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You are not allowed to fill in the lacuna in anti-homosexual reasoning

This is going to be a rather long, philosophical post, so I'm going to put some comments right up front so that people can get this gist even if they don't have the time to read the whole post.

By now my readers have probably heard about the flap concerning a regional meeting of the Society for Christian Philosophers. If not, you can get up to speed on the facts via Maverick Philosopher, Ed Feser, or Rod Dreher.

Extremely eminent British, Christian philosopher Richard Swinburne presented a paper at a regional SCP meeting (an invited paper) on Christian sexual ethics and morality. In the course thereof he stated that people with homosexual orientation are disabled and that it would be good if they could be cured of this disability, and the left, including some so-called Christians, went hysterical, insane with rage. The President of the SCP, philosopher of religion Michael Rea, then publicly issued a brief and highly ambiguous semi-apology for the "hurt" caused by Swinburne's talk, implying that it did not properly advance the goals of "diversity and inclusion." Others have then called for Rea to apologize to Swinburne for this unprecedented move of apologizing for an eminent philosopher's invited talk just because it was controversial and also to "clarify" that a defense of traditional Christian sexual views is still welcome within the SCP.

In my opinion it is utterly ridiculous that Rea issued such an apology. It is an obvious act of appeasement to the left, unworthy of a philosopher or a Christian or even a man who has a firm grasp of the issues. Its fuzziness looks like calculated bureaucrat-speak, and its selective "sorrow" for "pain," handed to the left as a kind of trophy, is the kind of non-leadership or even un-leadership that has been destroying not only Christianity but freedom in the United States. It does harm and no good, and Rea should certainly retract it forthwith. In issuing this statement, moreover, Rea was lending the force of his position as President of the SCP as a tool in a quite deliberate campaign of bullying and intimidation against younger and more vulnerable scholars than Dr. Swinburne, who will now have that much more reason to fear for their careers. Not that Rea himself has such an agenda. He's too ambivalent and (I'm told) too nice a guy to have such an agenda. But others definitely do, and this apology entirely served their purposes. And not because of some official policy on the part of the SCP (we are assured that regional conference organizers will still choose papers just as they have always done) but because of the increasingly evident hostile climate, even in an ostensibly Christian organization, to such views, an hostility to which even the President of the organization is apparently willing to cater so far as to apologize and appease. This is both unacceptable and tragic. And probably irreparable. The trolls and bullies have come out in force (see the comments Dreher quotes here and the screen caps here) within "Christian" philosophy, and that sort of thing can't be put back in the bottle. Michael Rea is quite obviously not the man to lead the SCP in resisting the bullies and making crystal clear the ridiculousness of their demands, even if he now does the right thing and retracts his earlier statement. But he should do it anyway.

With all that said and my own support (which should go without saying) for Swinburne's right to espouse traditional Christian views of sexuality at a Christian conference fully established at the outset, I will now go on to discuss the ideas in his paper in more specifics, sometimes critically.

One of the reasons why I haven't posted on this yet (besides the fact that other people are doing a good job on the basic issues of bullying and the like and that I had little to add) is that I was hoping to get hold of a copy of what Swinburne actually presented. Numerous sources have stated (and one person has told me that Swinburne told him) that the ideas in Swinburne's paper at the conference were identical in essence to those in a chapter of the 2nd edition of his book Revelation. I only have a copy of the 1st edition and was waiting to get hold of the 2nd edition. Meanwhile, however, a friend passed on to me an electronic copy of the actual paper presented, from Swinburne himself. I won't be quoting it at any length here (not having permission to do so), but I will work on the assumption that his already-published views in the 2nd edition of Revelation are similar (and snippets on Amazon and Google Books confirm this) and use my own possession of the paper itself to move ahead.

My thesis in what follows is that Swinburne's views, if anything, are incorrect in that they are insufficiently robustly traditional/Christian on matters of sexual ethics, but that his use of the term "disability" for homosexual inclinations is the remaining bit in his views that reflects a recognition that homosexual acts and desires are unnatural. Therefore, it would be impossible to remove this disability language without leaving a lacuna in the discussion of homosexuality, unless one replaced it with something else that would be even more offensive to the homosexual lobby. Therefore, the unfortunate sniffing of eminent Catholic philosopher Eleonore Stump that the problem with Swinburne's presentation was not his views but his "inflammatory way" of expressing them, is balderdash. There would be no less "inflammatory way" of expressing the relevant content, and indeed if anything Swinburne is already making too many concessions.

In his paper, Swinburne divides ethical norms in the areas where Christian morality is most at odds currently with secular morality into those that would be binding even if God had issued no command and those that are binding only because of a divine command. The former list of wrong acts, those that he calls "intrinsically" wrong, is rather short, consisting only of adultery without permission from one's spouse (hence also divorce-with-option-to-remarry without consent of the other spouse, except perhaps in very limited cases), suicide (hence also euthanasia), and late abortion (after approximately 22 weeks).

