What’s Wrong with the World

"[I]f Americans really believe that Persians are going to accept "lights out!" as a legitimate option, merely because America says that Persian ambitions are unacceptable, whether Islamic or not, well, then Americans are nuts. This would represent a massive failure to understand and predict the reactions of the Other, a massive failure of prudential reason. And, off at the margins, is it even licit to compel another society to revert to premodernity, with all of what that would entail? I'd not like to see, let alone make, that argument."

1) It is unacceptable for Iran to have nuclear weapons. If that means they can't have nuclear power, either (which I can't see any way around), I'm afraid that's just too bad. And it is the fault of various Iranians for being the sort of people they are and setting up the sort of country they've set up. It is not our fault that they are like this. What we should do to prevent it remains open. I don't mean this to be an advocacy of war. But I am *totally unsympathetic* to the idea that somehow, because the capacities for nuclear power and nuclear weapons are bound up together in the way that they are, we have some sort of moral obligation not to object to and try to find ways to prevent or stop the Iranian nuclear program.

2) They hate us like poison for all sorts of reasons. We already know that. _Since_ we should not approve of nor stop resisting their nuclear program, it seems to me a fairly irrelevant point in practical terms that, inter alia, if we succeed in stopping it, they will hate us *because* they cannot "join the nuclear club" and have nuclear power, because not getting nuclear power would be bad for their economy. This point of "understanding" seems to me relevant only if we are assuming that it should make some difference to how hard we should resist the Iranian nuclear program, that once we "understand" their "need" we will lighten up on our objections. Since we shouldn't, I don't think this type of understanding should really make a practical difference in the present situation.

3) I'm getting pretty doggoned tired of all the victim-mongering with regard to nasty foreign countries. Now, if I do not misunderstand, it's the poor, poor Iranians who are being thrown into the position of victims vis a vis the United States if (perhaps by diplomatic interaction with Russia, as one source reported in the past few days) we succeed in stopping their nuclear program. All this stuff about "compelling them to revert to premodernity" really can have only one trajectory: We are morally obligated not to try to stop Iran, even by non-violent means, from getting nuclear weapons if that also means that we are preventing them from getting nuclear power. Even to *contemplate* such an argument or such a position is, in my opinion, just plain crazy. Again, whose fault is it that their having nuclear weapons is such a Bad Thing? It certainly is not ours. How far would this go? If Hitlerite Germany had to either accept "lights out" or else get The Bomb, would the same argument apply, that we should not "compel them to return to pre-modernity" as a possible and indirect consequence of preventing them from getting The Bomb? This is really going too far.

Actually, my argument is not a victim-mongering one, merely one which notes to unrealism of expecting Persians, under whatever regime, to accept "lights out!" No Persian regime, and no possible configuration of Persian popular opinion, even in the absence of jihadist sentiments, would ever countenance it. This is a relevant fact, regardless of what we happen to think about the desirability of their possessing nuclear power/weapons. If preventing this entails war and millions of deaths, is that truly a licit cost? I think not.

Well, no, you questioned the moral licitness of preventing their getting nuclear power. It's right there in black and white. The sentence beginning, "And, off the margins..." You didn't question it on the grounds that the only way to prevent it would be an illict means. You questioned its licitness as an end. The implication then is clear: You think it morally questionable to stop Iran's nuclear program *as an end*, regardless of the licitness of the means, even if not stopping it means that they are going to get nuclear weapons, because you are struck by the argument that they need nuclear power to prevent their "going back to pre-modernity."

I think any apology of any sort for Iran's nuclear program is going too far. Way too far.

"merely one which notes to unrealism of expecting Persians, under whatever regime, to accept "lights out!" No Persian regime, and no possible configuration of Persian popular opinion, even in the absence of jihadist sentiments, would ever countenance it."

Why? Why plenty of countries large and more advanced than Iran don't have nukes and not scheming to get them?

Is it some God given right Iran has?

Iran is a major sponsor of terrorism for the last quarter of century. Regime openly and repeatedly calls for a nuclear distruction of its neighbor.
Morever the mullahs stated that losing millions of Iranians is OK if Jews are murdered. The main thing the Ummah will live but Jews will not.

Iran is not an India or even Pakistan. Iran is a thug state and cannot be allowed to have nukes.

