What’s Wrong with the World

One of the common tropes in arguing over virtually any subject is the notion that if we don't have an alternative theory of our own to the one proposed, we have no grounds to criticize a particular theory.

So for example if we don't have a naturalist alternative to the current prevailing Darwinian theory of origins (whatever it is today), that means we are in no position to criticize that theory.

And if we don't have an alternative comprehensive theory of how the legitimacy of government authority develops, that means we have to accept that it develops under some theory in which it derives from consent.

... In the first case, it is indeed true that "no theory is better than a bad theory". In the second case, it is impossible to have "no theory".

But, we cannot, neither individually nor socially, get on with our lives without making use of some “theory of government”.

That is odd, because I myself don't have a theory of the development of legitimate government authority...

I was under the impression you had stated a preference for the divine right of kings. Is that incorrect?

I am wondering if maybe consent is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a legitimate government. Sure, you pointed out that saints treated monarchies and such as legit but I believe this indicates only that consent can’t be the only thing making a government legit. The common good has to be involved. The ancient saint, obeying and cherishing a government not founded on consent, would only be wrong due to ignorance rather than on moral terms since another type of government wouldn’t be available to him as a ‘live option.’ Now though, we know that it is best for consent to be part of the equation along with the common good.

Another example would be the issue of abortion and Roe v. Wade. Roe imposed a one size fits all permissive abortion policy on a nation where a substantial amount of people opposed such a policy. Abortion is against the common good but this lack of consent makes it worse. California voting to make abortion legal within the state is morally different than the Supreme Court doing the same thing because the first is by consent while the second is not. Still, both acts would be morally reprehensible.

I think this is a good compromise between social-conservative and libertarian intuitions, at least the ones in my mind. I enjoy the blog. It provides lots of fodder for thought.

Usually in the case of origins theory, the criticism runs approximately like this: There is no such thing as a probabilistic _refutation_. Even if what happens is very improbable on theory A, that does not mean that theory A is not the correct explanation of the event. Explanation should be comparative. Now, I have _lots_ to say about this, which would doubtless take the thread off-topic.

But the only point I was going to make here is that a "theory of origins" and "theory of government" aren't quite the same thing, because a "theory of government" is going to be in some respect _normative_ and hence will to some extent be an a priori discussion: analyzing concepts like "legitimacy" and so forth. Whereas a "theory of origins" is in a sense _historical_. It answers a question about what actually happened to bring life about. Conceptual analysis is not really going to help us with it.

Hence, even if something about comparative reasoning is correct concerning origins theories, it wouldn't follow anyway that it is correct about theories of government.

(I say all of that really as an aside. As everyone by now knows, I think consent of those-who-aren't-in-charge has _something_ to do with governmental legitimacy under some not-terribly-farfetched circumstances, and I gather that Zippy definitely disagrees even with this highly watered-down use of "consent" as an important concept in political theory.)

I was under the impression you had stated a preference for the divine right of kings. Is that incorrect?

As far as justification theories go, I think the Divine Right of Kings theories which preceded the Enlightenment are wrong. I'm not sure they can be demonstrated to be wrong quite as pithily as consent theories; at least I haven't come up with a pithy demonstration. (In my defense, I rarely encounter anyone defending them). But I do think they are, like consent theories, and depending upon interpretation, either vacuous or wrong.

Furthermore I am very skeptical of reductionist theories of authority in general: in my view a reductionist theory of authority is like a reductionist theory of tradition or a reductionist theory of consciousness, inasmuch as it is inherently incapable of adequately grasping the subject matter it purports to explain.

We know this because the good is something to which we are obligated to conform our wills, and not vice versa.

Does this proposition not constitute one of the principles that undergirds a political theory (as well as ethics)?

In some contexts, such a proposition would be (rightly, in my view) taken to be an starting point, something to argue from, not something to argue to. But in other contexts, such a proposition would constitute something to be explained, defended, argued for, even proven insofar as it bears on politics.

Zippy, if you are willing to state the above proposition I have quoted above so firmly, I suspect (though I am ready to be corrected) that you are also ready and willing to defend it, provide the ground for it, argue that it belongs in politics, and so on. Would not such a discussion be a discussion about at least a partial political theory, and (since the proposition is yours) a partial political theory of yours? You don't need to have a comprehensive political theory to have a partial one. You appear to have a partial one because you hold that proposition. Is this mistaken?

We know this because the good is something to which we are obligated to conform our wills, and not vice versa. What is good does not derive from what we will.