The set of things that Swinburne says are wrong, but only because God commands against them, are homosexual acts, abortion earlier than approximately 22 weeks, divorce-with-remarriage (or a married person's having sex with someone other than his spouse) by mutual consent between spouses, fornication, and possibly contraception, though Swinburne is not completely decided on this last point.

Since Swinburne is dealing with such a wide variety of topics in one paper, his discussion is necessarily brief; hence, it might seem like caviling to say that his discussion at some point is too dismissive. But I do think it is noteworthy that he dismisses the entire Catholic natural law tradition on the underlying reason for the intrinsic immorality of homosexual acts in one sentence consisting of two independent clauses joined by a semicolon.

Swinburne's position on abortion is that fetuses prior to a particular stage of development at about 22 weeks are not persons and that killing them is wrong only because of a divine command. Yet notably, his presentation garnered outrage from some self-styled Christians only for an entirely different reason related to homosexuality. Swinburne is explicit at the end of the paper that there is "no point in rebuking non-Christians for not conforming to" those obligations created only by divine command, though of course we can try to induce them to become Christians so that they will "begin to appreciate arguments for conforming to them." This raises rather pressing questions about protecting the unborn in law, except for very late abortions. I, for one, find the selective outrage over the paper rather striking, though unsurprising.

Swinburne's taxonomy is puzzling in a variety of ways. Curiously enough, he states that the metaphysical grounding for the wrongness of suicide is the fact that God has created us, yet he considers suicide intrinsically wrong, not wrong only by divine command. But why could not a similar analysis be given of (e.g.) the wrongness of homosexual acts? Namely, that the metaphysical grounding of their (intrinsic) wrongness is the fact that God has created sex for the purposes of male-female bonding and procreation and that it is objectively a misuse of this gift to engage in same-sex relations, even if some people don't realize that this is wrong (as some don't recognize that suicide is wrong). If a theological fact--that God created man--can ground an intrinsic obligation to refrain from a particular act (suicide) in the one case, one would think that it could also do so in the other.

In any event, to move on to the "disability" language that caused such a stir: Even though Swinburne thinks that homosexual and other acts are wrong only on the basis of a divine command, he finds it philosophically interesting to discuss what reasons God might have for this prohibition. It's an interesting exercise, because of course if the reasons are sufficiently compelling, and if we can figure out what God's reasons might be, this would seem to raise a question as to why the acts aren't intrinsically wrong. Or, at a minimum, raise a question as to why purely secular people can't see the extreme consequential inadvisability of encouraging and celebrating the acts in question, be they fornication, homosexuality, or consensual divorce.

When Swinburne comes to discuss what God's reasons might be for prohibiting homosexual acts, he says this, "Having homosexual orientation is a disability – for a homosexual cannot beget children through a loving act with a person to whom they have a unique lifelong commitment." He goes on to say that it might even be hoped that a "cure" might be found for this disability, though he thinks this is unlikely right now for those who have been homosexuals for a long time, especially those who have acted upon their homosexual impulses.

And that's it. That's what caused all the hoopla. (See more below on "cure.")

So at this point what I want to ask is this: Suppose that Swinburne had left out that part of his discussion. What could he have put in its place? And would there have been anything less offensive (to homosexual sensibilities) that would have had the same contentful meaning?

Given what Swinburne does elsewhere with things like fornication, he could have left out the talk of homosexual inclinations as a disability and stated instead only that there is a special value to individuals and to society from the heterosexual nuclear family and a special value to society and to individuals of the production of children in the old-fashioned way. Hence, God might have believed that more people would be happier if homosexual acts were not normalized, if young people were encouraged to seek heterosexual relationships rather than to experiment with homosexual acts, and so forth.

If he had done this, however, it would have changed the content in an interesting way. First, it would have removed all hint of any explanation for the underlying reason why so much special happiness is generated by heterosexual nuclear families and by old-fashioned heterosexual procreation. The term "disability" gives a hint that this may be because having babies with (in the old-fashioned sense of "with") the person you love and to whom you've made a permanent commitment is more natural in a normative sense, more true to the telos of our bodily nature, than heterosexual sex acts. This might help to explain, causally, why the utilitarian benefits to individuals and to society arise from lifetime heterosexual pairings.

It's true that Swinburne has, earlier in the same paper, seemed to reject such teleological concepts, but here a hint of them is creeping back in. That would be eliminated and the probable greater happiness of a largely heterosexual society left entirely as an unexplained surd without the talk of a disability.