I'm quite optimistic that they might give up without being seriosly bombed.
"Persian popular opinion" might change drastically if Iranians will not able to travel, no currency exchanges, trade, oil is excepted, is suppressed, etc.

"Persian popular opinion" should be put on notice that they should build a track record of civilized behavior, say 20 years, before even thinking about nukes.
And by that time, if they as civilized as neo-conmen tell us (they said the same thing about Iraqis), they might find that health care is more important to spend money on.

"Persian popular opinion" should be put on notice that they should build a track record of civilized behavior, say 20 years, before even thinking about nukes.

Mik, you and I don't always agree, but you never said a truer word. And I wd. add that if part of the problem is an insufficiently diversified economy, this is also their own problem to fix.

And while we're talking about (at least I'm talking about) why no one should be making noises that sound even remotely like, "Hey, maybe it's unreasonable of us to expect Iran to forego its nuclear program," I give you the following link:

http://littlegreenfootballs.com/weblog/?entry=27699_Video-_Leni_Riefenstahl_for_Dummies&only

Please notice the Iranian sword cutting through the Star of David and the U.S. flag. The LGF intro. says there's also a swastika on the U.S. flag, but I didn't catch that. It's bad enough without it, anyway.

Actually, what I have argued is that it would be illicit to assist the Iranian regime in acquiring the bomb, and that, insofar as the Russian assistance to the Iranian programme tends toward that end, it too is illicit. I would not wish to argue, however, that a purely civilian programme - as an hypothetical - would be similarly illicit; neither, therefore, would I wish to argue that assistance rendered to such a programme would be illicit. The reason for this is simply that such a programme will be necessary in the foreseeable future if Iran is not to be confronted with the prospect of a violent reversion to premodernity. A forcible denial of such a programme should therefore be acknowledged for what it is, or at least will be at a certain point in time, namely, an act of war. Those criticizing my analysis of the situation should have the courage of their convictions, and avow that, in their minds, war is not merely a licit option, but is, in point of fact, morally obligatory. If Iran must not possess nuclear technology, and Iran will, as a matter of objective fact, require that technology in order to exist as a (cough) modern state, then this is nothing less than an argument for war: Iran must not possess that which is requisite to its continued existence. This has nothing to do with the obvious unsavouriness of the regime and its loathsome propaganda; this is simply a matter of realpolitik.

Again, I'm hardly seeking or expecting agreement. Clarity will suffice. If y'all want war with Iran, say so. I'm on record with the conviction that Iran can be deterred from the most egregious forms of misbehaviour, and that war is unnecessary to prevent those. Those who disagree ought to say so openly. Those who are dubious that Iran can be deterred, and those arguing that the very character of the regime precludes the legitimacy of its possession of nuclear technology, should be forthright concerning the inevitability of war - and indeed, the obligatory status of that war.

Let me try to understand your point, Maximos, re. "a purely civilian program." I had thought that we were all agreed that as a practical matter it is not feasible for a country like Iran to have "purely civilian" nuclear power without also having the wherewithal to make the nuclear bomb, and that it would be foolish to imagine that we can restrict Iran to doing the one without also developing nuclear weapons. Are you saying that there is some real-world doable way of separating these two things _in Iran_? Now?

Suppose there isn't. Are you saying then that we mustn't try to stop--even if we could stop it by means not themselves wrong--Iran from developing both nuclear weapons and nuclear power, because it would be wrong to try to stop Iran from developing nuclear power?

What would you include in a "forcible denial of a nuclear power program"? Would you include simple refusal of assistance--by Russia, say? Would you include various economic sanctions against Iran if it tries to develop what it calls a "nuclear power program" if we have reason to believe that this is or possesses the very real potential to be a nuclear weapons program? So if the two cannot be separated in practice, are you saying that it would be tantamount to an act of war against Iran to use economic sanctions to try to get them to stop the program? And would that be immoral?

I think _you_ have to think about what you are saying. Because what I'm _hearing_ is that even if we cannot separate nuclear power from nuclear weapons in Iran (which I think it obvious we cannot), it's morally wrong to stop them from developing the whole shebang, since, on your account, they are doomed, doomed, if they don't get nuclear power. If you're not taking this position, please clarify.

