cases, but not all, the laws of man). All authority has as its root: "Hear, oh Isreal, the Lord, your God, is one"...and..."thou shalt love the Lord thy God with your whole heart, your whole mind, your whole soul, and your whole strength. This is the first and greatest commandment. The second is like it - you shall love you neighbor as yourself. This summarizes the Law and the Prophets.". Authority does not need the consent of the governed as to station - Moses would have had authority even if no one in Isreal payed him any attention. It needs the consent of the governed to be peaceable, which is a fruit of authority, properly exercised, since authority, properly exercised, tends to justice and later to peace. If the bonds of justice are broken by someone in the station of authority, there can be no peace, only the silencing of dissent. The common good is a useful rule of thumb, but when it becomes an absolute, a slide into utilitarianism, it then suffers from the same flaws as utilitarianism: the inability to know the future - who is to say that the one person sacrificed for the one-hundred might not have been the one person with the knowledge to build the boat to get off of the island - or might have been the person who discovered the flaw in the plan for saving the other hundred.

I have no problem with the consent of the governed being an adjunct to legitimacy, but it is neither necessary nor sufficient, in itself. Surely, every parent has experienced this when they have tried to get their children to eat their peas.

The Chicken

'"consent" in the traditional understanding in this context wasn't divorced from the good to begin with as you wish to imply'

It doesn't seem to me that Zippy is saying that consent was divorced from the good, so much as that consent had come to be seen as a good in and of itself. This would make sense in light of what Paul Cella wrote about Burke on the other thread: "Burke gave the definition of Jacobinism as the principle 'that all government, not being a democracy, is a usurpation.'"

From this angle it might be said that "we are all Jacobins now."

Brett, in Tony's original political authority post we discussed various ways in which a government might be legitimate, and there I declared that other things might "do" in place of ordinary political legitimacy. In the case of the American Revolution, I think we _had_ consent of the governed, as well as a new legal set-up--first the colonial governments, then the Articles of Confederation, and finally the Constitution. I think the answer to your example is that even if the American Revolution was an over-reaction and hence unjustified, the eventual establishment, with the consent of the governed, of a new and carefully thought-out set of political rules for a new polity was one mechanism by which legitimacy of the new country was in fact established.

Now, Tony raised there the very interesting question: What happens if you have a coup of some sort and the "fist" of the person who carries out the coup remains from the get-go and onward a "threatening fist" rather than a "protecting fist" over the people. That is, he's set himself up against the people from the outset and is not accepted at all; nor does he have any ordinary political legitimacy. Nor, let's stipulate, was an occupation required from one people over another in self-defense against unjust aggression. That's what I'm trying to put forward in my Frank and Moe cases. What I conjectured as an explanation of Tony's intuition was this: Suppose that one agrees that revolution can be justified. (I myself have some doubts about this because of various Scripture verses that could plausibly be taken to rule out participation in any revolution for Christians, but set that aside.) Then one could argue that Frank and Moe have both set up governments that fulfill the qualifications for justifying a revolution *against them* from the get-go. Hence, their governments "never get to first base"--that is, they never become legitimate in the first place.

"Burke gave the definition of Jacobinism as the principle 'that all government, not being a democracy, is a usurpation.'"

So they usurp and usurp for years until their usurpation is the only democracy known. This is what is known as 'societal evolution,' and by the resulting society ('race' to some less enlightened listeners) ye shall know whether it's truly good.

Though the method of usurpery matters much. Usurping because you have simply greater skill, technology, or people on your side is going to create a far more different societal character than usurping because you're really good at parroting lies that sound good to the democracy of the day.

Also the relative permanence of what the people want from one day to the next has to be taken into account. But that's what REPRESENTATIVES and POLITICAL PARTIES are for-ideally, they should REPRESENT what you'd want when not constrained by sickness, doubt, drink, unhinged mental status, anger, irrational exuberance, and insufficent bacon.

In the case of the American Revolution, I think we _had_ consent of the governed, as well as a new legal set-up--first the colonial governments, then the Articles of Confederation, and finally the Constitution.

Really? The tens of thousands of American Loyalists who were dispossessed of their property, tarred and feathered, attacked by Patriot mobs, or forced into exile might have cause to disagree with you about the extent to which the governed consented to the new rule. So I find it hard to believe that it was the consent of the governed to the new government that granted that government legitimacy.

Suppose that one agrees that revolution can be justified... Then one could argue that Frank and Moe have both set up governments that fulfill the qualifications for justifying a revolution *against them* from the get-go. Hence, their governments "never get to first base"--that is, they never become legitimate in the first place.

Why would a revolution against an established Government of Moe be justified? I've already said that Moe's revolution --- to implement a minor improvement to tax law --- was unjustified because it was grossly imprudent and harmful to the common good. So why would I think that a revolution against Moe --- to reimplement the tax law and get Moe out of power --- would be any more justified? Once Moe has power, it's only justified to get Moe out of power if that will improve the common good.

Lydia:

Frankly, you seem to be arguing against a position I haven't taken.

The question is whether, given an existing and legitimate government, the withdrawal of consent - and only the withdrawal of consent - renders that government's powers illegitimate. The answer is that no, it does not. Consent of the governed is not a necessary condition of the legitimacy of government authority. (That it - whatever it is - may often be concomitant, doesn't make it a necessary condition).

Why you and Tony appear to believe that fairy stories about unjust rebellions and coups undermines this result in any way is opaque to me. Unjust rebellions and coups are against the natural law, and thus against the common good. Perhaps the problem is that your conception of the common good (or better, your understanding of what you take to be my conception of the common good) is consequentialist? For the record, it isn't.

Also I acknowledge that there are situations in history where we don't know who was legitimately in charge. But again, that doesn't undermine the result in the slightest, and I've no idea why anyone would think it does.

My post isn't about a grand theory of polity formation. As you know, I am highly skeptical of such things. My post is about the very narrow point that the principle "the just powers of government derive from the consent of the governed" is claptrap.

Well, Brett, I'm not about to defend the treatment of the loyalists during the revolution, but in the not-so-very-long run, things had settled down and the majority were, indeed, consenting in the new forms of government. The states did, in fact, ratify the Constitution via their representatives, for example.

What I'm suggesting is that the initial justifiability of a revolution is not the only factor in whether it results somewhere along the line in a legitimate government. It can be a sufficient condition for this purpose that a stable government holding some sort of general consent of the governed arises out of the revolution. If we envisage a situation in which this does not happen, we are plausibly envisaging a tyranny.

Whether one should seek to overthrow a tyrant depends not only on whether he is a tyrant; I'll grant that. It also depends on hopes of success against him and so forth. But in that case the would-be revolutionaries (which, ex hypothesi, include the majority of the people in the country!) could bide their time and see if there were better hope of success later.

Moreover, their purpose would be to depose a tyrant, not simply to change back the tax law.

Zippy, I completely agree that the withdrawal of consent of the governed from a duly elected, or inherited, or whatever, ruler doesn't invalidate the legitimacy of the government. But Paul already pointed out explicitly on the other thread (I can't recall if you responded) that such an easy dissolution isn't supported by compact theorists anyway! Not that I'm identifying myself as a compact theorist, but if it is they you are arguing against, and if even their position doesn't entail this kind of insta-dissolving of the compact, then your characterization of those you disagree with doesn't even include self-styled compact theorists!

Moreover, it does seem to me that in this post you're saying that _all questions of governmental legitimacy_ can be reduced to questions of the common good _without reference to_ consent of the governed. Now, I really do think that my Moe & Frank examples are counterexamples to that position. In those situations, it is precisely consent of the governed that is missing.