Second, the language of disability hints that heterosexual fornication is somewhat different from homosexual fornication. Consider: If a heterosexual man has a wandering eye and finds it hard to keep his thoughts and desires monogamous, we don't generally say that he has a disability. Yet such a man might find it difficult to make and keep a lifetime commitment to one woman and hence might at least find it difficult to beget children with a woman to whom he had a unique, lifetime commitment. Now, I suppose it's possible that Swinburne would also say that a man in that situation has a "disability," but I'm inclined to doubt it. The "disability" language, applied only to homosexual orientation, appears to be addressed to the absolute physical impossibility: A person with a consistent (unwavering) homosexual inclination is strictly unable, by means of sexual intercourse, to beget a child with the type of person to whom he is consistently sexually attracted and to whom he makes a social-sexual lifetime commitment. Once again, this distinction between a man with homosexual inclinations and a heterosexual man whose feelings are somewhat non-monogamous points to the telos of the human body.

How else might either Swinburne or someone else presenting the view that homosexual acts are wrong do without saying that homosexuality is a disability? Well, one way would be to say that the "disability" language is too mitigating, that it implies that there is some underlying biological cause of the inclinations that makes it difficult for people to act otherwise and mitigates the wrongness of the acts, but that in fact there is no such cause. A person who said this would take the view that all homosexual acts are entirely willful, chosen sins without a scrap of mitigation from an "orientation."

But this alternative position would obviously be far more offensive to homosexual sensibilities.

Another possibility would be to adopt thoroughly the natural law position, to say that homosexual acts are intrinsically wrong and that their wrongness springs from the fact that they are unnatural and perverse and that homosexual desires are intrinsically disordered, contrary not only to God's perfect and monogamous will for human sexuality but also to the very telos of the body itself.

Again, though, this robust natural law theory would hardly be less offensive than talk of "disability" to the pro-homosexual audience or those who heard about the paper.

In short, there simply is no way to replace the talk of disability with something less offensive that would not make a significant difference to content, a difference that would make the approach even less satisfactory, less clear, and less Christian.

Eleonore Stump, well-known philosophy professor at St. Louis University, said,

I was not at Prof. Swinburne’s talk, and my knowledge of what he said is derived from the comments about it by others. But it is clear from those comments that he took a strong stand on a highly controversial topic, which is divisive even among Christians, and that he expressed his views in an inflammatory way, so that those who disagreed with him were hurt and angry and even some of those who agreed with him were dismayed.

Stump very likely knows that the paper was allegedly a version of chapter 11 in the 2nd edition of Revelation. She doesn't cite any specifics of what she heard about Swinburne's talk but only the general commentary. No one is alleging that Prof. Swinburne got up and called homosexuals by nasty epithets. In fact, his paper expressly calls for compassion for those with these orientations.

My conclusion is that Stump is referring to Swinburne's talk of "disabilities" and his holding out (heaven forbid) the hope of a "cure" for homosexuality, as these were the allegedly "inflammatory" comments that everyone was having the vapors (or worse, the spittle-flecked, hateful rants) about.

A word about Swinburne's talk of the possibility of a "cure" for homosexual inclinations. It is entirely mild-mannered and consists merely of the hope for such a thing and of the fact that, if homosexuality is generally seen as a negative thing in society, there will be motivation to find a way to help people remove or ameliorate these inclinations, which will be for the general greater happiness of mankind. In no way does he remotely imply approval for forcible treatment, even if such could be found. Nor does he express enormous optimism about it. The most he says is that,

The evidence seems to me to indicate clearly that genes and environment (nature and nurture) both play a role in determining sexual orientation; and also that this orientation is sometimes to a considerable extent reversible. (Emphasis in original)

and

Medicine has made great strides in recent years. Diseases of mind or body hitherto believed incurable have proved curable; it would be odd if sexual orientation was the only incurable condition. But it looks as if for many homosexuals, but probably not for all, their condition is now incurable; and sympathy, not censure, must be our first reaction – as it must be for all those who find themselves in any situation not of their own choice where their sexual longings cannot be satisfied in a happy marriage.

This is hardly a ringing endorsement of the much-maligned reparative therapy. There is nothing remotely extreme about these statements, and no one would deem them inflammatory or even dismaying if they were made about, say, cancer or spina bifida! It would be utterly foolish to pretend that anyone deemed Swinburne's talk of the possibility of a "cure" offensive for any reason other than the fact that this implied disapprobation of homosexuality coupled with even a weak acknowledgement that homosexuality is in some special way unnatural and a disorder for the person who has the attractions. We get angry and offended and consider people creepy for talking about curing things when we don't think those things are the sorts of things that could need to be cured. One would get outraged over talk of curing Christian religious beliefs, for example. One would get outraged over talk of curing dissident political beliefs. So once again, any demand to remove this language is a demand for contentful capitulation, not simply a demand for some sort of trivial rhetorical tweak.