Actually, I think there is a difference between saying that it is not acceptable for Iran to have nuclear weapons and saying that all means to stop it are licit. It can be unacceptable and yet still something that we do not have the wherewithal morally to stop. If various sanctions could stop or slow the program, so much the better. And if that means Iran doesn't have the power it "needs," I don't care a lick. They should have thought of that a long time ago and behaved differently.

If, in the end, a targeted strike is necessary and will work, that would be an act of war, though best if it is a limited one. Other ways of "denying" Iran a nuclear program are not.

It is all contingent upon the significance assigned to those words "real world doable way". In theory, it would be possible to establish some sort of accord, under which Iran would pursue the development of civilian nuclear energy installations, while an inspections regime under the auspices of the IAEA ensured that the specific enrichment processes required as preliminaries for the development of nuclear weapons were not undertaken.

Good luck with that, given both the character of the Mullarchy and the counterproductive axis-of-evil rhetoric emanating from certain circles here.

What I argue, then is that we must discriminate between those activities suggestive of civilian applications and those indicative of military applications, insofar as this is possible. It is possible to a certain extent, given that the machinery and techniques are somewhat different, as between civilian power and weapons enrichment. Typically, the byproducts of civilian processes are refined further for weapons use. Sanctions and embargoes should be imposed to reduce the likelihood of, say, the specialized centrifuges necessary for weapons-grade enrichment finding their way to Iran. I do not think it either realistic or moral, out at those margins, to demand that Iran forswear, for all eternity, going nuclear, for the reasons already articulated.

In the event that we cannot discriminate effectively between aspects of a nuclear programme, then my counsel is that we yield to reality and rely upon deterrence, and this on realist grounds. It would be morally licit to impede or stop altogether an Iranian nuclear weapons programme, provided that the means employed were themselves licit, and that the deleterious consequences did not outweigh the beneficial ones. It is this latter condition which I believe incapable of fulfillment; any actions more bellicose than the imposition of sanctions, or an exceedingly limited surgical strike upon a discrete facility known to be dedicated solely to weapons-related research, will reverberate throughout the region.

Actually, I think there is a difference between saying that it is not acceptable for Iran to have nuclear weapons and saying that all means to stop it are licit. It can be unacceptable and yet still something that we do not have the wherewithal morally to stop. If various sanctions could stop or slow the program, so much the better.

I think I agree with this. It is unacceptable for Iran to possess nuclear arms, on moral grounds. Realistically, we may have to accept the eventuality, because there may not be licit and effective means of preventing it.

Actually, even the hypothetical surgical strike would reverberate throughout the region, in ways that could well make Iraq look like the neoconservatives' mythical cakewalk war. One should be clear about such things.

I don't think the issue is one of whether the Americans can prevent Persia from obtaining nukes, but the implication of the American foreign policy as a coersive pressure against the Terhan regime. I have always percieved that the US war on terrorism was focused primarily on a long term strategum against Iran.

The two prominent military actions impose american military dominance on both sides of Iran, effectively scaring the be-jesus out the government, forcing the leadership to increasingly allocate their limited resources to pending invasion, which, of course, will never come.

Invasion of Iran, with or without, nukes is impractical to any real control over the middle east. I have no doubt that Washington foriegn stategist know this well, having been trained in cold war tactics. Persia is on the brink of revolution for the last decade, and war with Iran is merely counter productive to what I precieve is the US end game, destablization and revolt.

Which brings us back to the issue of Iranian Nukes. The US backed pressure against the Iran nucular muscle is aimed at enhancing the pressure and extending it into the international arena to further isolated and cut off Iran from the world, and possibly pushing it into a "lights out" senario, which would reasonably be calculated to spell the end of the theocracy by popular dissatisfaction from the resulting impact to already poor economy.

"In the event that we cannot discriminate effectively between aspects of a nuclear programme, then my counsel is that we yield to reality and rely upon deterrence, and this on realist grounds."

Since Iran has made it abundantly clear in other ways that it is pursuing nuclear weapons, and since it is such a rotten country to have them, this is one sentence I can't agree with. It's not like you need to see the thing before your very eyes to have reason to know that it is happening. And it is not as though nuclear power activities are sacred in some way such that you have done something morally wrong if you indirectly, in attempting to stop or sabotage weapons-making processes you have every reason to believe are going on, also stop or sabotage nuclear power-generating activities. This seems to me to be true whether the means employed are sanctions, surgical strike, diplomacy with (say) Russia, or internal sabotage. If as a secondary effect the civilian nuclear power activities are harmed, this is no more evil than any other infrastructural secondary effect of the attempt to stop the weapons process. Sanctions or embargoes themselves, for example, would have deleterious effects upon the economy, yet these could be licit to bring about, so the same should apply even more strongly here.

