What’s Wrong with the World

That's a great post by Esolen -- on a great essay by Lydia. Greatness abounds!

Incidentally, the good professor's one mistake is to call The Christendom Review a blog.

Lydia:

Your essay is very, very good.

It's interesting that for Audi resentment is considered to be some sort of a virtue. But isn't it the case that sometimes people who resent coercion do so because they are immature, close-minded, and/or selfish? On the other hand, some people resent coercion because they are in fact being treated unjustly. Thus, there does not seem to be any way to assess the appropriateness of coercion without delving into the specific nature of the coercion. It seems to make a difference if the coercion is forbidding abortion or censoring literature.

Again, very nice work.

Frank

Yes, the term "understandably" is doing a lot of pseudo-philosophical work (in a phrase like "understandably resent") in Audi's writing, I find. It's very odd. I mean, _I_ don't think somebody's resentment is "understandable" if he resents not being allowed to have his child torn to pieces, solely because he suspects that the motivation some had for voting for a law prohibiting it was religious. That's just...bizarre. And calling his resentment "understandable" is hardly a substitute for an argument!

Thanks, guys!

My "public square" principle is very simple: good public discourse stems from political/social arguments that are aimed at engaging those with whom we disagree, rather than simply marginalizing them. As it pertains to religious people, it means that you should make arguments that do not depend on the hearer being a member of your in-group; i.e., that appeals to scripture, for example, are not good public discourse.

Thus, "you should vote for proposition 8 because homosexual marriage will create an environment in which we are all less free to raise our kids as we see fit," is a good argument (though, of course, I disagree with it strongly). On the other hand, "you should vote for proposition 8 because Leviticus declares homosexuality an abomination" is bad public discourse.

This holds true in reverse. Lydia, if you were to come to an atheist happy hour or the equivalent, I'd feel obligated to make my arguments in terms that were accessible to ordinary human reason, and not simply denigrate religion on the basis that the majority of people at that happy hour would understand and agree.

I realize this is not the subject of your article, but do you disagree with this principle?

Andrew, I think whether I agree a with principle of "speaking to your audience" or not depends on what we view ourselves as doing when we engage in "public discourse." I think one wrong principle is that whenever we engage in anything that could be called "public discourse" we are _by that very fact_ talking to every possible person within the sound of our voice (our cybervoice or otherwise). Now, just to begin with, I don't agree with this. I can write a blog post whose implicit audience is what you would probably call "in-group members." Moreover, when I'm trying to (say) gather signatures for a political petition, it's perfectly legitimate for me to send out an open letter intended to rouse the troops, as it were, from what you would probably call my "in-group," telling them what this petition is about in terms that "out-group" members would reject. That's perfectly okay. We have no duty (as one of the people I was answering in my article thinks we have) to restrain our advocacy of public policy in such a way that we never appeal to an argument that someone *who might be affected by the policy* would not accept--because, say, that argument is "religious" in some sense. So "We should vote for Prop. 8 because Romans 1 says that homosexual behavior is contrary to nature" is perfectly good public discourse, depending on how you define 'public discourse'.

A relevant point here is that a lot of times I know perfectly well that an atheist is unlikely to be moved by _anything_ I say on some policy point, whether he should be so moved or not, so I might as well spend my time more profitably rousing the base, as it were. It would be profitless and counterproductive, as well as creepy, carefully to neuter my statements of any religious references in order to try to appeal to a hypothetical atheist audience, and all the more so if I know quite well as an empirical matter that it isn't going to help.

Finally, I think it's relevant for me to say in so many words that I think the wrongness of many particular acts is directly accessible to reason as an a priori matter--murdering innocent children, for example--and that often when we start talking about providing _arguments_ accessible to secular reason we tie ourselves up _automatically_ in talking about consequences or slippery slopes or whatever. That is to say, we slip unnoticed from "we have to give arguments accessible to secular reason" to "deontological statements that such-and-such is absolutely wrong aside from consequences are out of bounds." A good example might be suicide. I think the wrongness of suicide as self murder is an a priori truth. When we start telling ourselves that we have to argue with secularists that suicide should not be legally permitted and doing so on grounds that they will accept, we often think that means we have to start talking about the absence of meaningful "safeguards," about possible coercion of the elderly, and so forth. Now, I'm not saying that those are not relevant points to make. But I am saying that they are in a sense side points, because even if everybody who ever committed suicide under a PAS permit did so with no coercion, it would still be a horribly wrong thing for us to have going on in society. I believe that *in principle* a non-Christian can see this just directly, by the natural light, once he gets notions like "innocence," "murder," and so forth. But often he won't. And I think it is a mistake to start making all our arguments while _skipping over_ the fact that suicide is _wrong_. We end up moving immediately past even the badness of the policy in question to the possible badness of its consequences or even of other policies that are likely to follow.