Dr. Stump is a smart enough philosopher that she ought to know that. I cannot help thinking that at some level she does know it. But for some reason she chose to say otherwise, implying that Swinburne was needlessly "inflammatory" and that he could and (implicitly) should have conveyed the same content (if he wished to do so), only in a somewhat nicer way that would not have changed the content. Well, no. He couldn't, and he had no obligation to try.

Where things will go from here in this particular flap, I don't know. My best guess is that Dr. Rea will stand pat on his vague statement, that the leftists, including the Christian left, will continue to rant, that nothing particularly bad will happen to Dr. Swinburne for his "inflammatory" comments except perhaps a few fewer invitations to speak (which he can probably do without anyway), but that younger conservative philosophers will take due note and warning.

It's extremely ominous that so concessive a paper as this one, presented at an ostensibly Christian conference, should have garnered so much rage and so much appeasement. I can't do much better than to echo Rod Dreher's conclusion on the significance:

Anybody with eyes can see what’s going on here. There is a cleansing underway. The fact that the Society of Christian Philosophers is allowing itself to be bullied by these people is deeply depressing.

Ed Feser makes the same point:

To pretend (as some Christian philosophers I know do) that this sort of thing is essentially just a regrettable but understandable overreaction on the part of wounded souls who have had some bad experiences with obnoxious religious people is naiveté. It is often rather a calculated political tactic aimed at making public dissent from liberal conventional wisdom on sexuality practically difficult or impossible.

[snip]

What does all this have to do with Rea and Swinburne? Just this. Sophistries and ruthless political pressure tactics of the sort just described succeed only when people let them succeed – when they let themselves be intimidated, when they acquiesce in the shaming and shunning of those who express unpopular views, when they enable the delegitimization of such views by treating them as something embarrassing, something to apologize for, something “hurtful,” etc.

This, it seems to me, is what Rea has done in the case of Swinburne. Given current cultural circumstances, Rea’s statement amounts to what philosophers call a Gricean implicature – it “sends a message,” as it were -- to the effect that the SCP agrees that views like Swinburne’s really are disreputable and deserving of special censure, something to be quarantined and set apart from the ideas and arguments that respectable philosophers, including Christian philosophers, should normally be discussing.

That is unjust and damaging to philosophy itself, not merely to Swinburne. It is especially unjust and damaging to younger academic philosophers – grad students, untenured professors, and so forth – who are bound to be deterred from the free and scholarly investigation of unpopular ideas and arguments. If even the Society of Christian Philosophers is willing to participate in the public humiliation even of someone of the eminence, scholarly achievement, and gentlemanly temperament of Richard Swinburne, then why should any young and vulnerable scholar trust his fellow academic philosophers to “have his back” when questions of academic freedom arise? Why should he believe they are sincere in their purported commitment to reason over sophistry?

Why, indeed.

Comments (70)

Global Christian Stockholm Syndrome on homosexuality claims another victim.

Looks like Dr. Rea has been working on developing the Stockholm Syndrome for a while now.

https://www3.nd.edu/~mrea/papers/Gender%20as%20a%20Divine%20Attribute.pdf

I haven't had time to read the whole thing, but my fave quote near the beginning is this:

Some, to be sure, have suggested that the harms done by the traditional pattern are overstated.4 But even if that were true, it is undeniable that many people believe that women have been and continued to be harmed by the traditional pattern, and that Christendom’s failure to adopt more gender-inclusive ways of speaking about God has presented such people with serious, ongoing obstacles to faith and to comfortable participation in their own religious communities. This fact alone constitutes reason to adopt more inclusive ways of characterizing God,

Got that? If many people _believe_ that women are harmed by referring to God in masculine terms, that _alone_ constitutes a reason to adopt more "inclusive" language for referring to God.

Casts some light, I think, on the apology for Swinburne's talk.

Lydia,

What's happening to Rea very often happens to Protestants in academia. Because of the various pressures and group-think of that milieu, they experience a considerable (albeit often subconscious) pull leftward.

Unfortunately, since Protestantism is anti-doctrinal in its essence, it offers very few fixed points of reference to resist this pull.

(Catholics can also slip, but the nature of Catholic dogma makes it less likely to happen.)

Not to excuse the cowardice of Dr. Rea, but it would probably be much easier to resist the bullies if it wasn't for the fact that a great many people with real clout (e.g., administrators, justices, and media types) already share a common point of view with the bullies and are prepared to support them if necessary.

I genuinely doubt that Dr. Rea has any concern that he's going to lose his position at Notre Dame if he doesn't go along with the demand here. He probably had some vain idea of promoting "unity" in the SCP by making his apology. Given his general stance toward the left (see the paper on gender-inclusive language for God), this appears to be typical of him: The left is to be appeased because they are by definition the oppressed, the ones harmed, hurt, etc. We must protect them, work with them, and even learn from them! The right is expected just to endure this and make no complaint. What possible harm could it do to _them_ to apologize for Swinburne's paper? A certain kind of administrative type that lives in a certain kind of appeasement bubble genuinely has this blind spot.