Just to clarify: did you mean "necessary condition" in that last sentence? Or "sufficient condition"?
Necessary condition.
I really do think that my Moe & Frank examples are counterexamples to that position.
I don't get that, at all. Moe and Frank are illegitimate revolutionaries overthrowing the existing government, as far as I can tell.
But Paul already pointed out explicitly on the other thread (I can't recall if you responded) that such an easy dissolution isn't supported by compact theorists anyway!

What about this guy?

"We may consider each generation as a distinct nation, with a
right, by the will of its majority, to bind themselves, but none
to bind the succeeding generation, more than the inhabitants of
another country." --Thomas Jefferson to John Wayles Eppes, 1813.

Are you responding to someone like Étienne de la Boétie?

It seems to me consent is valuable in terms of upsetting an illegitimate regime. Convincing people to remove their consent, to not co-operate with their own enslavement, is useful. This is quite different from arguing consent equals legitimacy- at least, I don't remember such a claim being made. Indeed, I would assume the whole premise of removing consent from an invalid government would presuppose consent not being the means via which a government becomes valid.

A link to whoever set you off down this road in the first place would be helpful for those of us not in the secret WWWW club.

I am arguing against Thomas Jefferson's own construal of his own words in the Declaration. I am suggesting that those who find themselves unable to unequivocally disavow Thomas Jefferson's conception of the legitimacy of government authority are right liberals. I am suggesting that the great mass of (e.g.) Tea Partiers and other ordinary people of the right aren't about to disavow Thomas Jefferson. I am suggesting that a conservative movement which fails to disavow Jefferson is not a conservative movement at all: it is acting as codependent enabler for the inevitable leftward march of history which has dominated politics for longer than any of us have been alive, and is likely to continue dominating after we are gone. And I am suggesting that the more nuanced who are trying to lawyer up and "save" Jefferson for conservatism, even while personally understanding the problemmatics involved, are enabling the enablers.

I am not arguing about some obscure scholarly discussion somewhere. I am arguing about the actual, metal-meets-the-meat politics we find ourselves in right now.

Now, I really do think that my Moe & Frank examples are counterexamples to that position. In those situations, it is precisely consent of the governed that is missing.

If I understand Zippy correctly, it is not the consent of the governed that is missing, but rather the fact that Moe and Frank deposed a government that was not opposed to the common good. On my understanding of Zippy-ism, a marginal increase in the common good is not sufficient to justify a revolution. Rather, the government to be deposed must be tyrannical, which by definition means actively and substantially opposed to the common good, and not just subject to improvement here and there.

On my understanding of Zippy-ism, a marginal increase in the common good is not sufficient to justify a revolution.
Right, and also the common good (which is just the good, but with our specific attention on the community) is not utilitarian or consequentialist in nature. You can't make a calculation and say that today we have X good, so that justifies doing whatever it takes to have X + Y good tomorrow. The Good, True, and Beautiful don't work that way.
What I'm suggesting is that the initial justifiability of a revolution is not the only factor in whether it results somewhere along the line in a legitimate government. It can be a sufficient condition for this purpose that a stable government holding some sort of general consent of the governed arises out of the revolution. If we envisage a situation in which this does not happen, we are plausibly envisaging a tyranny.

I would in fact go further: the initial justifiability of a revolution; that is, whether the revolution was just or unjust, is irrelevant to whether it results down the line in a legitimate government. And no, it is *not* a sufficient condition for legitimacy that it forms a stable government with the consent of the governed. Suppose that Country A is governed by a good and wise king, but is constituted by a wicked and degenerate people. If the people revolt, depose the king, and institute a new government which licenses their wicked behavior, to the complete consent of the people, that does not make their government legitimate.

If the people revolt, depose the king, and institute a new government which licenses their wicked behavior, to the complete consent of the people, that does not make their government legitimate.

I think there's probably an ambiguity on "legitimate" as between "good" and "legally really the government to which the citizens must submit in all things not themselves immoral." In your example case, Brett, it could be the case (perhaps not immediately, but after things settle down) that the few good citizens of the country (the minority, ex hypothesi, in your example) should be obeying the non-immoral laws of the new government and not attempting to overthrow the new government.

Zippy, do you think that after an unjust revolution, the de facto new government can _become_ legitimate eventually? And if so, would you agree or disagree that the acquiescence of the populace (in some sense of "acquiescence" and "populace") is a necessary part of such a "settling down" process?

Or, alternatively, after a just revolution when a new government must be established and there is no other mechanism in place in the historical context (e.g., the revolution was not carried out in the name of a rival hereditary claimant to the throne), would not some mechanism of consent of the people's representatives or the major citizens or something like that be a necessary part of legitimizing the new government?

Zippy, do you think that after an unjust revolution, the de facto new government can _become_ legitimate eventually?
Sure.
And if so, would you agree or disagree that the acquiescence of the populace (in some sense of "acquiescence" and "populace") is a necessary part of such a "settling down" process?
In the decidedly non-Jeffersonian sense of "not staging another revolution" or "not staging a successful counterrevolution", sure.

The terms of art in liberalism are all equivocal, and consent is no exception. At one extreme "consent" means just vacuously that no revolution has been successfully staged. So Saddam Hussein's government was government by consent in that sense of the term consent.

So yes, if Saddam Hussein's government is an example of government by consent then yes, that sense of consent applies to the supposed counterexample.

The way liberalism works is that we are first sucked in by the impossibility of disagreeing with vacuous assertions of its pieties. And once we've decided what we are, the rest is just haggling over the price.

A spiritual and moral counterrevolution against liberalism though would require unequivocal rejection of its pieties, and I just don't see that happening when even the best of us continue to light the pinch of incense.

"In neither case does consent determine the legitimacy of government authority. The ruler either conforms his will to the good, or he is in the wrong. The masses either conform their will to the good, or they are in the wrong."

Now, I think that St. Thomas agrees with you in part - laws not framed for the common good are unjust. With that said, Aquinas also noted a second part, namely in I.II. Q. 96, Art. 4 of the Summa, that:

"[L]aws are said to be just, both from the end, when, to wit, they are ordained to the common good--and from their author, that is to say, when the law that is made does not exceed the power of the lawgiver--and from their form, when, to wit, burdens are laid on the subjects, according to an equality of proportion and with a view to the common good.....On the other hand laws may be unjust in two ways: first, by being contrary to human good, through being opposed to the things mentioned above--either in respect of the end, as when an authority imposes on his subjects burdensome laws, conducive, not to the common good, but rather to his own cupidity or vainglory--or in respect of the author, as when a man makes a law that goes beyond the power committed to him--or in respect of the form, as when burdens are imposed unequally on the community, although with a view to the common good."

We also might quote Cardinal Bellarmine:

"It depends upon the consent of the multitude to constitute over itself a king, consul, or other magistrate. This power is, indeed, from God, but vested in a particular ruler by the counsel and election of men” (“De Laicis, c. 6, notes 4 and 5). “The people themselves immediately and directly hold the political power” (“De Clericis,” c. 7)."

With all due respect to Aquinas and Bellarmine, both vastly greater men than I, those passages weren't written from the perspective of twenty first century America; and to propose (if that is the suggestion) that either man would appreciate having his words deployed in defense of Jeffersonian liberalism is more than a little presumptuous. In fact it is doubtless also presumptuous to presume that Jefferson himself would not be driven to recant given the actual course taken by history. The hour is late.

Zippy, I don't know enough about Saddam Hussein's government and the position held by the populace vis a vis that government to know. I don't _just_ mean "not staging a successful counterrevolution." After all, my comments above about Moe and Frank envisage a situation where the people all hate Moe and Frank (or the vast majority do) but just don't have the guns. So I do mean something stronger by "acquiescence" than that. Basically, I'm trying to get at what Tony was talking about when he spoke of the fist raised (perpetually or indefinitely) for punishment over its own people vs. the fist raised for protection of its own people.