The Iranian nuclear program is either an integrated whole, such that any attempt to halt one aspect would, of necessity, adversely impact the other - in which case the attempt to halt the development of nuclear weapons would entail the demise of the civilian power programme, a consequence not merely morally dubious (in my judgment) but one which would come in contravention of international law (NPT, which distinguishes between civilian and military nuclear programmes) - or the Iranian nuclear programme is comprised of related, but separable components, such that efforts to halt the military component might have as a secondary effect the halting of the civilian component.

Understandably, there is some measure of ambiguity in the situation; nevertheless, Iran is entitled under international law to the development of civilian nuclear technology. Hence, while as a matter of ethical theory, the argument about secondary effects is well-taken, I remain dubious that it is actually applicable in the circumstances. Quite apart from the medium-term possibility of Iran going lights out, it is untenable to posit the United States as a permanent extra-legal tribunal ruling on the significance and applicability of international law/treaties. Such things possess public meaning, in a manner analogous to the public meaning of the Constitution, which the Supreme Court routinely eisegetes, effaces, or simply disregards. Admittedly, such a circumstance is preferable to a world court asserting similar authority; but the United States' arrogation to itself of this role is no less untenable for its being preferable to something still worse.

"Hence, while as a matter of ethical theory, the argument about secondary effects is well-taken, I remain dubious that it is actually applicable in the circumstances."

From my perspective, if the argument about secondary effects is right, the whole "international law" thing is pretty much irrelevant. I don't believe in international law. Never have, and see little prospect that I ever will. And indeed, this proceeds _from_ my opposition to centralized authority.

I think it's nuts to say that countries are "entitled to" or "have a right to" develop civilian nuclear power, precisely because it might not be possible to avoid negatively impacting a nuclear power project when stopping a nasty and belligerant country from developing nuclear weapons. Again, if there's something so special about nuclear power that you can't as a matter of collateral effects stop a nuclear power program in the process of stopping a nuclear weapons program, then any country, no matter how evil, powerful, and aggressive, can take advantage of this and entangle these in such a way that people think they "have to" let them get nuclear weapons. See my example of Hitlerite Germany. Now, this is hostage taking of a bizarre sort. It's one thing to say that if every soldier goes into battle with a baby strapped to his back we have an ethical problem with carrying out battle normally. It's another thing to say that if a country goes into making nuclear weapons with a nuclear power program "strapped to the back of" the nuclear weapons program, we just have to sit back and do nothing that would stop it! I mean, in that case, and if Iran succeeded in making its nuclear program an "integrated whole" (which I suppose it could easily find ways to do), we shouldn't even negotiate with Russia to try to get them not to help Iran complete its reactor!

International law of the sort embodied in the NPT is not a matter of centralized authority, but a matter of accords between states monitored and enforced by consultative institutions, working groups and the like. There are things not to like about some of this, and things warranting caution, but this is not identical with the centralization of authority, EU-style. In the modern age, given the interconnectivity of everything, the pace and nature of technological development, and the ease with which technologies can be transferred and disseminated, such arrangements are inevitable. Even at the level of theory, nations relate to one another, and often require codified norms according to which, or within which, such relations will unfold. Regularity is preferable to ad hoc procedures, particularly where nuclear technologies are concerned.

The ethical claim I am making is that it is questionable for the United States to assert authority to - in extremis - tell Iran to go lights out at some point in the future; that the US is saying this is implicit in the present controversy. The "rights" in question are, by contrast, positive rights, created by a set of international accords, and defined in the provisions and procedures of those accords. And the argument there is that futzing around with treaties entails a distinct set of pragmatic risks and consequences, overlapping with - though never to the degree of complete identity - the risks and consequences of the attempted exercise of hegemony in the Near East. Partiality, exercised on whatever basis, engenders the impression that such accords are just so much parchment, and thus encourages resistance - the very resistance - in this case the development of nuclear programmes - that the partiality was intended to foreclose upon. What I am arguing, therefore, is that options for precluding the success of the Iranian nuclear experiment are, both pragmatically and morally/prudentially, rather more limited than the more hawkish are inclined to concede. This an undesirable state of affairs, to be certain, but even the most bellicose of measures cannot guarantee the indefinite suspension of the nuclear programme, while they virtually secure the descent of the Near East into a wider conflict.