After reading this article, I was struck with the sudden desire to buy Dr. McGrew a pint of beer. This is truly a manly article. And if I am to suffer reproach for my sexism by calling a piece of philosophical work performed by a woman 'manly,' I will be forced to call to my defense none other than the self-same author of that very article, Lydia McGrew. For here is the ultimate sentence of her piece:

Rather than cherishing a subjective and poorly-grounded set of religious beliefs and abandoning the body politic to its own devices, we should stand up like men and follow after truth with all our might.

In this one sentence, Dr. McGrew has struck a mortal blow to the laughable and tragic project of language gender neutralization (among other evils to which she has stricken a sore blow). Our language is not gender neutral (for very good reason, having something to do with the truth of things) and the attempt to make it so simply renders it, well...neutered.

Bravo.

I should add that the italic emphasis in Lydia's quote is mine.

Andrew T. makes a good point here:

My "public square" principle is very simple: good public discourse stems from political/social arguments that are aimed at engaging those with whom we disagree, rather than simply marginalizing them. As it pertains to religious people, it means that you should make arguments that do not depend on the hearer being a member of your in-group; i.e., that appeals to scripture, for example, are not good public discourse.

That is, counter-productive to their intended purpose, one is effectively excluding members of the public they sought to convince in the first place should that very person utilize premises in their arguments that such members in the audience not only disagree with, for instance, but also seem ostensibly geared only those of a certain religious affiliation.

When the latter, it is no longer the public that person is addresssing or attempting to convince. By the very act, this person has alienated entire sections of the public they sought to address & convince (if that was their purpose) as the message seems tailored more towards a specific minority of the public.

If I might be so bold to offer an example, if a presidential candidate were to cite a sura from the Quran as a premise for one of his arguments; would I or any of you in the public hearing these arguments actually be convinced?

Am I wrong to assume that none here who happen to claim to be Christian would not be so convinced of an argument that revolved around specific passages from the Quran?

I think not and I believe I do so safely.

Aw, thanks, Byronic. I take that very kindly. In fact, analytic philosophy _is_ manly, and that's one of the reasons I like it. And down with gender neutral language forever and ever! :-) (But I'm afraid I have to confess that I don't drink beer.)

Aristocles, I would take it that a person who cited a sura of the Koran was indeed appealing to people who accept the Koran. But at that point, you know, one should ask if there is good reason to accept the Koran. There isn't, so there you go. In other words, it isn't like we can just say, "Oh, that's religious, so you shouldn't talk about it." (Full stop.) See, truth matters, and evidence matters. Islam is both false and poorly grounded. I don't want sharia introduced because sharia is based on a religion that *I can tell is false* (and also horrible), not per se because anything that has any connection to religion is somehow out of bounds in public discourse.

Lydia,

My point is that we fail to convince the public when we start premising our arguments on things they would consider untrue -- similar to how you would likewise consider any such argument premised on the Quran (as would I) invalid.

In fact, analytic philosophy _is_ manly, and that's one of the reasons I like it.

Well, you know the flip side of that coin is that you just read like a sensible mom, who, with her daily responsibilities of running a household, simply hasn't the time or inclination for fuzzy thinking and nonsense. Just give me the straight poop. And that is femininity par excellence.

Addendum: Your stance in the article, properly understood, displays a thoroughly catholic (small 'c') sensibility.

(But I'm afraid I have to confess that I don't drink beer.)

A pint for the other Dr. McGrew then (surely he'll have one), for knowing when to say when, if you get my meaning.

Thanks again, Byronic. Interesting point about the "straight poop." The other Dr. McGrew doesn't drink beer either but does drink port occasionally. :-)

Aristocles, my point is that "the public" is not some univocal "they." If it were, there would be no such thing as a culture war. But it isn't, so there is.

Certainly there are tactical questions here. Suppose your state has a ballot initiative in the works that would make assisted suicide legal. Is it a good idea to run ads talking about pressure, exploitation, lack of oversight, etc.? It may be good from a tactical perspective. But then again, sometimes that doesn't work. My own state recently (to my great sadness) passed a ballot initiative rejecting all possible state regulation of the embryonic stem-cell industry and making such freedom from regulation part of the state constitution! The "no" campaign slogan was "2 goes 2 far." To my mind, it laid too much emphasis on the probable waste of taxpayer dollars for this "research" and too little emphasis on the fact that we are making it impossible for our state legislators to outlaw the dissection of small human beings. In any event, it failed, so pragmatism doesn't always work.

But let's admit that these are tactical questions, not questions of principle. The secularist wants to put in place a _principle_ that it is illicit for the conservative to use premises that those who disagree with him on some given political issue wouldn't accept. That's a lousy principle, and it can't be supported by any good argument. It also, in my opinion, is often poor tactics.