Given that I do mean something stronger, I'm guessing (but only guessing) that you would disagree about the importance of consent or acquiescence in the questions I asked above.

If that's true, then we've found a sense of "the importance of the consent of the governed" that is not vacuous, that we disagree about, but that is considerably less strong than the position that the people can _withdraw_ their consent at will or at whim from a government that is already in place.

If that's true, then we've found a sense of "the importance of the consent of the governed" that is not vacuous, that we disagree about, but that is considerably less strong than the position that the people can _withdraw_ their consent at will or at whim from a government that is already in place.
All of which is very nice, but, from my perspective, quite beside the point. So beside the point that I don't know if I grant its existence or not, since I can't keep my attention on the question long enough to think it through. Whether we disagree over the necessity of some extremely lightweight meaning of consent is just not important, at all, because whatever it is we are talking about it is incapable of distinguishing between liberal and illiberal societies.

So fine: for the sake of argument, constrain "consent of the governed" to mean some principle capable of distinguishing between liberal and illiberal societies, where liberal societies have it and illiberal ones don't. Clearly Jeffersonian consent is of this type. Clearly Jefferson himself meant to invoke this type of consent when he wrote the Declaration. And when consent is understood in this way, it is flatly and unequivocally false that the just powers of government derive from consent, period, amen, end of discussion.

Furthermore, all the nuanced argumentative bluster attempting to legitimize some concept of consent which would have applied just as well in the reign of Louis IX does nothing whatsoever to legitimize what the vast majority of Americans understand as "consent of the governed".

So when the "consent of the governed" doctrine is understood to mean what it actually means to most everyone, rather than as some esoteric thing, it is flatly false. Given as much, it is pointless and counterproductive for conservatives who actually understand that to use the term as an expression of something positive or good.

We need to distinguish, too, between consent to individual laws, as in "agreeing that those specific laws are good laws" and consent to an overall government's being in charge. A person might, for example, hate everything that the Obama administration and the Democrats in Congress are doing and have severe disagreements even with many laws previously passed while at the same time consenting in the continuation of the American form of government, agreeing that Obama really is the duly-elected and legitimate President, etc. In other words, having no inclinations towards revolution at all and not considering himself merely to live under a tyranny.

Do you actually think that most conservatives, say, mainstream conservatives, who talk somewhat positively about "consent of the governed" believe that the people can just dissolve the social compact "just like that" if they decide they don't consent to it anymore? I dunno, I think most of them are a lot less hotheaded and revolution-inclined than that, as witness the lengths to which they are willing to go in the name of what they deem to be the "rule of law." So far from thinking the social compact is easily dissolved, they seem to have an almost exaggerated fear of anarchy.

I thought in my last post I stipulated that the consent doctrine refers to something distinguishing liberal societies from illiberal. And yes, I think most everyone unreflectively understands it that way in ordinary discourse..

"consent" in the traditional understanding in this context wasn't divorced from the good to begin with as you wish to imply'

It doesn't seem to me that Zippy is saying that consent was divorced from the good, so much as that consent had come to be seen as a good in and of itself.

Oh I know. But, as with the equality question, he's espousing a moderate sounding theory (something like "as long as it doesn't go too far") but his rejection goes well beyond that.

I think Lydia is right that he's "saying that _all questions of governmental legitimacy_ can be reduced to questions of the common good _without reference to_ consent of the governed." That was my point too.

When he sets up "conforming the will to the good" in opposition to "consent of the governed," the common expression I was hinting at does not make explicit the question "consent to what?" I think he thinks consent is too squishy and subjective, but the "good" is what consent was always thought to be based upon. Not consenting to the government as some old buddy we're loyal to, but giving consent if and when a government was sufficiently good, or failing that as it often does, consent was given provisionally anyway based on the common good because its means of gaining authority were properly arrived at until the time to withdraw it by whatever means are available. Consent in this context and "the good" are not separable.

It sounds like zippy conceives consent in this context as some warm fuzzy internal psychological state. But it isn't.

It seems to me consent is valuable in terms of upsetting an illegitimate regime. Convincing people to remove their consent, to not co-operate with their own enslavement, is useful. This is quite different from arguing consent equals legitimacy- at least, I don't remember such a claim being made. Indeed, I would assume the whole premise of removing consent from an invalid government would presuppose consent not being the means via which a government becomes valid.

August, that is an astute point. I'm impressed. Are you new around here? Or maybe it's me that is new, but I hope you stick around.

When he sets up "conforming the will to the good" in opposition to "consent of the governed," the common expression I was hinting at does not make explicit the question "consent to what?" I think he thinks consent is too squishy and subjective, but the "good" is what consent was always thought to be based upon. Not consenting to the government as some old buddy we're loyal to, but giving consent if and when a government was sufficiently good, or failing that as it often does, consent was given provisionally anyway based on the common good because its means of gaining authority were properly arrived at until the time to withdraw it by whatever means are available. Consent in this context and "the good" are not separable.

So your theory is that the members of the polis cannot or will not ever collectively consent to the government doing something wicked?

Or is it that when we say "consent of the governed," what we have always really meant is "consent of the governed, as long as whatever they're consenting to isn't too bad"?

The question is whether, given an existing and legitimate government, the withdrawal of consent - and only the withdrawal of consent - renders that government's powers illegitimate. The answer is that no, it does not. Consent of the governed is not a necessary condition of the legitimacy of government authority. (That it - whatever it is - may often be concomitant, doesn't make it a necessary condition).

I think, though I tender this tentatively, that Zippy extracted more from the first sentence, in getting to the third sentence, than it can logically bear. And that's the heart of the matter.

A thing can be a necessary condition for the fullness of X, without being a condition such that without it X fails to exist in any sense whatsoever. When one says "renders the governments' powers illegitimate" the connotation is that of their being WHOLLY illegitimate - so totally illegitimate that none of the citizens need take the least notice of them because they bear no obligation whatsoever, they bear on us like the prince of Abyssinia's commands bear on us. But there are many situations in which authority is weakened, damaged, fraying, and (perhaps) even in the process of dying, but is not yet dead. Just as, there are many states in which the government's ordination toward the common good, in its habitual practice, is weakened, damaged, fraying, and in the process of dying, but not completely gone yet. In those situations, one cannot say that the government is illegitimate without a qualifying clause: it is less legitimate than a fully sound government, but it is more legitimate than pure anarchy.

Governments do not pass from _total legitimacy_ to being _absolutely illegitimate_ without intermediate stages. During those intermediate stages, at some point, the preponderance of the government's direction becomes against the common good, and at some point still further along the people's comprehension and certainty that its direction is preponderously against the common good. It would be wrong for any people to act in revolt before the preponderance of the government were against the common good, but it would be rash nonsense to say that they must wait for every last possible ounce of intention in favor of the common good has departed the government before they can act against it. When it (the transition against the common good) reaches such an extent that it is clear and certain to the mass of the people, they reach a condition in which they have a right to cease to obey the government in some measure. And at that point, when they begin to withhold their willingness to be ruled by him, one can truly say in a special and distinct way that his authority is illegitimate. Even though it is still not absolutely and in every respect illegitimate.

It is possible for consent of the governed to be a necessary condition for the _fullness_ of political authority, even if not for a merest whisp of authority. The logic allows for that.