The way in which good and authority pertains to what we will is NOT simplistic and obvious. If someone in authority gives erroneous orders that you are absolutely certain will defeat the specific good he is trying to achieve, that does not OF ITSELF relieve you of the bindingness of the command. If you must conform yourself to the good, in a simplistic manner, you would simply achieve the good and defy the command. If someone in authority gives a command which will defeat the good intended, our conformity in obedience to his command can gain great merit, and thus a different good results (derives) from our will than the good the command was ordered to, while no such good (being aimed at by the person in authority) derives in actuality from the act you carry out in obedience.

If someone in authority gives a command which will defeat the good intended, our conformity in obedience to his command can gain great merit, and thus a different good results (derives) from our will than the good the command was ordered to, while no such good (being aimed at by the person in authority) derives in actuality from the act you carry out in obedience.

You're thinking of "The Charge of the Light Brigade" type of scenario here, Tony?

Does this proposition not constitute one of the principles that undergirds a political theory (as well as ethics)?

You're thinking of "The Charge of the Light Brigade" type of scenario here, Tony?

No, no, I am thinking of simple, everyday sorts of hi-jinks that those in authority get into all the time, because they don't have all the facts at their disposal. Sometimes their underlings DO have the critical facts, facts that would tell the superior that his command cannot possibly work if only he would take the time to listen. Like "John, put up the volleyball net so your sister can play volleyball." John might know that the net is ruined because he and Bill used it for "fishing" and it got snagged.

Only if every truth or bundle of truths constitutes a theory,

I didn't ask if the truth constitutes a theory , I asked whether it undergirds a theory (not necessarily YOUR theory, just A theory). In addition to holding that some things are false about politics, you also hold that some things are true about politics. Even if those propositions that you hold are not aligned into one, single, all encompassing theory that explains life, the universe and everything, they bear on politics. To be held in the same mind, these propositions - even if disparate in content - cannot be wholly independent of your perspective. If two of those propositions that you hold even bear on the same thing, they start to explain what you think about politics. To be totally and absolutely devoid of a perspective on politics, while you hold several propositions true about politics, is kind of like saying a person who sees doesn't have a perspective.

Does this proposition not constitute one of the principles that undergirds a political theory (as well as ethics)?

Only if every truth or bundle of truths constitutes a theory, and I think that isn't true. Rejecting a theory on the basis that it violates a basic truth isn't the same thing as holding an alternate theory.

But what is the "basic truth" that is being violated? It seems to me that in the context of this entire debate as framed, and certainly the statement "the good is something to which we are obligated to conform our wills, and not vice versa," we are dealing with a metatheory rather than theory. In other words, a theory about a theory. It seems to me the main disagreement has always been one of metatheory, so I don't see how it can be said that a "basic truth" is really being violated. In like manner, the debate between Calvinists and non-Calvinists is at the level of metatheory, since both hold to the same "basic truths" of scripture and ethics.

My second-hand understanding is that Divine Right of Kings was a Protestant concept developed to counter the authority of you know who; so my guess is Zippy takes a dim view of it.

To the topic at hand, we see the insistence for a good theory to replace a bad one from abortionists. That is, I recall a YouTube video of a pro-abortion ad which showed women behind bars for having abotions. When I noted in the comments that making abortion illegal doesn't necessarily involve jail time for the women, they nannered on about the police state it would take to pull it off and kept asking, "How much time should she get?". It was obvious what was going on. For one, they wanted to portray pro-lifers as misogynists who wanted to inflict draconian punishments on women (to which I reply, please put down the bong and your copy of The Handmaid's Tale and back away), and to pretend that abortion is so uniquely problematic that it prohibits us making it illegal. "Where is your comprehensive legal structure for making abortion illegal?" isn't an argument.

We've done the consent thing to death, and this post is really about valid argumentation and theories, not consent theories in particular. But I'll observe that the underling's dilemma revolves around determining the truth about the good: it isn't that his consent or lack thereof determines the authority of his commander. He has the obligation to determine the truth about the good and conform his will to it.

To be totally and absolutely devoid of a perspective on politics, while you hold several propositions true about politics, is kind of like saying a person who sees doesn't have a perspective.

Which sort of goes to the heart of the issue of accuracy in paraphrase, I think.

... they nannered on about the police state it would take to pull it off and kept asking, "How much time should she get?"

We've done the consent thing to death, and this post is really about valid argumentation and theories, not consent theories in particular.