I second Byronicman! Perhaps I can treat you to a good cup of tea if you come this way sometime, Lydia!

Lydia,

To my mind, it laid too much emphasis on the probable waste of taxpayer dollars for this "research" and too little emphasis on the fact that we are making it impossible for our state legislators to outlaw the dissection of small human beings.

The latter reflects somewhat the difficulty I have when arguing about such things.

You and I rightly consider these "human beings"; however, this is something that is not accepted by the secularly minded. The fact is, these folks to whom I am referring to do not at all consider these as human beings but rather an aggregate of biological materials and nothing more.

To start on the onset with this premise ultimately leads to a failed argument -- much like how you (as do I) view arguments made by the secularist (that which revolves around that principle we consider infamously lousy) would fail as well because of our own views & principle.

While it is a virtue in argumentation to begin with premises that you know your interlocutor will accept, this is not at all the same thing as saying that we must only argue on premises that our interlocutors do, in fact, accept. This may not always be possible. To say so is to water down any argument, ultimately, to the lowest common denominator, which will necessarily preclude arguments from very good premises. If a virtue ethicist (VE) is arguing with a pure consequentialist, by this rule the VE can't argue as a VE. She (notice gender-sensitive pronoun) has to argue as a consequentialist as well, since consequentialist arguments are all the consequentialist will accept. As Lydia might say, that is just wrong. The whole point of being a VE is that one thinks VE is superior to consequentialism. I just as well might demand that the consequentialist to argue as a VE. In fact, one of the primary goals of the VE's argument would be to make the case that virtue ethics is a better ethics than conseqentialism. I want to convince the consequentialist that he's not just wrong in his conclusions, he's wrong in his consequentialism.

I think the idea we are searching for here is 'publicly available.' A VE believes that there exist publicly available truths which can be used as premises in ethical arguments. Some of these are what Lydia has called 'a priori.' Such truths are just as available to the consequentialist as they are to the VE, whether or not the consequentialist thinks so. In such an argument, one may indeed arrive at a fundamental impasse. But how many times have Christians engaged in arguments with secularists only to hear, very early on in the conversation, the charge, "I know you are a Christian and I know where you are going with all of this. I don't accept your religion, and so I refuse your argument," or some such thing. That's just barbarism, plain and simple. So,

Am I wrong to assume that none here who happen to claim to be Christian would not be so convinced of an argument that revolved around specific passages from the Quran?

Whether or not a person has a belief based on what the Koran tells him is not relevant to me, as long as the argument is good. If it's a good argument, I don't care if he believes it because LGM's from Mars told him. It's just a good argument. Period. Now, if he says, "You should believe this because the Koran says so," full stop, then that's another matter. If I'm not Muslim, that won't be convincing to me. But because I believe the world is intelligible, I believe that any truth about the world can be known by rational beings. (That is a public truth, but not everyone believes it! I might have to argue vigorously for it). Excluding things that are by nature matters of divine revelation, e.g. the doctrine of the Trinity, any "religious truth," if it is in fact a truth, is also a public truth. "Thou shalt not kill" is not a truth epistemically restricted to Jews and Christians.

So that's just what it means to be rational--to be able to know truths. Whether these truths are in the nature of first principles or conclusions arrived at discursively, anyone can, in principle, have access to them. Public discourse is the meeting place of rational minds.

My point is that we fail to convince the public when we start premising our arguments on things they would consider untrue -- similar to how you would likewise consider any such argument premised on the Quran (as would I) invalid.

Not necessarily. The problem I see here is that there are many who simply think things untrue that are in fact true. The goal, again, is to convince them that they are wrong. Otherwise, I'm just conceding from the outset. If we follow this out, we have made consequentialism the only viable structure for the discussion of public policy, since CSQ, not VE is the LCD, ISTM, IMHO. And thus, Audi wins. Because I can simply say, "well I don't accept that" full stop. Should that assertion alone be enough to disqualify the line of argumentation? I don't see how it can be. That puts an inordinate power into the hands of a person whose only way to argue is to invoke categorical denial, ala Python's Argument Sketch. If you deny a premise, you have to be able to justify it on rational grounds.

So what we are ultimately fighting over is the mode of discourse which is to be preeminent in our public life, since without a public
way of thinking, there won't be any public thinking. Period. The idea that we must work from publicly available truths is a catholic principle, and the consequentialists and radical secularists want to try and turn this around against the Christian. It's not simply that I disagree with them. I say they are being irrational. And you can't insist that irrationality is the public common denominator, since if it is, we are truly in trouble.

But I'm afraid I have to confess that I don't drink beer.

Well, a highland single malt, then!