Further, there can also be a difference between what is true about "coming to be" of authority and what is true about "authority as it rests in being". It is not necessary for an adult man, to continue his life, to continue to have his father around, but it is certainly a necessary condition for the man's coming into being to have his father there at the start. Zippy's comment mentions "withdrawing" consent, given a government already in existence. What is a necessary condition for the new government to arise in the first place is a different matter. And that is the matter I raised in my prior post.

Let me take Lydia's sample and extend it: suppose Moe, in total control for 30 years running, comes to the realization overnight that he has been a tyrant, has been evil, and has held the power illegitimately. And he decides that this shall not continue, he must turn the country toward the common good again. Now, he can let go of power, but after 30 years he cannot just walk away without a power implosion, conditions will be quite opposed to the common good. So, for the sake of the common good, he must continue to rule at least for a time. During those first days and weeks after his change of heart, he is NOW truly ruling for the common good. But of course, the people cannot know whether (a) he really has had a change of heart, or (b) whether it is a fixed intention or a passing fancy. During all that 30 years they would have been morally and politically justified in revolting if they had a decent chance at succeeding and at setting up a just government. So: now that Moe is ruling for the common good, do the citizens have a right to revolt against his rule based on his 30 years of unjust tyranny? If the people, during that first week of Moe's conversion, were to discover some new source of might by which they could suppress Moe's secret police and military, would they be wrong to use it because Moe is now ruling for the common good?

No: It is not enough to say that Moe is ruling for the common good: Moe never had legitimacy before his conversion, and he cannot achieve a legitimate government merely by deciding he will start to rule for the common good. Therefore, the ruling for the common good is not a sufficient condition for the legitimacy of a ruler. It takes more.

By the way, may I politely suggest that we steer cautiously away from using the complete phrase "consent of the governed" unless we intend by it exactly the extreme liberal form of the concept in which "consent" is a totally unguided and unrestrained pure act of will (for, or against) without connection to justice and morality? This meaning is the special meaning that Zippy is referring to in Thomas Jefferson's works.

One reason I would suggest this is that it is not the meaning most of us here are thinking of when we suggest that the people of a city consent to the creation of a kingship, as St. Thomas says about the Romans making Tarquinnius king.

The second reason is that even Thomas Jefferson didn't always mean the phrase in its most extreme form. His thinking on the subject changed over the years, becoming more extreme after the war of independence up to when he was made ambassador to France, tempering just a little in seeing the excess of the French revolution that carried willfulness of consent untrammeled by rationality to its logical extreme, tempering further during his period as President when he saw the difficulty (impossibility) of ruling with total "consent", and moderating still more after both he and Madison were retired and wrote back and forth year after year.

Can we use "consent" to mean something different than that extremity of Thomas Paine's anarchic sense?

So your theory is that the members of the polis cannot or will not ever collectively consent to the government doing something wicked?

Or is it that when we say "consent of the governed," what we have always really meant is "consent of the governed, as long as whatever they're consenting to isn't too bad"?

Of course not. I'm not trying to be snarky, but have you read comment #2? Put in your terms, why aren't you asking zippy if by "conforming one's will to the good" he means "only when one judges the good rightly"? Jeff S. rightly pointed out the fact that we simply don't agree on the good. Anyway, both claims are equally subjective, and are subject to the same critique. If you rule out "consent of the governed" as a component to legitimacy, on the grounds that one can judge the good wrongly, you must also rule out "conforming one's will to the good" on the same grounds. Now zippy didn't explicitly say that "conforming one's will to the good" was necessary for legitimacy, but I think it was strongly implied that morality was the standard. Which it is, but in this world we're talking about how to measure things because we don't all have the same "good" in mind. That's the point. If we had a God's eye view we wouldn't need any way to try to find ways to judge the morality or rightness of things. We wouldn't need to theorize on how to judge the rightness of actions. Is the general public a good gauge, or are we better off with elites, sometimes known as philosopher kings? The age-old question. So it doesn't solve anything at all to replace "consent of the governed" with "conforming one's will to the good." As I said, that the verbs are synonyms is somewhat revealing.

I see. So your point is just, "What is truth?"

Anyway, both claims are equally subjective...

No, they're not.

We're not interested in whether someone believes themselves to be promoting the common good, but whether they actually are promoting the common good. It is true that sometimes it is difficult to know what the common good is, and what actions one ought to take to promote it. But these epistemological issues do not and cannot change the objective moral facts.

So fine: for the sake of argument, constrain "consent of the governed" to mean some principle capable of distinguishing between liberal and illiberal societies, where liberal societies have it and illiberal ones don't. Clearly Jeffersonian consent is of this type.

But we want "consent" to include also the situations where people erected a new king thinking he would be good, and found out that he wasn't - they got a bad bargain, but they really and truly made him king by their concerted choice. And other situations not amenable to being described as "liberal society" in either of its 2 leading meanings.

Further, there can also be a difference between what is true about "coming to be" of authority and what is true about "authority as it rests in being". It is not necessary for an adult man, to continue his life, to continue to have his father around, but it is certainly a necessary condition for the man's coming into being to have his father there at the start. Zippy's comment mentions "withdrawing" consent, given a government already in existence. What is a necessary condition for the new government to arise in the first place is a different matter. And that is the matter I raised in my prior post.

Yes, that's a point I've been trying to make.

I think, too, that Tony has a good point about legitimacy's possibly coming in degrees or being partial. Very interesting idea.

Yes, Tony, I realize that there are all sorts of discussions you want to have to keep open a window of respectability for a concept of the just powers of government deriving from consent. And I think those attempted discussions you want to have are wrongheaded and imprudent, for reasons already stated.

Meanwhile, on the logic front, I just disagree. If the masses of a polity wake up one morning and decide to a man withdraw consent to the rule of the existing legitimate ruler, it is they, the masses, who are engaged in grave wickedness; and the commands of the ruler remain just, utterly independent of their rebellion. Categorically, their withdrawal of consent to a legitimate ruler affects the justice of his commands not a whit.

And by the way, there are several good reasons to simply shun the whole discussion of a grand theory of how legitimate governments come into being.

1) It is like discussing how a family becomes a clan, and how legitimate authority arises in a clan structure; and such a thing is not amenable to the sorts of theorizing being attempted. The real development of actual authority simply doesn't work that way.

2) All manner of atrocities have been committed in the name of such theories;

3) The whole discussion is really a bait and switch, because the political significance is about attempting to justify rebellion, not theorizing about how legitimacy arises in governance in the first place.

Folks can have their own threads about grand theories of origins if they want to. How could I stop it? But I'm not interested in that kind of theorizing. In fact I think it is a kind of rebellion porn, truth be told.

Anyway, both claims are equally subjective...

No, they're not.

They're not? How are they not?

We're not interested in whether someone believes themselves to be promoting the common good, but whether they actually are promoting the common good. It is true that sometimes it is difficult to know what the common good is, and what actions one ought to take to promote it. But these epistemological issues do not and cannot change the objective moral facts.

Of course epistemological issues don't change objective moral facts. What exactly do you think I'm claiming when I say the "consent of the governed" and "conformance of the will to the good" are on equal epistemic status? The latter is a statement about judgment. Inserting the word "good" doesn't do any epistemic magic. This topic is so fundamental it is well discussed by the ancients.

Yes, Tony, I realize that there are all sorts of discussions you want to have to keep open a window of respectability for a concept of the just powers of government deriving from consent. And I think those attempted discussions you want to have are wrongheaded and imprudent, for reasons already stated.

Zippy, you have alluded to this theory of yours before, that there are some (philosophical) things that should not be said even if they are true. But you have not managed to elicit a cogent argument for this theory, that responds to this: if there is a manner in which the stated truth can be misused, it may be incumbent on the propounder to elicit not ONLY the philosophical truth itself, but to elicit the larger truth that explains how it is to be distinguished from its abuse. When doing that, he is serving the common good, one aspect of which is truth. Or THE Truth. But to refuse to propound both the smaller truth and the larger explanation that distinguishes the right from the wrong understanding of it is to serve ignorance, not truth.