This is an excellent post, by the way, Lydia.

I especially liked:

Dr. Stump is a smart enough philosopher that she ought to know that. I cannot help thinking that at some level she does know it. But for some reason she chose to say otherwise,

You're definitely onto something here. Now, I'm well aware that you have no sympathy for the so-called alt-right, but this touches on a theme similar to what the the latter has called attention to in contemporary politics: there are 'conservatives' in our midst, that we think are on our side, but--when push comes to shove--reveal themselves to be of questionable loyalty.

I suspect this is all indicative of our nearing the end of history (in the Christian sense, not in the Fukuyama sense). Divisions will grow more severe, and defections from the Church, from Christian truth, will increase.

My level of incredulity varies, but it all seems to be of a piece. George H.W. Bush endorses Clinton. Robert P. George writes the following: "In fact, the Church can and has changed its teaching on the death penalty, and it can and does (now) teach that it is intrinsically wrong (not merely prudentially inadvisable)." Certain Cardinals in the Church routinely make borderline or outright heretical statements, or make claims at least extremely 'offensive to pious ears.' The list goes on...

I think I probably have just been mostly ignorant of Eleonore Stump's moral and/or political leanings all along, not that she has been identified as conservative and turns out not to be. I heard somebody say that someone said (sorry to be so vague, but that's really all it amounts to) that she's always been rather "progressive." About the only evidence to the contrary, at least concerning homosexuality, is her brief and unconvincing statement (in her statement of support for Dr. Rea's apology), "As for Prof. Swinburne, I share with him a commitment to orthodox Christianity,..." Hmm, make of that what you will. Notice that it says precisely zilch about what she thinks a "commitment to orthodox Christianity" tells us about the morality of homosexual acts or the naturalness of homosexual inclinations. Stump, btw, is Roman Catholic. Swinburne is Eastern Orthodox. At least he's willing to say outright that orthodox Christian teaching forbids homosexual acts. I'd be willing to accept information, but thus far Google and I have not been able to scare up anything Dr. Stump has written on the subject. Maybe we're just supposed to "deem" what her views are from her Catholicism? But as a famous man recently said, "Who am I to judge?"

https://web.archive.org/web/19990209115857/http://christiananswers.net/summit/plunder.html

"The feminists' linguistic lobby, however, has exercised some discretion. Although they have stormed the Bastille Of Language and literature, and although they have laid siege to the gates of heaven and kidnapped its Chief Occupant, they have not yet had the nerve to bombard the walls of hell in order to claim its king as their own. It's funny how calling the Devil "he" doesn't bother the feminists. it doesn't strike them as chauvinistic or sexually bigoted to personify evil in precisely the same language they elsewhere label sexist when used to personify goodness. Nor do they complain on behalf of all little boys everywhere about how psychologically devastating it must be for males to think of evil itself as one of their own kind. Apparently, pronouns are sexist only if they can be construed as anti-feminist."

Lydia,

Is you or your husband a member of the SCP? If so, I would get out now, and begin working with other Christian philosophers to found another (faithful) organization. Let the current SJW-infected SCP go to the birds.

Similar to the advice I'd give to a parishioner attending a Catholic church with a dissenting priest: write a full explanatory letter to the Bishop, take your family (and your donations) to a faithful Catholic church, and encourage your friends and relatives to do the same. Do NOT adopt of the mentality of 'this is my parish' or some such nonsense. Do NOT give aid to dissenters, even if incidental (by showing up at Mass, putting money in the plate, taking part in parish activities under the auspices of a dissenting priest). Tell the bishop why, tell the dissenting priest why (politely and forcefully, to his face), and get the hell out.

[by way of Ed Feser]

The head of the SCP - Christina van Dyke - has not only defended Rea's apology, but has also come out in explicit support of the following comment of Yale "philosopher" Jason Stanley, who opined on Swineburne's views shortly after the talk:

"I really wish now I hadn’t said that!! I PROFOUNDLY regret not using much harsher language and saying what I really think of anyone who uses their religion to promote homophobia, you know that sickness that has led people for thousands of years to kill my fellow human beings for their sexual preferences. Like you know, pink triangles and the Holocaust. I am really, truly, embarrassed by the fact that my mild comment '**** those ***holes' is being spread. This wildly understates my actual sentiments towards homophobic religious proponents of evil like Richard Swinburne, who use their status as professional philosophers to oppress others with less power. I am SO SORRY for using such mild language."


http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2016/10/christina-van-dyke-owes-richard.html


Totally disappointing. Members of the SCP need to see that new leadership is instated or jump ship.