I teach the rhetoric of argument to college freshman every year. This whole problem of what one's audience will be persuaded by informs a lot of our conversation. I point out to them that "the Bible says so" *by itself* is solely convincing to those who believe the Bible, and so is limited in its appeal to a Christian (and perhaps Jewish, depending on the particular argument) audience. But I also challenge them to look for ways to argue from Biblical principles even when they aren't specifically invoking the Scriptures. I have heard Christians argue that one can only argue on a pragmatic basis (say, with the woman who is considering an abortion) because that is all today's audience is swayed by. But while I think it is fine to make the pragmatic arguments, I also know that a decision made solely on that basis will never become a firm conviction and so will always be up for reconsideration on the same basis. And it can't lead one to understand how to make other good decisions. Only arguments from principle lead to conviction and guide beyond the immediately obvious consequences -- and that's what we want for people.

So I think it's vitally important, as shared common values lessen day by day, that believers learn how to make arguments from principles and not just roll over and play dead because so few people "believe the Bible." But I warn my students that this may pretty often mean they have to back up from the immediate argument about, say, a policy decision, to clarify their principles and make the case that these are to be accepted. If someone doesn't believe an embryo is a child, then it's up to us to try to make the argument convincingly, even if it's hard and seems like it should already be obvious. It certainly makes argument more difficult without shared values -- but we'd better be making the values arguments or we shall certainly (continue to) lose all the rest of them.

Not especially eloquent, the above, but I am being threatened with the theft of my barbecue ribs if I don't get to the dinner table . . .

thebyronicman & Beth: Thanks so much for your comments!
Oh yeah, Go Get Your BBQ Ribs (and Save Some for Me)!

You and I rightly consider these "human beings"; however, this is something that is not accepted by the secularly minded. The fact is, these folks to whom I am referring to do not at all consider these as human beings but rather an aggregate of biological materials and nothing more.

Aristocles, if you think it is a religious statement to say that a human embryo is a human being, you are very wrong. That a human embryo is a member of the species homo sapiens at an early point of development can be argued for biologically just as it can be argued for biologically that a tadpole is a frog at an early point of development and so forth. The phrase "human being" is not some sort of mystical, arational phrase that can only be seen to apply to some given biological entity by way of special revelation! And the biological arguments have been made again and again and again, as you well know. Indeed, there actually are pro-choicers and pro-ESCR folks who would admit that the embryo is a human being but would simply try to shift the goal by invoking personhood theory and arguing that there can be members of the human species who aren't persons because they lack some level of awareness, etc. But there _they_ are the ones going ideological and away from plain scientific fact. All this is ground that has been hashed over time and time again.

Aristocles, you will never get me to admit some sort of fideism or epistemic relativism here. In some cases the problem is that you think particular statements (as in the above example) are religious when they aren't. In other cases, the problem may be that you actually think religious statements must be accepted without or against evidence (we have been over this before in other threads). But you're wrong on both counts.

Beth, you are quite right about principles. And I think these principles _are_ in principle accessible to non-religious people--for example, that it is wrong to kill innocent human beings, that unborn children are innocent human beings, etc.

Where the trouble comes in (or one place where it comes in) is as you say where we abandon those sorts of arguments that are in principle accessible to the non-Christian and go instead for purely consequential arguments--abortion is wrong because it can cause breast cancer, for example. This isn't a bad thing to say. It's just a bad idea to say it as if that's what the whole ball of wax is about, when obviously that isn't the most important point by a long shot. Another place where the problem comes in is where Christians abandon certain portions of the political sphere altogether--usually the most controversial parts--because they are worried that they are violating some sort of principle in engaging those areas given that their own strongest convictions there arise *in some sense* from their Christian commitment. A third problem arises when we feel inhibited even from speaking among ourselves using religious categories when we are telling fellow Christians about why they should get involved with some issue or take a particular position.

Lydia,

Aristocles, if you think it is a religious statement to say that a human embryo is a human being, you are very wrong....

Aristocles, you will never get me to admit some sort of fideism or epistemic relativism here. In some cases the problem is that you think particular statements (as in the above example) are religious when they aren't. In other cases, the problem may be that you actually think religious statements must be accepted without or against evidence (we have been over this before in other threads). But you're wrong on both counts.

Everything you've stated in your most recent comments are based on an incredibly egregious misinterpretation of my comments.

The errors are far too replete & conspicuously wild that I have no idea where to begin and, given the tone of your comments, would seem all too futile to even address.

Indeed, there actually are pro-choicers and pro-ESCR folks who would admit that the embryo is a human being but would simply try to shift the goal by invoking personhood theory and arguing that there can be members of the human species who aren't persons because they lack some level of awareness, etc.

Camille Paglia: http://www.salon.com/opinion/paglia/2008/09/10/palin/index3.html

But the pro-life position, whether or not it is based on religious orthodoxy, is more ethically highly evolved than my own tenet of unconstrained access to abortion on demand. My argument (as in my first book, "Sexual Personae,") has always been that nature has a master plan pushing every species toward procreation and that it is our right and even obligation as rational human beings to defy nature's fascism. Nature herself is a mass murderer, making casual, cruel experiments and condemning 10,000 to die so that one more fit will live and thrive.