I have repeatedly, without ceasing, distinguished the kind of consent that we are trying to understand from the sort you are insisting is the sole meaning in the Declaration. The fact that there is an abusive way of using "consent of the governed" does not mean that there is NO POSSIBLE proper way of talking about consent in the context of politics.

Meanwhile, on the logic front, I just disagree. If the masses of a polity wake up one morning and decide to a man withdraw consent to the rule of the existing legitimate ruler, it is they, the masses, who are engaged in grave wickedness; and the commands of the ruler remain just, utterly independent of their rebellion. Categorically, their withdrawal of consent to a legitimate ruler affects the justice of his commands not a whit.

Since that is exactly the kind of withholding of consent that I have distinguished from what we are ascribing as having at least a partial role, your point disturbs my arguments (and Lydia's) not at all. It doesn't touch on them. Try tackling the kind of withholding of consent that I set out at 8:47: the actual status of governmental direction is against the common good to such an extent (though not in every last detail) that it has become clear and certain to the mass of people. Compare what happens between the moment when that people (realizing that the government is directed wrongly) still continues for a time to obey out of fear or hesitancy, to the moment (the government itself remaining unchanged) when they cease to obey in significant ways (though not in all ways), either because they lose their hesitancy or because they begin to see an opportunity for some kind of change. In the second condition, we would be right to describe the government as being less legitimate than in the first condition, even though the government's own actions between the two remain equally poorly directed to the common good.

Rebellion porn, Tony, that's all it is: rebellion porn. Naked centerfolds contain truth too. Staring at them while discussing what truth they contain is imprudent, and you shouldn't do that either.

If you rule out "consent of the governed" as a component to legitimacy, on the grounds that one can judge the good wrongly, you must also rule out "conforming one's will to the good" on the same grounds.

The reason that "consent of the governed" is not a necessary component of legitimacy is not because the governed can consent to the wrong things.

As I've said repeatedly, I'm certainly open (though for scriptural rather than philosophical reasons) to the position that revolution is _never_ allowable to Christians. Is this your position, Zippy? I didn't think that it was (from what I recall of your comments on the question at other times), but your rather harsh comments to Tony just here might be taken to imply that.

I for one will persist in believing that the questions surrounding the right of revolution, far from being pornographic, actually want for more extensive, careful and discerning discussion. I find desperate ignorance on these subjects wherever I turn; but I deny that the lunacies of the modern world relieve us of the burden of right reason on this subject; deny that, in others words, modernity has so mishandled terminology and conceptual language as to compel a certain quietism in its opponents. It may be, as a commenter shrewdly suggested way up thread, that a deliberate withdrawal of consent from the modern political order, a refusal to participate in one's own enslavement, (echoes of Moldbug's critique of the Right?) is precisely the surest route to a restoration of government toward the common good. In which case, by a marvelous irony, nothing is more vital to Zippy's teaching than a proper estimate of the power of consent.

The reason that "consent of the governed" is not a necessary component of legitimacy is not because the governed can consent to the wrong things.

zippy is the one projecting a necessity thesis onto others. As far as I can tell, no one here thinks consent is necessary in any way that could be called a strict sense. It isn't a common sentiment that I've ever heard expressed anywhere that I can recall. So I think it is fair to say it is hyperbole at the least.

So whatever is the reason is for NOT thinking "consent of the governed" a necessary condition of legitimacy, it seems to be good enough that we need not be concerned by it. The commenters seem to grasp that zippy has more in mind than this, and what else he may mean has always been the topic of discussion I think.

That's really ironic, Paul. Thanks for bringing that out.

Zippy, you have likened my discourse to something that is grotesque and inherently disordered. And you chose as a metaphor something that I (most vividly) repudiated in a new thread less than 2 weeks ago. Was that an intentional poke?

Lydia, I think the case for the right to revolt is at least as strong in Scripture as the case against. Though I could be mistaken. But Zippy said earlier that he agrees that the people can revolt when it is necessary for the common good, the government being corrupt and illegitimate.

As far as I can tell, no one here thinks consent is necessary in any way that could be called a strict sense.

I find it hard to believe you are serious. Both Lydia and Tony have been defending some sort of consent of the governed:

Lydia: "I'm saying that it is a necessary condition ceteris paribus--that is, in the absence of some other of a relatively small number of sources of legitimacy, such as ordinary succession or election under law."

Tony: "It is possible for consent of the governed to be a necessary condition for the _fullness_ of political authority, even if not for a merest whisp of authority."

It isn't a common sentiment that I've ever heard expressed anywhere that I can recall.

Really? So you haven't read the Jefferson quotes Zippy posted upthread, or the Declaration of Independence, or the Wikipedia page on "consent of the governed" that explicitly describes it as "state power is only justified and legal when derived from the people or society over which that political power is exercised"?

Paul:
I have no problem with discussion of where justification of war in general and revolution specifically might be found, generally speaking. But attempting to root it out of, or relate it in any way to, the Jeffersonian consent doctrine, moves the locus of justification from the good to the human will. That line of discussion is rebellion porn, in my view.

Tony:
No connection to your earlier post was intended.

Brett, "necessary" has a specific meaning, and Lydia and Tony's statements are carefully qualified so that I take them to be rejecting "necessity."

Yes I know about the Declaration's "just powers from the consent of the governed" statement. I think I was conflating Tony's wide-ranging post on the topic with zippy's more limited one. I know zippy's point was about Jefferson, but he has also applied his comments to at least one pre-modern regime as well

I did not mean to be hyper-precise, but I guess it goes back to the meaning of "necessary." I take it to mean that if it is necessary, then no government could ever have been legitimate without this consent. I take that to be false, and that is what I was referring to about it not being a common sentiment. I've never heard anyone say "I tell you what Mo, those ancient governments were nothin' but illegitimate. Why people didn't even have a vote!" It is certainly a common sentiment to hold that consent of the governed is necessary to have a modern government most people would want to live in now. That is a common sentiment, and it is certainly mine, given that there is a sufficient understanding of the meaning of tacit consent, as I've said elsewhere.

But then maybe that is where zippy and I agree because he did say "I thought in my last post I stipulated that the consent doctrine refers to something distinguishing liberal societies from illiberal." If that were all he meant then we have no disagreement.

So my bad for considering the term "necessary" in a way that didn't fit the loose nature it was used in the debate. I didn't stop to think about that. A good lesson for me.

I have no problem with discussion of where justification of war in general and revolution specifically might be found, generally speaking. But attempting to root it out of, or relate it in any way to, the Jeffersonian consent doctrine, moves the locus of justification from the good to the human will. That line of discussion is rebellion porn, in my view.

Zippy, as I said, Jefferson himself re-characterized his thoughts on the matter over time, more than once. Even apart from that, when the Declaration was debated for days, edited, voted upon, and signed, it became a document of a group of men, not the sole expression of one man. As such, it came to represent the many nuances of meaning that they all took into the meetings. Not all of the signers were admirers of Locke and Rousseau.

And still, the phrases of "consent" started before Locke, and developed many different meanings and explanations before (and after) Jefferson. You can no more lock down the phrase for political discourse to one single man's idea at one period of his life than you can for the word freedom, or power. If you meant to have an entire discussion about the phrase so that it is limited to one sole, narrow, bounded, unnecessarily constrained sense, you went about it rather feebly.

There are many more consent doctrines than Jefferson's. There are many more meanings of consent in politics than Jefferson's. Are they all equally wrong?