I would have preferred, in that case, that you had not yourself chosen to use consent theory as one of your examples. Why did you choose that particular example?

But at your suggestion I am fine with keeping consent in the background instead of the foreground.

The difference between "I don't have a specific theory of how legitimacy arises in political authority: in fact I doubt it can be captured by a reductive theory" and "I am absolutely devoid of a perspective on politics" is, as the saying goes, nontrivial.

Perhaps I was not making myself clear. I was not trying to say that you must have a theory of how legitimacy arises in political authority BECAUSE you have political perspectives. I was suggesting that, for the purposes of the discussion, you do have political perspectives. That's all. Didn't mean to imply further than that. If I am wrong even so far as that, please correct me.

Perhaps I was not making myself clear. I was not trying to say that you must have a theory of how legitimacy arises in political authority BECAUSE you have political perspectives. I was suggesting that, for the purposes of the discussion, you do have political perspectives. That's all. Didn't mean to imply further than that. If I am wrong even so far as that, please correct me.

Seriously?

Because from my perspective, this is the part where you say: "Gee Zippy, you have a point. It must be maddening to have a particular person grossly mis-paraphrase you repeatedly for years across multiple blogs, causing you endless tedium of corrective work. I'll try not to do it again."

it isn't that his consent or lack thereof determines the authority of his commander.

We already established in one of the past threads that no reasonable person believes this about consent.

Which sort of goes to the heart of the issue of accuracy in paraphrase, I think.

I think a paraphrase of this would not be pretty.

But I'll observe that the underling's dilemma revolves around determining the truth about the good: it isn't that his consent or lack thereof determines the authority of his commander. He has the obligation to determine the truth about the good and conform his will to it.

In many concrete instances, this is obviously true. Like, "Will it be more for the service of the good that I should obey this asinine command and get myself killed in battle or that I should refuse and undemine my commander's authority over others?" Or, "Will it be more for the service of the good that I should submit to and fill out this unjustly intrusive 'census' form in the name of obeying those in authority over me or that I should fight this law by civil disobedience and a legal battle?" And so forth.

That's clearly true in cases of individual people deciding whether or not to defy individual commands.

In fact, it is almost certainly also true (even if revolution is ever permissible) of deciding whether or not to start a revolution--along the lines of just war theory. Hope of success and all that, for example, which are themselves non-trivially oriented towards the common good.

It doesn't actually follow from that though that there are no plausible situations in which authority comes to be in a new government where the initial consent of the people plays a non-trivial role in bringing about the initial authoritative nature of that government in a way that cannot be reductively explained away by reference to the common good.

Which we've also in a sense "done to death," but it seems to me that there probably _are_ such situations, and I gather that your position, Zippy, is that there definitely are _no_ such situations. You don't have to have a comprehensive theory of legitimacy in government just to get as far as that somewhat interesting disagreement, and your point about the underling, the commander, and the orders does not decide it.

Seriously?

Hmmm. Was I serious? Yes, actually, I was. I was serious in that I was just trying to make the point that you have political perspectives. I would like to build toward a further point IF that initial point is true, but if it is not true then there is no further discussion about it.

"Gee Zippy, you have a point. It must be maddening to have a particular person mis-paraphrase you repeatedly for years across multiple blogs, causing you endless tedium of corrective work. I'll try not to do it again."

A recent commenter, I think it was Mark (correct me if I am wrong, Mark) suggested that a very large part of the WHOLE POINT of these discussions is to re-phase and re-cast and re-package someone's point to the best of your ability see if (a) whether you really do understand it, (b) to draw out of their point the underlying (sometimes hidden) assumptions or implicit conclusions, and (c) see if the person agrees with that re-packaging. And, conversely, the work involves responding to such a rephrasing of your own thought with corrections, clarifications, agreements (partial or full) and other improvements in the other's rephrasing. That's how we work to an eventual statement that both parties can be satisfied with, and then you have made progress. If the only possible form of progress was the other person saying right off the bat "Gee, you're right and I have been wrong for 20 years", there would be even less achievement of agreed points of view than there are now.

If you don't think that's an acceptable mode of proceeding, please let me know.

Okay. If you won't man up, I have to conclude that I simply can't talk to you.