Hence I have always frankly admitted that abortion is murder, the extermination of the powerless by the powerful. Liberals for the most part have shrunk from facing the ethical consequences of their embrace of abortion, which results in the annihilation of concrete individuals and not just clumps of insensate tissue. The state in my view has no authority whatever to intervene in the biological processes of any woman's body, which nature has implanted there before birth and hence before that woman's entrance into society and citizenship.

On the other hand, I support the death penalty for atrocious crimes (such as rape-murder or the murder of children). I have never understood the standard Democratic combo of support for abortion and yet opposition to the death penalty. Surely it is the guilty rather than the innocent who deserve execution?

What I am getting at here is that not until the Democratic Party stringently reexamines its own implicit assumptions and rhetorical formulas will it be able to deal effectively with the enduring and now escalating challenge from the pro-life right wing. Because pro-choice Democrats have been arguing from cold expedience, they have thus far been unable to make an effective ethical case for the right to abortion.

thebyronicman,

There was nothing in my comments to Lydia that even implied that arguing embryos as human beings was a religious argument. Moreover, the secularly-minded folks I addressed in my comments who denied such a notion and even went as far as considering them merely as aggregate of biological materials and nothing more are, specifically, those people who I've encountered.

Furthermore, in those comments of mine, I was attempting to point out the eventual failure of an argument (as far as convincing the target individuals) based on such a premise that the other party does not actually accept.

As for the other stuff Lydia has accused me of attempting to do & whatever else, go figure.

(Although, I do have to say I am quite thankful for the elaborate nature of your own comments in reply to mine; those were indeed helpful.)

Lydia,

"To my mind, it laid too much emphasis on the probable waste of taxpayer dollars for this "research" and too little emphasis on the fact that we are making it impossible for our state legislators to outlaw the dissection of small human beings."

The latter reflects somewhat the difficulty I have when arguing about such things.

You and I rightly consider these "human beings"; however, this is something that is not accepted by the secularly minded. The fact is, these folks to whom I am referring to do not at all consider these as human beings but rather an aggregate of biological materials and nothing more.

To start on the onset with this premise ultimately leads to a failed argument -- much like how you (as do I) view arguments made by the secularist (that which revolves around that principle we consider infamously lousy) would fail as well because of our own views & principle.

Aristocles, I'm going in part on some of our past exchanges. I'm glad in one sense if I've misunderstood you, actually. But you did certainly right here seem to be saying that calling embryos human beings is making an assumption that secularists won't accept. This could be taken either as a simple prediction: "Most secularists will in fact try to say that an embryo is not a human being." I took it that you meant it somewhat more strongly, "One needs to be a non-secularist to see that an embryo is a human being."

Lydia wrote: "Another place where the problem comes in is where Christians abandon certain portions of the political sphere altogether--usually the most controversial parts--because they are worried that they are violating some sort of principle in engaging those areas given that their own strongest convictions there arise *in some sense* from their Christian commitment. A third problem arises when we feel inhibited even from speaking among ourselves using religious categories when we are telling fellow Christians about why they should get involved with some issue or take a particular position."

I see these concerns all the time in my students (along with the opposite extreme, where they seem to have been so sheltered that they really don't realize you can't just quote a verse from the Bible as the sole evidence for everything, no matter the context . . .) . It's hard to address, especially in the single semester we have with so many of them. And I'm personally not great at teaching it because this kind of writing is not my own strength and interest. We rightly criticize much of the educational establishment for failing to even allow truth into the mix (most of my students are excellent practical relativists, even though 90% or more are professing Christians) -- so I know that I and my colleagues around the country in various educational venues deeply appreciate the prayers and the work of believers who can help us do our work more effectively. While a lot of the discourse at WWWtW is over my students' heads (we won't talk about how much is over *mine*!), I glean so much here from you and the other posters and commenters that helps me in thinking through and articulating the principles I try to teach. So thanks to all of you for fighting the good fight as you've been called to. It makes such a difference and is such an encouragement.

Furthermore, in those comments of mine, I was attempting to point out the eventual failure of an argument (as far as convincing the target individuals) based on such a premise that the other party does not actually accept.