You call my commentary pornographic. A centerfold isn't pornographic because it is poorly done photography, it is pornographic no matter the quality: the subject determines it. If my commentary on consent is pornography, then so is yours: the subject determines it. But I at least did not start a thread knowing that it would descend into pornography, you started your thread right on the centerfold itself.

Mark, I started the other thread wanting to give a chance for OTHER accounts of legitimacy to come forward, that did not include consent. None did. I do not think that consent is intrinsically necessary for the legitimacy of authority in all possible circumstances: God's authority is legitimate whether anyone consents. Likewise, a father's authority is too.

But when a people are not at the moment already subject to a legitimate ruler, it seems impossible to explain and account for their coming to be subject to a specific ruler Louis without either God's direct miraculous intervention, or some kind of free choice by (at least some of) the men, at least to the extent of which ruler they select (not to the extent of selecting someone to rule). Zippy says that there is no such situation of men not subject to a ruler, (no state of nature condition) but he is manifestly wrong: there have been times when a king dies with no legal successor. There have been times when a just and necessary revolt leaves the people with no legitimate ruler in place.

If a bad people overthrow a good ruler to get a bad ruler, then they will have an illegitimate state of affairs - for a time. Eventually, they may come to have a fully legitimate government. This can only happen if either the bad government changes character and orders rightly for the common good, or if they (once again) overthrow the bad government, repent of their evil, and form a good one. In the latter case, the coming to be of the good government cannot be explained without some element of consent: the authority to rule comes not from the people but from God, but who it is that rules comes from men (acting by God's grace, if they are choosing uprightly). It is not necessary to say that the authority to rule derives from the consent of the people, but that is only one aspect of consent. It is necessary to explain how Louis comes to be the legitimate ruler when there was no legitimate ruler, and this cannot be explained by the natural law. Zippy seems to think that whomever the people select to hold office, that man will either be legitimate because he rules for the common good or he will be illegitimate because he does not. But that fails to explain: even before he has started to give commands Louis is legitimate: people are under no obligation to obey him if he has no legitimacy. It is not on account of giving good commands that he holds the office legitimately. It is on account of his holding office legitimately that his commands actually command obedience; and if they are only imperfectly related to the common good, they still bind. The natural law and the common good do not explain the coming-to-be of a specific ruler (of a new government) legitimately holding office, of legitimately being able to command obedience where before he could not.

I'll add here that there are features of the Declaration of Independence that clearly harken back to an older, pre-modern symbol of consent: the covenant.

Then there is the Preamble to the Constitution, which has all the hallmarks of a document oriented precisely toward an older notion of common good.

In a word, I can't agree with Zippy that exploring the symbols and vital phrases of our political tradition is imprudent because liberals have made hash of it. Not every expounder of that tradition is an enabler.

Brett, Mark's use of "in a strict sense" and my use of "ceteris paribus" make it clear that you cannot counterexample him with me. In other words, mine is precisely _not_ a "doctrine of consent in a strict sense" but rather in a somewhat weak or watered-down sense. For example, I forget now which thread it was on, I've suggested that the Glorious Revolution in England was probably illegal! Given what a Whig I'm usually thought to be in historical discussions, this is quite an admission. But the reason I'm inclined to think it is that I doubt that the English had a good enough reason to overthrow James II (even if there ever can be such a reason). Hence, they couldn't legitimately just withdraw consent, boom!, like that, and bring in William and Mary. What this suggests is that there are other routes to governmental legitimacy besides "consent of the governed," the most obvious of these being someone's coming to govern in the ordinary course of law.

That's just it, Paul: modern liberals haven't made a hash of it. Anyone who can't see that modern liberalism is an authentic development of Jeffersonian liberalism just doesn't want to see it.

And Tony: it is a cute lawyerly trick to suggest that objecting to porn is itself pornographic.

Tony:

Zippy seems to think that whomever the people select to hold office, that man will either be legitimate because he rules for the common good or he will be illegitimate because he does not.
I don't think that, by the way. I've already told you several times that I don't have a comprehensive theory of how legitimate political authority develops de novo; just that, as a specific point, its legitimacy does not derive from the consent of the governed in any non-vacuous meaning of "consent". (I also don't have a comprehensive theory of love, or money, or any number of other things).

But you just can't take no for an answer, can you?

For many years now, over at my blog and elsewhere, since well before you were a contributor here, you've been telling lies about what I think - despite my constant correction, with all the endless tedium that implies - and doing every lawyerly trick in the book to misdirect, cover up my specific points with verbal diahrrea, etc etc etc.

For whatever reason, after I left, the editors here decided to make you a contributor. I think they shouldn't have, but I'm not really "here" anymore, so I don't have a say in it.

I certainly include Jefferson among modern liberals. Indeed, I reject the whole classical liberal/modern liberal distinction most emphatically.

Zippy, part of your mystique is that you're boldly cryptic. I'll never forget your masterpiece of Socratic subtlety (complete with some marvelous puns that went right over the poor fella's head) in treating with an intransigent liberal on the subject of Birth Control (GKC capitalized it, so I will too) many years ago at my old blog.

If you're gonna go all "I'm an innocent little flower only talking pure sincere plainness," why I can only suspect a greater subtlety than that which at the moment has presented itself to me.

Zippy, as I defend you when people say things I think unjustified and incorrect about you, I must here say that at least in everything I have seen (which probably doesn't include everything at your blog), Tony has never _lied_ about what you think. Nor do I think he ever would. Tony is a straight shooter and an honest, honorable blogger and thinker. I realize that you think otherwise, but I beg you to consider that you might be wrong.

As far as his point about starting the thread, here's an analogy: A week ago someone asked me what I think of constructivist theories of education. I answered, quite honestly, that I know nothing (specifically) about constructivist theories of education. What I did not say (though it's also true) is that I'm inclined to think high-level theories of education vacuous and a waste of time at best and harmful at worst. What would have been conversationally odd and off-putting (if we translate this to a blogospheric context) would have been for me to say in a post, "Constructivist theories of education are all absolute garbage" and then, in the comments, to say, "I think discussing theories of education is harmful and wrong, and I don't want to discuss theories of education here."

It is understandable that people should find something that looks like that puzzling.

Paul: since the high level point is just that the conservative movement needs to explicitly disavow Jeffersonian ideas, and that it won't, I'm not sure that leaves us with anything to argue about.

"Thomas Jefferson got consent of the governed wrong!" isn't a sign I expect to see at tea party rallies any time soon.

Part of what makes me seem much smarter and more subtle than I actually am is that I'm not a positivist, not even in a "soft" way. I subscribe to the notion that just because we can't have comprehensive theories that connect to each other covering everything, that doesn't mean that we can't reach definite conclusions about some things. When your garden variety Internet moron projects some theory on you and makes all of his idiotic claims of what you must think, it is just another day on the funny farm. We've seen that in these threads, and one quickly learns who to just ignore. When someone like Tony, who has demonstrated time and again that he knows better, does it; well, I could say more, but let's just say that the hypothesis of good will stretches credulity to the breaking point.

Lydia:
I appreciate your efforts at making peace.

I realize that most people get a little freaky when I say that there are public conversations people should not have. But in fact there are public conversations people should not have, so I don't know what I am supposed to do about the fact that saying so freaks people out. That theories of the origins of political authority lie behind all sorts of atrocity is just obvious even to the historically illiterate. And indeed, one might argue that the "what is family, anyway" question is in an earlier stage of the same trajectory.

Sexual porn isn't the only kind of porn. All sorts of things - things which contain partial truths in them - should be avoided by the virtuous. And it isn't as if this is an a priori conclusion; this is a 'by their fruits ye shall know them" conclusion. Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau were engaged in political pornography.