Look Tony, some advice. You and zippy aren't talking to each other. If he sees it that way that's his problem. If you two talk without us listening in you are talking to each other. The nature of public debate is that every one here is speaking to all. If someone puts their opinion out in an intentionally public fashion, and you are able to comment on it, then it doesn't matter if they claim to refuse to talk to you. Just ignore it. The public decides if they needed to respond or not, and if you've undermined their argument or not. It makes no difference whatever if they've determined not to "talk to you." When you comment on what a person writes publicly, you are not talking to that person. You are speaking publicly to us all.

So my advice is never to take the bait when someone publicly says "I'm not talking to you anymore." It's childish, but more important to understand is that is some sort of category error, it makes no difference whatever technically, and I wouldn't take it personally if I were you. It need not hinder you.

Zippy, please. Stop. Just stop. There was nothing whatsoever wrong about Tony's asking you, "Well, okay, if that's your perspective, then doesn't this mean that you hold a proposition which would underlie a partial political theory?" As, for example,

I didn't ask if the truth constitutes a theory , I asked whether it undergirds a theory (not necessarily YOUR theory, just A theory). In addition to holding that some things are false about politics, you also hold that some things are true about politics. Even if those propositions that you hold are not aligned into one, single, all encompassing theory that explains life, the universe and everything, they bear on politics.

and

Would not such a discussion be a discussion about at least a partial political theory, and (since the proposition is yours) a partial political theory of yours? You don't need to have a comprehensive political theory to have a partial one. You appear to have a partial one because you hold that proposition. Is this mistaken?

And all qualified every other breath and every other sentence with, "Please correct me if I'm wrong."

For crying out loud, those aren't even _any_ paraphrase, much less a _mis_paraphrase. They are just an attempt to have an interesting discussion about your own claims!!! And a very courteous attempt, too. That's what we _do_ on blogs. That's good blogging practice and makes for interesting and potentially profitable discussion.

Please, stop all of this, Zippy. And if that request isn't straightforward enough and direct enough and honest enough for you, I don't know what is.

Perhaps we've been going about this the hard way. We're looking at grand theories to try to prove fairly weak claims, and that gets us way off track. Maybe another tack is in order.

It seems to me it is uncontroversial to think that a lack of consent constitutes coercion. Most adult (and adult to non-parental minor) non-consensual relationships are illegal because they are assumed to be coercive.

So if the idea that consent in the citizenry to be governed in any way relates to the legitimacy of the government is too strong to countenance, I guess the question those who hold this view is whether or how much coercion of law-abiding citizens can be justified before the legitimacy of government comes into question? It seems to me that puts the matter we're interested in a better light by stripping away various meta-theoretical baggage that keeps creeping in.

Are we wrong to think lack of consent in adult relationships necessarily entails coercion? Are we wrong to think of coercion as inherently bad in normal circumstances? Or is the relation of citizen to government wholly other and exempt from what coercion normally entails?

You guys and your theories... Speaking as a theorist, I have to say that it is not necessarily better to have no theory than a bad theory, if the bad theory is either completely wrong or partially right. For instance, the theory that gasoline will put out a fire is empirically wrong, but still a useful theory even in it's wrongness, because it is still a theory, just with a different antecedent - knowing what will promote a fire implies a theory of fire potentially. There is no such thing as a bad result, just results not pertinent. If the theory is right, some of the time, the it can be used to find out why it fails.

The reason theories do not work well in politics is that it is very hard to design experiments to rigorously test the theories. It has yet to be done, in practice, because of ethical considerations. This is the fortieth anniversary of Zimbardo's Stanford Prison Experiment, which is about as close as we have come to making politics into a real science and that experiment will hardly be reproduced. Thus, one is left to draw on only a partially understood history, which is a poor substitute.

Doing theory is hard and doing political theory takes extraordinary courage. No wonder the mad dreams of politicians so rarely succeed.

The Chicken

You guys and your theories...

MC: Well that is why the claims here are so very modest. Whether consent has something to do with legitimacy or not. One side says consent has something to do with legitimacy in some way, the other, so far as I can tell, that it doesn't or at least is dangerous to think so. That's very stark. How much political theorizing does it take to argue that chasm? That was the point of my previous comment. Not very darn much, if any. No more than is required in the type of discussion we're having now in the thread "On Being Ladies and Gentlemen." People feel entirely confident that they can make moral judgements on these matters. I've already said that it seems quite clear that zippy's problem with consent is on meta-theoretical grounds, and not about "basic truths." So let's not get carried away here with skepticism of all things preceded by "political", no matter how basic, lest in doing so we cast doubt upon making moral judgments in general.