On this point you are undoubtedly correct. This is part of the problem. If we all, or most all, accepted the same general premises about, say, the inherent dignity of human life, then we could have productive public arguments. As it stands, we cannot have such arguments because we don't all share the same first principles (that is to say, we could make headway with some people, but not everyone). My argument, and I believe Lydia's as well, is that this must not stop Christians from arguing from their own first principles as best they can. When I make the statement "human life has inherent dignity," a public intellectual such as, say, Steven Pinker, will hold that the term 'dignity' is "fungible" and does not do any philosophical-ethical work. He will hem and haw and produce high sounding arguments, but in the end he just doesn't think the term 'dignity' carries sufficient meaning to warrant usage in debate on ethical questions--or so he argues. And I'd warrant that no term a Christian or pro-life person could employ that wouldn't deface the pro-life argument would be acceptable to Mr. Pinker. What are we to do, in this case? Mr. Pinker and his sort will simply not be satisfied until we agree with him, or at least agree to stand down. Their commitment is to ideology, not to reason. And we can neither agree nor stand down, since our commitment is to reason. Much of what we face here is not a failure of our own argumentation, but simply a dedicated resistance to our conclusions. There is simply no argument that I could make, even on pragmatic, consequentialist grounds, that will convince some people of the moral criminality of abortion. I could argue from psychology, sociology, economics, evolution (SEE Paglia above)--it wouldn't matter. Let abortion be legal, should the Heavens fall. Nothing can contravene the doctrine of radical human freedom.

Our commitment, I hold, must be to human life in its real totality, which means our commitment must be to reason. It's not simply a matter of saving babies. It's also a matter of defending reason. This is a battle over what it means to be human. And as I think Lydia points out, ironically and perhaps paradoxically, the Christian argument is also the most pragmatic--in the end it has the greatest chance of success, since to give in to consequentialism, even in a functional way, is to establish our conclusions on philosophically shaky ground, where it cannot ultimately stand. It would be a betrayal of what we know to be true.

I think Byronicman is showing, quite rightly, that there are people who shouldn't be our target individuals, because we will simply be wasting our time. When I advocate a particular social policy, Peter Singer is not my target audience.

But I'm afraid I have to confess that I don't drink beer.

A lamentable defect. Even those you most admire end up disappointing in some fashion.

On the other hand, a commenter at Touchstone says: "Oh my goodness, what an elegant mind this woman has. Slices and dices like a sushi artist and serves it up nice on the plate."

I guess that's more important than a taste for beer, but not by much.

Peter Singer is not my target audience.

Right. If you went in to do battle with Singer (which I'd love to watch, btw) your target wouldn't be Singer, but Singer's dupes.

"Oh my goodness, what an elegant mind this woman has. Slices and dices like a sushi artist and serves it up nice on the plate."

I guess that's more important than a taste for beer, but not by much.

Best to chase sushi with Kirin.

Peter Singer is not my target audience.

Perhaps not that specific individual, but this does not mean that those who we wish to convince do not carry similar opinions as his.

To this latter point, isn't our primary purpose in all this to convince those who hold contrary views opposed to our own in view of the Pro-Life cause? Or is it merely to serve as some sort of moral booster for those who already agree with us?

If the former, than we must shape our argument on some point of commonality that the opposing party would find acceptable; however, this doesn't necessarily mean that it be a commonality that is espoused exclusively by the antagonist (i.e., with respect to thebyronicman's subject comments, one need not argue from a consequentialist perspective but rather from a point of value and/or principle that is mutually shared by both the Christian & that individual(s)).

If we don't, if we merely start spouting of, say, passages from Scripture; no matter how true those passages may very well be outside the context of Christianity itself; because they are coming from a source found unacceptable by or even offensive to that other party, they will simply refuse to listen to your arguments no matter how sound.

I believe there is a blatant disregard to the human component of an argument here if we are approaching things from merely a logical perspective which would inevitably lead to failure in achieveing our very purpose in all this; i.e., to convince the other party of the truth that is the Pro-Life view.

Aristocles, I very much doubt the existence of any non-consequentialist fundamental and important principle that I share with someone who is of Peter Singer's mind on matters of domestic policy. You don't seem to get it, here. Sure, we can argue from, say, the value of human life. But when we're talking about people who don't think unborn children are human, that doesn't get us very far, does it? And when we're talking about someone like Singer who _explicitly_ holds that the value of humans and animals is interchangeable depending on their level of consciousness, guess what? There is no common ground. This isn't a matter of spouting Bible verses. This is a matter of dealing with people who have ripped out the motherboard of their ethical system. So, no, I'm not trying to convince such people when I advance public policy proposals. If one of them specifically _came_ to me and said he was reconsidering, I'd try to find some way to talk to him. But the only arguments I can just put "out there" for hypothetical people who think that plenty of humans aren't persons and that plenty of humans aren't even humans, arguments which might get them to go with me pragmatically, _would be_ utilitarian arguments.

Please note that the Bible has nothing to say, per se, about embryonic stem-cell research! Nobody is advocating quoting Bible verses against embryonic stem-cell research. However, it is pointless to talk vaguely about finding "common ground" with people who think an embryo is merely a bunch of cells. If they are willing to listen to biological arguments, we might be able to get somewhere. But if they've already heard them and brushed them off, then my job is to rouse people who know better, even _somewhat better_, people who at least feel _uncomfortable_ about cannibalizing embryos for research, to oppose such people at the polls.