Zippy, you could never blunder so badly as to let the matter be strictly personified in a particular Virginian of the late 18th century.

Let us drag Jefferson like Isaac up the mountain for the sacrifice and all stain of error is redeemed? What game in this, I wonder.

How about a piece of extraordinary trivia: the last time Jefferson, Madison and Hamilton were all in alliance on a matter of state or policy was the Report on Credit and the first Treasury's plan to pay out Revolutionary debt properly. Both Jefferson and Madison had misgivings but Hamilton sold them on the necessity of securing American credit. Then, the alliance forged for the last time, the bill was carried in Congress.

And bloody hell, man: Jefferson for all his faults saw the wickedness and ruin of slavery upon the soul the Republic. God bless that Virginia infidel for reminding us to tremble when we reflect that God is just.

Zippy, I completely understand thinking that there are some things that shouldn't be discussed, especially in public and sometimes not at all. And I agree that there are such subjects. It does make it hard to post about those subjects, though, especially if one wants forcefully to deny a particular theory about those subjects. For example, I don't think pornography should be discussed in detail. For that very reason, I would not (especially knowing our readership at W4) put up a post saying, "The theory that something isn't pornography if it has artistic value is completely wrong," because I would know that that would invite discussion of exactly the details I don't think should be discussed. It would be only to be expected, and I couldn't justly be annoyed if people disagreed with me and instanced specifics to support their side of the debate.

I realize that most people get a little freaky when I say that there are public conversations people should not have. But in fact there are public conversations people should not have, so I don't know what I am supposed to do about the fact that saying so freaks people out. That theories of the origins of political authority lie behind all sorts of atrocity is just obvious even to the historically illiterate. And indeed, one might argue that the "what is family, anyway" question is in an earlier stage of the same trajectory.

Here is where I part company with you. I firmly believe that the more moral the nation, the more public conversations it CAN have. It is in the dissolute, divided, immoral and lying nation where one must dig for scraps of the truths untold in the mainstream media. I greatly prefer the directness of General Sherman to the endless caginess of Sun Tzu, or Machiavelli, his Western civilian equivalent.

Sexual porn isn't the only kind of porn. All sorts of things - things which contain partial truths in them - should be avoided by the virtuous. And it isn't as if this is an a priori conclusion; this is a 'by their fruits ye shall know them" conclusion. Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau were engaged in political pornography.

What you speak of is quite frankly impossible. The human thirst for knowledge, understanding, and dominion over the world will always outstrip the written canon, though knowing the canon beforehand usually assists in the separation of the evil from the good. EVERYTHING you eat contains some poison-that's why you have a liver. While overwhelming yourself with the mixed-truths of the world will lead to confusion and immorality, that's no reason to make Sola Catholicanon to all media as binding as Sola Scriptura is for, say, the more conservative Protestants.

Oh, plus the fact that the experiences we have in life can actually tend to illuminate and increase the understanding of the Scriptures and the Canon, too.

Maybe it's a reverse of the once influential Parrington thesis until the 40's? Where Jefferson was the author of everything good about America whose ideas lost to Hamilton so the country went to Hell in grocery-cart. But in this version Jefferson won over all comers and so the country went to Hell in grocery-cart.

For that very reason, I would not (especially knowing our readership at W4) put up a post saying, "The theory that something isn't pornography if it has artistic value is completely wrong," because I would know that that would invite discussion of exactly the details I don't think should be discussed. It would be only to be expected, and I couldn't justly be annoyed if people disagreed with me and instanced specifics to support their side of the debate.
I agree, and I would ask you to take note of where in the context/timeline I started posting.
What you speak of is quite frankly impossible.
I'm not sure which thing it is that you view as impossible. Is it identifying porn that you think is impossible, or avoiding it? Or something else entirely?

Paul:

Thomas Jefferson isn't simply an historical Virginian, and even someone as steeped in the rough and tumble particularities of history as you are knows it. He is also an icon, a symbol in himself, and representative of particular modes of thought certainly very influential in, if not preponderant in, the founding.

"Maybe it's a reverse of the once influential Parrington thesis until the 40's? Where Jefferson was the author of everything good about America whose ideas lost to Hamilton..."

My guess would be that Zippy's not the world's biggest Hamilton fan either.

I mentioned this on another thread a week or two ago, but someone (Richard Weaver? Eugene Genovese?) argued that TJ's thought was somewhat "schizophrenic," in that he had his free-thinking Lockean side, but also his agrarian more Burkean side, which were in tension with each other. I don't know enough about him to know how he was able to reconcile these two trends, or maybe he never was. But I wonder whether it's necessary for conservatives to disavow TJ altogether. Shouldn't we rather keep the positive elements in Jeffersonian thought while maintaining our distance from those which are too strong a reflection of the Enlightenment? Or, Zippy, are you saying that's not doable?

When your garden variety Internet moron projects some theory on you and makes all of his idiotic claims of what you must think, it is just another day on the funny farm. We've seen that in these threads, and one quickly learns who to just ignore.

While I try not to project some theory onto someone else and tell them what they think (I'm having a hard enough time trying to figure out what I think...), often times, I am, nevertheless, quite ignorable.

The Chicken

My guess would be that Zippy's not the world's biggest Hamilton fan either.

Ya think? You sliced off my text a bit early. I said "But in this version Jefferson won over all comers and so the country went to Hell in grocery-cart." .

No, what I was implying was that in the TJ vs. AH conflict, Zippy wouldn't choose either side.

Myself, I'm of Bill Kauffman's opinion that the biggest mistake Aaron Burr made was that he didn't shoot Hamilton 20 years earlier. ;-)

For the record, I read Chicken posts whenever I see them. I like chicken.

Nice:

But I wonder whether it's necessary for conservatives to disavow TJ altogether. Shouldn't we rather keep the positive elements in Jeffersonian thought while maintaining our distance from [the negative elements]?

(Apologies for the edit, but I wanted to address it as a more general point.)

Is there anyone we couldn't say this about? I've read all sorts of bad stuff by bad people, and rare indeed is the case where I find nothing whatsoever that is true in what they write.

Well, yes, as a general point I agree with you. I was simply inquiring as to how far, so to speak, the conservatives' disavowal of TJ should go in your opinion. What would you keep, generally speaking, and what would you jettison?

Given that we previous meager contribution to this debate seemed to fall flat, I thought I'd jump in again this time only to direct everyone's attention to a couple of pieces over at The Public Discourse relevant to the discussion we are having here:

http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2011/07/3583

Enjoy!

Thanks for the link, Jeff. No surprise that I like the article I guess. :)

Okay, interesting diversions and tangents all around. Dragging this monster back on track, let's suppose for the sake of argument that another famous truism is not vacuous: "Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely." from Lord Acton. If that is a truthful reflection on how a ruler's power usually plays out, why shouldn't consent of the governed be seen as a hedge against that corruption? Consent functions in this case as a power sharing agreement, the ruler's power is partially limited so that temptation to corrupt behavior is reduced but of course not eliminated. Now obviously there were some events where the people were more corrupt than the ruler and engaged in an illegitimate rebellion (conservative tend to pick the French Revolution, liberals the Civil War). Maybe I just have an odd view of history which Zippy will disabuse me of, but I think the cases of unjust rebellions are very infrequent while the incidences of rulers that become tyrants are very frequent. Given that view, I'm inclined to consider consent to be a greater good, both for the public and for the ruler. So by extension of Zippy's rule that the common good is paramount, consent has a better outcome for everyone and thus has greater legitimacy than alternative arrangements for governance.