Definitely, as a matter of morality, destroying a nuclear energy capability would be justified under the principle of double-effect if, inter alia, destroying the nuclear arsenal with which it was entangled was justified (including the particular chosen behaviors involved in doing so). So I agree with Lydia here that we ought to stick to the latter point, that is, whether a particular act (in all of its particulars) of destroying a nuclear arsenal is justified. I think the latter doesn't require the support of the former in order to block consideration of any "preventative" act of war.

This is part of what I was getting to in my comment in the other post: when we over-justify our resistance to a proposed evil act we imply, or at least connote, that this over-justification is necessary. But it isn't. "Preventative" acts of war cannot be justified. Unless we are certain (in a reasonable, ordinary sense of certainty) that the actual damage inflicted by the aggressor will in fact occur, we cannot justify an act of war. This literally never obtains in prophylactic cases. We shouldn't act or speak as though greater justification for rejecting a proposed act of war is necessary; because it isn't.

"Preventative" acts of war cannot be justified. Unless we are certain (in a reasonable, ordinary sense of certainty) that the actual damage inflicted by the aggressor will in fact occur, we cannot justify an act of war. This literally never obtains in prophylactic cases.

I'm not sure I follow you here, Zippy. It sounds like too strong of a statement. Suppose we had intercepted reliable messages stating clearly that Japan was going to hit Pearl Harbor with war planes from such-and-such a base on such-and-such a day. Wouldn't we have been justified in hitting the military airport on the day before, or even hours or minutes before, those planes took off to go hit Pearl Harbor?

I can certainly see that taking over a whole country when it hasn't yet committed an act of aggression is morally questionable. But some first-strike military acts against military targets seem to me eminently justifiable.

Wouldn't we have been justified in hitting the military airport on the day before, or even hours or minutes before, those planes took off to go hit Pearl Harbor?

Sure. A prophylactic or preventative measure is one where we are not certain that an actual concrete particular attack is coming, but we attack them in order to prevent them from becoming strong enough to attack us. If we know a particular attack is coming - which doesn't mean that we just "know" they will attack somehow when they get the chance because they hate us or are crazy or something - we can hit them good and hard before they get the chance to carry it out.

The difference is akin to the difference between preventing an actual crime and locking up a dangerous person before he commits a crime. It is fine to prevent an actual crime. Note that it is not just to treat a person or polity as criminal prophylactically even if it is true that the person or polity has criminal aspirations. Until actual specific criminal intent is known, just action is limited to defensive preparation, etc. Prophylactic violence is inherently unjust.

People intuitively know this I think, but many generally don't like how dangerous it makes the world seem, at least for those who have no trust in Providence. (Well, to be honest I don't like how dangerous it makes the world seem; but trust in Providence involves an act of the will, and I aspire to choose it).

I acknowledge the distinction and that my Japanese example was (deliberately) in the realm of knowledge of a specific threat. I'm not sure I'm convinced of your overall principle, though. To me it seems to depend on how "cleanly" some strike can be made. Take, for example, the recent Israeli bombing of something (no one on either side is telling what) in the middle of the desert in Syria. As far as I know, no one is claiming that any human lives were even lost in that. Speculation is that it was either a weapons cache or a partly-built nuclear facility. Now, to me, that's a pretty clean strike. You fly in, drop some bombs in the desert, and fly out. Nobody gets hurt, nobody's home is even flattened, for what that's worth, a full-fledged regional war does not begin, and the bad guys have fewer weapons. What's not to love?

I'm generally very wary of analogies between international relations and domestic situations, but if we must have one, to me this is more like having some restrictions on who gets guns, and Iran fails the background check, so a surgical strike (if it could work) would be just like confiscating the gun.

I agree with your last example, Lydia, but I don't see how it calls into question Zippy's "overall principle", which is absolutely essential to any conception of just war. Israel did to Iraq what you recommend (back in the early 80's, was it?), taking out a nuclear reactor. A criminal has no legal right to own such a weapon, and so, like the Lone Ranger shooting the gun from an outlaw's hand, Israel blew up the weapon because the criminal would not surrender it peacefully. I suppose it was officially an act of war, though Israel did not declare it and had no intention of going to war with Iraq.