Lydia,

I'm glad you wrote about this. A couple of points:

1) I hope our readers check out the links you provide and read some of the reactions from ostensibly 'Christian philosophers' to Swinburne's lecture. Your phrase "spittle-flecked, hateful rants" is right on the money. How dare these folks consider themselves either Christian or philosophers! Their comments were shameful;

2) While I like the Catholic Church's natural law language related to homosexuality being "intrinsically disordered" (which apparently -- I can't remember where I read this recently -- is also causing some to start to question whether or not it should be used because it causes hurt feelings) I've also thought that it is useful and correct to use the language of "disability."

I believe we have discussed on W4 (if not in other places) the idea that in some sense suffering from homosexual desires can be thought of as the suffering an addict faces. Whether or not, for example, someone with alcoholism has such a problem via nurture or nature we don't run around affirming that person's identity as a drunk and wishing them well as they drink themselves to death. We want them to in some sense give up their alcoholism -- leave it behind -- even if they continue to suffer from the temptation and desire to drink, they are leading good lives if they refuse to give in to the temptation and instead follow the advice in a program like the Twelve Steps when they are tempted. Likewise, as you allude to in your OP, a heterosexual might have a disordered sex drive (perhaps we might even call him a sex addict.) Again, whether such a problem is brought on via nature or nurture, the problem itself is a disability and is not something to be celebrated or affirmed. The person suffering from such a problem needs help and would want to figure out how to live their lives using their sexual gifts in a healthy way that helps them flourish in a marriage or living in chastity as a single person.

Why any of this is particular controversial for a small o orthodox Christian -- or at the very least why it can't be discussed in good faith at a philosophical conference is mind-boggling! As you note, Ed Feser's post on the implications of Rea's statement are particularly depressing for younger, orthodox Christian philosophers who want to explore these issues in their work or even if they just want to defend Christian sexual morality in the public square.

Is you or your husband a member of the SCP?

Nope.

I think that "intrinsically disordered" is by far the best language to use for homosexuality, and much else. Good for the Catholics for using it. The fact that even that term isn't a part of a consensus, if the only one, is quite telling of the philosophical confusion among Christians.

As far as this dust-up, Swinburne torqued-off all sides in a long-standing acrimonious debate. I’m not sure the result is all that surprising unless we want to stipulate that presenting ideas already published can’t be a cause for controversy. Of course they can and do all the time.

The issue is pretty basic really. It comes down to two simple claims.

1) Homosexuality is morally wrong
2) Homosexuality is a disability

Those in line with the acceptance of homosexuality see #2 as demeaning. I suspect they could live with #1 much more easily because it isn’t inherently demeaning, though they probably won’t admit this. The fact is some people do enjoy breaking moral norms and take pride in doing so. But of course they'd like to undermine both.

As I see it the traditionalists split along these lines:

a) Some traditionalists without tendencies to moralism think #2 is a bad thing because it represents the medicalization of ethics and the normalization of everything that happens a la Kinsey. They see it as undermining #1.

Though this has going on in elite circles since Descartes, has entered the mainstream in terms of public ethics only recently, so it's a big deal. For example, the AMA declared alcoholism a disease in the late 70's or early 80's, despite the fact that there's no evidence for it.

b) Traditionalists with tendencies to moralism tend to be agnostic about questions of human nature, so don’t care much either way on #2 as long as #1 is verbally affirmed.

c) Then there’s another camp of traditionalists like me who don’t have tendencies to moralism, and who think #2 undermines #1 and is demeaning to those living disordered lives to boot. To us #2 is pure fail, but we understand that it takes all kinds and are happy to make allies where we can.


So I don’t see where all the mystery is on the controversy. It seems to me the essential thing about this uproar is at least as much about the intergroup tensions of those opposed to the normalization of homosexuality as it is the fury of the gay lobby over whether thinking #2 is demeaning. I deplore the SCP and/or Rea in the public apologies over not advancing "diversity and inclusion”, but we will have learned nothing if we don’t acknowledge the context of this mess. The fact is that once a controversy had begun there is no consensus view other than verbal affirmation of #1 with which to defend Swinburne. That that shouldn't be enough to appease philosophers shouldn't be surprising. This was was a combustible mix bound to happen sooner or later unfortunately.

I read years ago where William Lane Craig has said the same thing as Swinburne about homosexuality. It’s a disease or disorder I think was his language. I think its deplorable. I think it’s just handwaving to avoid the issue to better get along with his field of expertise. Professional bias.

In my opinion describing or analyzing such things as homosexuality requires a multidisciplinary outlook. Analytical philosophers tend to screw these things up because they want to stay within the limits of their specialization. Dallas Willard didn’t stay within his academic specialization in explaining moral behavior so far as I could tell, nor does Gilbert Meilaender. There are others, but those are fairly well-known. They spoke as Christian men with a wide range of experience and understanding. Philosophy in service of moralism is insufficient to understand the phenomenon. Those philosophers who incorporate in their philosophy accounts of the moral psychology of such things have already gotten there.