Tony: Zippy seems to think that whomever the people select to hold office, that man will either be legitimate because he rules for the common good or he will be illegitimate because he does not.

For many years now, over at my blog and elsewhere, since well before you were a contributor here, you've been telling lies about what I think

That is, itself, a falsehood. I have NEVER knowingly mis-characterized your thinking. In this case, I recognized that I didn't know for sure what you think, that's why I used the word "seems". If I was wrong, it was an error but not a lie. Since a "lie" involves an intention to express something contrary to the truth, and I never had any intention to state something contrary to the truth; and since you knew that the definition of "lie" involves that intention, and since you didn't know my intention, what does that mean about your statement?

It is legitimate in discussion to attribute ideas that are the natural results (or natural predecessors) of things that a person says and thinks to be, themselves, things that the person thinks. Your stated ideas DO have natural consequences, whether you state them or not, whether you take the care to think them THROUGH or not. Attributing such conclusions to you may be erroneous, though: sometimes what _we_ believe is a natural conclusion isn't, sometimes the person fails to think through an idea to its natural conclusion, and sometimes he simply is inconsistent and incoherent. That's why one needs to be tentative in attributing natural conclusions of what a person says to them. That's why using "it appears" or "it seems" is acceptable in attributing conclusions to someone based on things they have said. The fact that you don't seem to recognize reasonable and accepted discussion methods means that the discussions may not be productive, but doesn't mean people are "lying".

I don't think that, by the way. I've already told you several times that I don't have a comprehensive theory of how legitimate political authority develops de novo; just that, as a specific point, its legitimacy does not derive from the consent of the governed in any non-vacuous meaning of "consent".

And in the midst of repeating this ad nauseum, you have refused to permit any kind of further development of discussion toward the notion of legitimacy into any OTHER concept than "deriving legitimacy from the consent of the governed" where you force the meaning of "consent" to be what you mean by the term and nothing else. Your method is to shout over and over "it isn't so" without even attempting to address arguments that propose to show that it IS so, or alternatively that, even if it isn't so simply, but it might be so in a qualified sense, or alternatively that it isn't consent alone but consent alongside other things. You then refuse the to take on the debate on the vacuous grounds that such a topic "should not be discussed", in spite of the fact that YOU YOURSELF started the discussion. If I were to say the things you have said in this thread, I would consider myself to be a hypocrite, because I would see a kind of incoherence in starting a discussion and then saying that conclusions I don't agree with are not merely wrong but pornographic. I don't know what you are, because I cannot see inside your head.

You insist that any other sense of consent than the one TJ claimed at one time is "vacuous" but you make no attempt to prove that it in particulars. Interestingly, some time ago you insisted that the forbidden expression was the false notion that "the just POWERS of government derive from the consent of the governed", here you extend your despotic condemnation to an expression that "legitimacy derives from the consent of the governed." Next, perhaps, will you also condemn the notion that "consent of the governed is inherently connected to the consent of the governed?" Legitimacy is not the same thing as just powers. The phrase that TJ used is not the issue being bandied about in the current debate. Did you notice that difference? Did it matter?

All sorts of things - things which contain partial truths in them - should be avoided by the virtuous.

They should in some contexts. In other contexts, the CORRECT response to partial truth is to complete it. A philosophical debate on politics and the nature of government cannot be pornographic in virtue of its subject matter, and if it were defective in its imperfect truth the correct response would be to show where the partial truth is wrong and bring forth the WHOLE truth.

The reason pornography, i.e. images about sexual matters, cannot be _brought_into_the_light_of_day_ in a corrected manner is that the sexual matter is essentially about an intimate 2-person personal relationship that nobody else can participate in. Extending the relationship to more doesn't share it, it poisons its very nature. Politics (and legitimacy of government in particular), quite the reverse, is PRECISELY about the community that we share in common. The universal philosophic truths that underlie the correct ordering of that community are, more properly than most other truths, exactly COMMON GOODS to be shared as extensive as humanly possible. You are 180 degrees off from the truth in claiming imperfect expressions of truth in this current debate are pornographic. You are, in fact, sullying the very idea of civil discourse in saying what you have said.

If that is a truthful reflection on how a ruler's power usually plays out, why shouldn't consent of the governed be seen as a hedge against that corruption?

Step2, I rarely say this about your comments (we go a long way back, and almost invariably on opposite sides), but: Amen. Very good point, from you and Lord A.

Thanks for the link, Jeff. No surprise that I like the article I guess. :)

Jeff, I too liked the article. Good research.

Tony writes:
[Blah blah blah]

Yeah, whatever.

Step2:
I agree that as a pragmatic hedge, or heuristic of some sort, separation of powers - and requiring consent from multiple and various parties is a form of separation of powers, like missile commanders and launch keys - has value.

I've decided upon reflection and re-reading that I didn't word what I said above strongly enough: It's _completely crazy_ to think, much less say, that Tony is a liar and obfuscator. If his style annoys you, Zippy (as obviously it does), that's all there is to the matter. You've blown this totally out of proportion so that your perception on this point is not in tune with reality, because that's all it is--just a difference of styles and personalities.

We're very lucky to have Tony; I'm proud to be his blog colleague.

Interesting article, Jeff. What I liked about it (while not having enough research myself to evaluate all of its claims) is that he manages to disagree with Locke without sounding shrill, as too many natural law critics of Locke do sound.

Agreed. Nicely expressed step2.

Maybe I just have an odd view of history which Zippy will disabuse me of, but I think the cases of unjust rebellions are very infrequent while the incidences of rulers that become tyrants are very frequent.

I think you're quite right about that. And we know from history that there are many should-have-been rebellions that weren't. I think it has been rightly said that to have a better shot at living a virtuous life, it is wise to err on the side of courage. Rebellion is pretty rare because it takes courage. Human nature is such that people tend to follow authority even when they know the authority has gone bad. Milgram experiments have been done over and over again with the same result. People tend to follow authority even when it means doing wrong. I suppose if God hadn't made humans that way the social order would be very unstable, and this is why it takes a great deal of courage to rebel. But that doesn't mean it is a virtue to follow them either. All of us tell ourselves we would never follow a wicked leader and do wicked things, but we know that if we are a representative sample of the public in the relevant ways, very likely I would say, in fact many of us are probably overestimating ourselves.

Oh and on Milgram, the French have sunk to a new low. How shocking. Well at least they never claim to be culturally superior to us. Oh wait . . .

If that is a truthful reflection on how a ruler's power usually plays out, why shouldn't consent of the governed be seen as a hedge against that corruption? Consent functions in this case as a power sharing agreement, the ruler's power is partially limited so that temptation to corrupt behavior is reduced but of course not eliminated.

Step2, I think that Zippy's critique is probably accurate here: it is indeed possible to establish a governmental form where the exercise of authority is shared between different parties. It may even be that one of the "parties" is the common people, in some fashion. But such a form of shared authority, as exercised, is consent toward the various acts of government, not consent as to the formation of a government to begin with. The latter consent (if it exists and is really responsible for anything) would conceptually precede the form of government in which the governmental authority is shared. The sharing of power would not tend to explain the legitimacy of that government as a whole.

If his style annoys you, Zippy (as obviously it does), that's all there is to the matter.
As far as I can tell, how it works (and how it has worked for years) is this:

Tony gets to tar my writing with whatever he chooses to tar it with. And when I object, it is just me refusing to accept the natural implications of my own stuff. Tony isn't ever smuggling in any of his own presumptions or background theories whatsoever into his inferences.

Whatever you want to call it, is it just outright dishonest misrepresentation.

Bye now y'all. Don't forget to tip your waitresses.

I apologize without qualification for calling into question Tony's honesty.