And I could say the same mutatis mutandis regarding post-implantation abortion. If a pro-abort is willing to look at pictures of unborn babies, for example, to consider the evidence that this is a baby, then maybe he'll change his mind. No Scripture verses required. (And, again, the Bible doesn't say anything per se about abortion anyway, so that's a red herring.) If we're talking about a _committed_ pro-abort who has already hardened his heart to the humanity of the unborn child, then, no, my goal in advancing public policy proposals is not to try to argue with him, because he's already considered and rejected the arguments.

But if they've already heard them and brushed them off, then my job is to rouse people who know better, even _somewhat better_, people who at least feel _uncomfortable_ about cannibalizing embryos for research, to oppose such people at the polls.

I think this is the thing, and we should make hay while the sun shines--while the majority of people in our culture are still more or less decent folks with more or less traditional, realist ethical and religious predilections (emphasis on "more or less"). They must be woken up from their media and technology-induced slumber. Because in a very possible future where most people think like Singer (its morally ok to kill a born 4-year old), Sam Harris (some ideas are so dangerous that it might be necessary to kill people just for holding them), Dennett (we should hold a few Baptists in cultural zoos, but otherwise eliminate religion), Pinker (there is no such thing as "human dignity"), and the all-power Federal Government (run by the Harrises, Dennetts, Singers, and Pinkers among us) has appropriated unto itself every means of human survival, from birth to death, people like us will be begging the Masters of the Universe for our very lives.

And when we're talking about someone like Singer...

That's where you've missed the point --

People who hold views (i.e., that which is contrary to Pro-Life) do not necessarily rest on principles specifically identical to those of Singer.

I believe that our efforts should not be so limited as to only convince those who are already of the same mindset as ours.

Could you imagine had Jesus limited evangelization, the very prospect of Salvation itself, exclusively to Jews alone without paying any mind whatsoever to the Gentiles because they're of that intolerably radical and notorious mindset that aren't worth the bother?

Aristocles, I am in no way opposed to arguing that (for example) the unborn child is a human being. We pro-lifers do it all the time. I know one professor, a non-Christian, who was convinced of the humanity and personhood of the unborn child from conception onward by the well-known argument that the "personhood" principles that would make the unborn child a non-person would also apply to the newborn infant. But to be convinced by that argument, he had to realize that newborn infants are persons who should not be killed! If he'd bitten the bullet and gone the other way, embracing the legitimacy of infanticide, the argument wouldn't have convinced him. Pro-lifers have made biological arguments, arguments from pictures, arguments from the arbitrariness of birth as indicating a change in the nature of the being killed, and so on and so forth. We have done it for years and years, and we will not stop. But this is not the same thing as finding common ground with people who listen to all of that and simply will not follow the argument to the conclusion.

I think an analogy might help: Suppose that we were talking about slavery. Someone might say, "Oh, but what do you do about all the people who don't believe that Africans have human value and dignity equal to that of white people?" Now, one type of answer might be that we publish books written by former slaves, we publish interviews with slaves, we publish descriptions of the slave trade and slavery, we have ex-slaves go around giving lectures. We basically try to make the full humanity of African slaves so evident that people cannot deny it. But how would one answer if someone said, knowing that abolitionists do all of that, "Yes, yes, and you and I rightly regard the slaves as 'human beings,' but we have to try to find something to say to those who deny it"? I mean, I wouldn't know quite what to say. Either such a person is urging us to go on doing what we are *of course* already doing (see the list above) to make the humanity of the slaves and the barbarity and inhumanity of their treatment evident, or he's urging somehow that we _waive_ the question of their humanity and make our arguments for abolition on some _totally different_ grounds. And that we should not be willing to do.

We should never stop showing beautiful baby-in-the-womb pictures. We should never stop speaking the truth about what abortion is. We should never stop making the evident biological points about newly-conceived embryos. (All of these, I might add, being non-religious arguments.) And some people will be convinced. But merely saying, "Some people don't believe that these are human beings" tells me nothing in itself about what I should do about them. If they are simply lacking information or haven't heard some standard, principled, pro-life argument before, then I'm happy to make that to them. If they are just resistant to any of it, knowing it all quite well, then I really am not obliged to waste my time with them.

Byronicman, you are so right.

If they are just resistant to any of it, knowing it all quite well, then I really am not obliged to waste my time with them.

That's just it, and I'm glad you yourself brought up the very example of the abolitionist --

That is, the abolitionist movement itself, particularly in England, notably depended as well on convincing especially the resistant, and, incidentally, it was because of having convince folks of the latter sort that actually significantly advanced the very cause of the movement leading up to the later success when finally slavery was abolished altogether.