But let us suppose that the criminal -in possession of the gun he has no legal right to - is holed up in his home, surrounded by family members, screaming out the window at the police that he's not going to give up his gun, yet at the same time has given no sign that he intends to use it against them or anyone else. We can't shoot it out of his hand because he's not waving it about, but we know he's got it (really good intelligence). If you would still take it from him, I think it is here that very sticky prudential and moral considerations come into play, and that Zippy's principle ought to kick in with full force.

How can it be more imperative to keep Iran from getting nuclear weapons than it was to keep Red China from getting them in the mid-60s? No hindsight, please, about how the Maoist regime moderated and became less scary over the succeeding decades.

I'm generally very wary of analogies between international relations and domestic situations, but if we must have one, to me this is more like having some restrictions on who gets guns, and Iran fails the background check, so a surgical strike (if it could work) would be just like confiscating the gun.

Kind of. It would be like me going over to my neighbor's house myself and "confiscating" his gun, as opposed to being like the police going over to my neighbor's house and confiscating his gun; unless we are stipulating a form of international law, in which case we have the nontrivial matter of competent authority to discern.

But: If you got knowledge that your neighbor was plotting to break into your house and break up all the furniture on May 15, you wouldn't therefore be allowed to go over on May 14 and hit him first hard. You'd call the cops. So even the Pearl Harbor example assumes that it isn't invidiously "taking the law into our own hands" for Country A to decide that it needs to make a first strike against Country B. If this is allowable in cases of knowledge of specific threat, it doesn't seem that suddenly when we're talking about a surgical strike against a nuclear facility or weapons cache the duly constituted authority of Country A no longer has the right to make those decisions anymore.

In other words, we are _always_ going to have the oddity for any strike or fight of any analogy between civilian affairs and war. It's arbitrary to bring that in for the one type of case as an argument against going in and taking out the nuclear facility and not for the other kind of case where it's striking Japan's military airport the day before Pearl Harbor.

Or to show my point another way, Zippy: You argued that it isn't right for one country to make a strike against another without knowledge of a specific threat by an analogy to the police locking up a man who hasn't yet committed a crime. You pointed out that it would be unjust to lock someone up just for being the sort of person who might commit a crime. This very argument makes the admittedly rather awkward analogy between the "good" country and the police. We try to ignore that disanalogy, and that's fine. Because consider: You don't have a right to lock your neighbor up even when he _has_ committed a crime. Yet presumably the analogy on your terms in the case of countries to "committing a crime" would be either County B's actually attacking A or planning such a specific attack. So, in that case, Country A's response would be like locking up a criminal. That's fine, but if we're allowed to make such analogies at all, then we ought to be able to use them for cases where an evil man/country has some weapon with which he can't be trusted and the cops/better country take/takes away that weapon.

Again, I'm not terribly comfortable with such analogies precisely because countries don't interact like cops and non-cops within a given country. But if it's justice we're talking about, then it seems to me entirely just skillfully to remove a highly dangerous weapon from a highly dangerous country. And if the justice issue is to be argued by way of analogies to locking people up and such and what sorts of locking up or restraining actions are permissible w.r.t. individuals, then I get to use them, too, without being told "But one country isn't in the relationship of a cop to the other country." We knew that already, and we subtract it from all the analogies equally.

I don't know that the analogy is perfect, but I also am not sure it is that complicated. If there is no international law and no international competent authority then what we have is frontier justice: that is, we have no lawgiving body to construct positive law but we have (always) the natural law. There is no applicable positive law (e.g. "this nation may not possess nuclear weapons"). If I am attacked I may defend myself, but I do not have the authority to simply make up positive laws that my neighbor must follow.

How competent authority arises in the frontier is a much more complex question of course, but if we are stipulating that we don't believe in international law (either in principle or as acknowledgement of an actual competent authority, e.g. the UN) that question is moot in this case.