As far as this dust-up, Swinburne torqued-off all sides in a long-standing acrimonious debate.
It seems to me the essential thing about this uproar is at least as much about the intergroup tensions of those opposed to the normalization of homosexuality as it is the fury of the gay lobby over whether thinking #2 is demeaning.

Nope. I'm the only one I know of who has even drawn all this out at such length, including a discussion of different possible underlying approaches to the wrongness of homosexuality. By no stretch of the imagination did Swinburne "torque off all sides." In fact, I'm the only one I know of who has even written a blog post highlighting (e.g.) the abortion issue and the ironies surrounding that.

In general, *all* the fury has come from the left gay lobby and their progressive allies flipping out over anything that could be "demeaning" to gays, and not even *just* the disability language but what they call "homophobia" generally. They want to purge the SCP and philosophy generally of all opposition to homosexual acts, period, full stop.

Moreover, nobody on the "right" here, including me, is "torqued off" at Swinburne. It's only the progressives who want to make nice with the pro-homosexual lobby, or who are ardent members of that lobby themselves. who are "torqued off." Despite my disagreements with Swinburne on several issues here, which I'm not hiding, I'm strongly supportive of him in this dust-up, because I know perfectly well which side is which.

Even Stump is tipping her hand pretty broadly. If she's what you call a mere "moralist," she is quite clear that *nothing* beyond a bare moral prohibition *should* be said, because to say any more would make the poor, poor homosexuals feel bad. Of course, she's a smart lady and should know that the moral prohibition alone makes the poor homosexuals just about equally mad nowadays, because nothing but full approval will be acceptable to them; everything else is "homophobia." But she apparently wants to think otherwise so she can appear genteel while not quite going so far as to ditch 2,000 years of Christian morality. It has everything to do with appearance, as she said herself more or less in so many words.

Ed Feser's post on all this was pitch-perfect.

Sorry to repeat myself, but here was my comment at his place:

"I was especially struck by this: 'to pretend...that this sort of thing is essentially just a regrettable but understandable overreaction on the part of wounded souls who have had some bad experiences with obnoxious religious people is naiveté. It is often rather a calculated political tactic aimed at making public dissent from liberal conventional wisdom on sexuality practically difficult or impossible.'

"Precisely so. All this stuff about 'hurt feelings' might have made sense thirty or forty years ago - but in the current year? No way.

"To see those who now hold the whip-hand playing the victim, for advantage - it's a spectacle for the ages. Has anything even remotely like this ever happened before, in all of human history?

"We live in remarkable times."

Let me add, here, that I'm no longer at all sure that it's safe for me even to try to *explain* to my students the views of St. Thomas Aquinas on sexual morality - at a Jesuit University!

The crybullies always remind me of the old aunt's Siamese cats in "Lady and the Tramp." Look at about 2:20 here where, after trashing the place, they start playing the victim.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TpPGE_SKtA4

As for teaching St. Thomas Aquinas, see this hack's comment:

I also heard the same “unnatural” garbage language of the natural law tradition was present that I’ve talked about before as I also learned that there’s a deep Protestant appreciation and appropriation of St. Thomas. That was a new one for me as I don’t travel in these “intellectual” circles often.

http://www.philpercs.com/2016/09/richard-swinburnes-toxic-lecture-on-christian-morality-at-the-midwest-meeting-of-the-society-of-chri.html

Which brings to mind another movie allusion:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BUg2cp23rGE

1) Homosexuality is morally wrong

2) Homosexuality is a disability

Mark, in #1, by "homosexuality" do you mean homosexual acts? Do you mean homosexual desires? Something else?

Nope. I'm the only one I know of who has even drawn all this out at such length, including a discussion of different possible underlying approaches to the wrongness of homosexuality.

Nope? Ok, so I give an explanation for why it shouldn’t be surprising that the debate is about the debate rather than the substantive issues. And you respond with why you’re the only one arguing for the substantive issues? It sounds like you’re agreeing with me.

Moreover, nobody on the "right" here, including me, is "torqued off" at Swinburne. It's only the progressives who want to make nice with the pro-homosexual lobby, or who are ardent members of that lobby themselves. who are "torqued off." Despite my disagreements with Swinburne on several issues here, which I'm not hiding, I'm strongly supportive of him in this dust-up, because I know perfectly well which side is which.

Right. I fleshed out, however tersely, your support of him AND mine. I fleshed out the basis for your agreement with him as a traditionalist of type "b", AND the basis for mine as well as traditionalist of type "c" who "understand that it takes all kinds and are happy to make allies where we can". I'm aware of the political realities.