The same can also be said with respect to the story of Christianity itself and all those notorious persecutors who even went so far as to murder the early Christians, even when already knowing their arguments and proofs. Significant progress in specific regions, in specific locales, of the empire were made with respect to the Christian mission when such individuals were ultimately convinced that initially were adamant in their original views and beliefs.

It seems you intend to focus your arguments on (and, thus, the very success of your arguments are actually dependent upon) an audience already heavily predisposed in your favor.

It seems you intend to focus your arguments on (and, thus, the very success of your arguments are actually dependent upon) an audience already heavily predisposed in your favor.

I think so, yes. One plays the margin, looking for success, since the times are dire. I think the polls generally show that most Americans think abortion is bad, yet paradoxically, think it should be at least somewhat legal, although regulated and restricted to some degree. These "most folks" are the ones we're going after. They are currently the political majority that make legalized abortion possible, and they can be turned (for such a one was I). This is really a "pragmatic" argument, the most practical, tactical approach to victory, if you want to think in those terms. People need to realize that it's ok to stand up against the death forces, to trust their God-given intuitions on the question, and to trust in the rational arguments that are increasingly promulgated. I heard a 20-year old girl say, after being on the receiving end of a very good pro-life argument delivered by Yours Truly, "I think you are right, abortion is probably wrong, it's probably killing a human being. But I think that sometimes it is for the best." There are many such weak reeds who can be reached (and who knows what her personal experience was, that would cause her to hedge--perhaps she'd had an abortion herself). But you have to argue from the truth. You just have to.

I think the "knowing it all quite well" is pretty important. There can still be pro-choice people out there who have never thought about it much. They may be young people. Their hearts are not entirely hardened. In a sense they "don't know it all quite well."

But let's remember that my original objection, the example that first prompted your statements, Aristocles, was that I thought it a mistake for the Vote No on Proposal 2 campaign here in Michigan to argue from a waste of taxpayer dollars on embryonic research more than from the humanity of the embryos. Now, one can emphasize the humanity of embryos in multiple ways. For example, one can show pictures of "snowflake children" who were adopted embryos, emphasizing, "See, _this_ child used to be _that_ embryo, of just the sort that the scientists want to dissect." That is an argument directed at people who may not initially be on one's side. Nonetheless, it's an argument that has the focus right--on the principle of the thing.

I can't quite figure out what it is you want us to say to people, Aristocles. The context in which you originally raised this gave me the impression that you agreed more with the "vote no on 2 because it will waste taxpayers' money" approach, since this doesn't start from any controversial premises and indeed seems to waive them altogether. On the other hand, you sometimes seem merely to be saying that we should try to convince at least some of the unconvinced. But that latter goal might be achieved by the standard pro-life arguments that do focus on showing the humanity of the unborn child at various stages. I've already pointed out, and so has Byronicman, that people have been convinced by these arguments. And they are arguments _for_ the humanity of the unborn child. So how can one object that this is just "preaching to the choir"? But, again, they put the emphasis where it belongs. So I'm honestly not sure what arguments you think we should be making that you think I am unwilling to make.

I think, too, we have to think about a phrase like "an audience already heavily predisposed in your favor." Sometimes I might indeed preach to the choir. But other times, when I think somebody is willing to listen to arguments for the humanity of a type of person presently being killed with impunity, I would not regard myself as preaching to the choir. Is someone "heavily predisposed in my favor" just because he's willing to consider that _maybe_ an unborn child or an embryo is worthy of protection? I mean, that doesn't seem to be asking much.

Is someone "heavily predisposed in my favor" just because he's willing to consider that _maybe_ an unborn child or an embryo is worthy of protection? I mean, that doesn't seem to be asking much.

I'm sure that Jesus and those who came after him preached only to those who were willing to consider the Gospel message rather than those who were staunchly against it.

The point being is that when attending to the public, we must attempt to make the message (which we consider Truth) accessible even to the stone-hearted.

Now, that doesn't mean we compromise the message -- only that we start from a place that is agreeable to both parties, which does not mean we begin by a watering-down of our own principle(s) or that we accomodate that of the opposite party.

To convert even the Gentiles (i.e., the Pro-Abortionist) and not restricting the Gospel to the Jews alone (i.e., Pro-Life initiate) -- is that asking too much?

Aristocles, since you won't answer my question, I'm going to ask it one more time and then ignore your increasingly fuzzy and annoying comments: What argument is it that you want me to make to the pro-aborts that you think I'm not willing to make?

You bet the principled and good arguments pro-lifers have made, do make, and will continue to make are accessible to the pro-aborts. I've referred to several of them. They have been rejected by many and have convinced some. We cannot control results. But for some reason the accessible arguments I've talked about don't satisfy you. You need to tell me what you're looking for in some terms other than vague and high-falutin' references to Jesus--in other words, please fish or cut bait.