Yes, I pretty much agree that it's frontier justice. That's one reason why I don't like analogies to locking people up, because you aren't really, and there's no overarching authority, etc., etc. So then the question is, on the frontier, with no overarching authority, would it be okay in the name of prudence and preventing the deaths of the innocent to go into your neighbor's house and take his guns if a) you could do cleanly it without harming innocent people and b) he was a scary kookball who was uttering loud and scary noises about "wiping off the map" people in the nearby town, but wasn't specifying a date or time. I'd say, in the frontier, with no cops to do the job, sure, no problem. Certainly there doesn't seem to me to be anything _unjust_ about that, as there would be if I just thought he was a weirdo and locked him up for nothing more than that.

What if the gun was a hunting rifle, and the kook claimed he needed it to hunt for food to feed his family? Could you still take it away?

It depends, to my mind, on what else he is threatening to do with it, even if he isn't obliging enough to tell you exactly when and how he is going to carry out the threats.

Look, Zippy already agreed that stopping or slowing a civilian nuclear program is licit under double effect if the primary act is licit. And Zippy's positiion is that you can hit a country first if you have clear knowledge ahead of time of a specific, planned threat, as in my Pearl Harbor example. This would mean that if you got knowledge that Iran was going to hit somebody with nukes at a particular time, and you could stop them ahead of time with a strike, it would be licit to harm their civilian power program in the process under double effect. All of _that_ seems to me just obvious common sense. The only disagreement between me and Zippy is whether you can similarly make a strike, even a surgical one, ahead of time on the basis of more generalized threatening talk.

Your question is now taking us back again to the double effect question, which we've already gone over. So my answer to you is that yes, it would be licit to take the hunting rifle away if you had good reason to believe he was going to use it in a killing spree against the innocent. And I bet you would think so, too, if the threat to the innocent got sufficiently specific and imminent.

Again, this whole double effect thing about nuclear power programs is very weird to me, since people believe in double effect of very much this sort in so many other scenarios. Think of it this way: It can be licit to lock a guy up in jail after he murders somebody and is a danger to the community even if he is his family's only bread-winner. In that case the family has to be taken care of in some other way. So _obviously_ double effect permits removing a person's power to do good (hunt for his family) as an incidental effect of removing his power to do evil (murder). So the question isn't whether we can ever stop him from hunting for his family, the question is just when and for what cause.

The only disagreement between me and Zippy is whether you can similarly make a strike, even a surgical one, ahead of time on the basis of more generalized threatening talk.

Oh, I wasn't disagreeing as much as just following up the ramifications. I still think frontier justice is an interesting area of inquiry, at least in the abstract, and I don't have fully settled opinions about it so therefore I don't have fully settled opinions about present-day international relations, which is a context of frontier justice. (Even a UN-favoring or US-hegemonic-favoring globalist would I think have to concede that at best our present state is transitional, that is, still has many of the characteristics of frontier justice, and that the putative end of frontier justice lies somewhere in the future).

The jaded practical side of me interjects at this point with scepticism about whether a nuclear plant can be destroyed without directly killing anyone though. And in that case, the someone directly killed would have to be engaged in actual aggressive preparation-for-an-actual-attack behaviors (that is, not innocent) in order for the specific killing act to be licit. So I'm not sure that the discussion has the practical moment which some may ascribe to it. But it remains interesting at the nerdy philosophical level, as one might say :-).

So then the question is, on the frontier, with no overarching authority, would it be okay in the name of prudence and preventing the deaths of the innocent to go into your neighbor's house and take his guns if a) you could do cleanly it without harming innocent people and b) he was a scary kookball who was uttering loud and scary noises about "wiping off the map" people in the nearby town, but wasn't specifying a date or time.

In this hypothetical, given that the neighbor hasn't actually done anything other than make "scary noises," you'd have to count him as among the "innocents" that you'd have to avoid hurting in order for your act of involuntary disarmament to be licit.

(And although no one seems to have wanted to address the question I raised earlier, I'd point out that people in the government of Red China were making noises around 1964-1968 that were at least as "scary" as those that Ahmadinejad is making today.)

Were they saying some other country should be "wiped off the map," Seamus?

In this hypothetical, given that the neighbor hasn't actually done anything other than make "scary noises," you'd have to count him as among the "innocents" that you'd have to avoid hurting in order for your act of involuntary disarmament to be licit.

I agree with that, which is why I see it as a rather academic point.

For the record, I think it depends on whether you can rationally take him to be making preparations for a rampage, in which case he is not an innocent. The "scary noises" were meant to be evidence on that subject.