I also know perfectly well this debate about the debate isn't a surprise precisely for the reasons I've already stated, which was the point of my comments. I think that matters simply because one would might hope philosophers would get social reality as well as whatever specialization they've made their name on. Sadly, that isn't true is it?

Mark, in #1, by "homosexuality" do you mean homosexual acts? Do you mean homosexual desires? Something else?

All of the above is disordered. If it's thinking, it's disordered thinking. If it's acts, they are disordered acts. This isn't to say that thoughts are sinful in themselves. I do not think that in any way. But idealizing them and identifying with them goes well beyond that.

I'm in agreement with Lydia here. I just realize now that we don't agree on the meaning of Natural Law.

On idealizing certain understandings of things broadly speaking, here's Brian Leiter, a philosopher disapproving of Swinburne:

"... a kind of ideological intolerance that is incompatible with the Socratic ideal of philosophy to which almost everyone professes allegiance."

At bottom I think a discernment of the "signs of the times" is that most disagreements and differences in moral judgment (if it was ever any different in other times) come down to clashes of ideal visions with more realistic ones, or clashes of two more or less equally unrealistic ideal visions.

"... ideological intolerance that is incompatible with the Socratic ideal ..." Exhibit A as evidence of my view.

1) Homosexuality is morally wrong
All of the above is disordered. If it's thinking, it's disordered thinking. If it's acts, they are disordered acts. This isn't to say that thoughts are sinful in themselves. I do not think that in any way. But idealizing them and identifying with them goes well beyond that.

So, are you willing to correct your #1 by saying (if I got your point right):

1A) Homosexual acts are morally wrong and disordered.
1B) Homosexual thinking is disordered thinking, and to the extent it is intentional it is sinful.
1C) Homosexual idealizing and identifying, insofar as it consists in intentionally thinking homosexual thoughts, is sinful.

So, let me ask you a question: if a man does not have heterosexual desires, and is subject to homosexual desires that are unwelcome to him, and he refuses to consent to them, and he fights them with every tool he has, but he cannot (so far) rid himself of these thoughts, while he in in this state can he reasonably and appropriately marry a woman? If he cannot appropriately marry a woman while in this state, does this state constitute a disability? Is it an impediment to marriage?

Joe, I'm not sure what you're up to, but actually, I'm not particularly interested in having this thread become a free-for-all discussion of the morality of homosexuality, or whether people with homosexual impulses can marry women, or whatever it is you are trying to get Mark to give you his opinions on. (Also, Mark is inclined to talk a lot anyway, so...) I'm thinking _maybe_ you're trying to press him to say there's something correct about the disability language in and of itself. But I suppose even if one thought such a man shouldn't marry a woman, one might still have some objection or other to calling his feelings a "disability."

Whatever. I'm down with "intrinsically disordered." I actually *prefer* it in some ways to "disability."

I'm certainly not going to go to the mat for "disability," specifically. But what I will go to the mat for is *something more than* "Homosexual sex is just wrong, we're not going to say anything more about why or about the orientation being undesirable or anything, not, not, not, God just said it was wrong, we don't know why, might as well be like saying eating broccoli is wrong, it's just some irrational Christian-y thing, try not to judge us too harshly because we have to say doing this is wrong, we luuuuv you."

>> to the extent it is intentional it is sinful.
>> intentionally thinking homosexual thoughts

Joe, I can’t see what your phrasing of intentionality really comes to. Does it say anything meaningful about any immoral behavior to say “it’s wrong if it’s intentional”? I can't see how. I also suspect you're unprepared to say very much if anything that could give any content to what is desire. Dictionary definitions aren't particularly informative on that score.

Mark, having temptations (which involves thoughts) toward homosexual acts is disordered, but not sinful. Consenting to these thoughts is sinful. This is pretty standard Christian teaching.

Desire is an act of an appetitive faculty, which in us fallen humans can begin to be in act without the consent of the will. But the desire cannot go on for long without an act of the will either to consent to it or reject it, and this is where sin occurs if the desire is disordered.

Lydia, I was trying to understand what Mark was doing with

c) Then there’s another camp of traditionalists like me who don’t have tendencies to moralism, and who think #2 undermines #1 and is demeaning to those living disordered lives to boot. To us #2 is pure fail, but we understand that it takes all kinds and are happy to make allies where we can.

But it that's not important, then let's drop it. Me, I am good with calling homosexuality disordered, and a disability, and sinful when acted on, consented to, enjoyed or willed or preferred or embraced. It's all of those.

But it that's not important, then let's drop it.

Apologies, I sounded sharper with you, Joe, than I meant to. I'm just trying not to encourage the bees in another commentator's bonnet. It isn't you, really.

Mark, having temptations (which involves thoughts) toward homosexual acts is disordered, but not sinful. Consenting to these thoughts is sinful. This is pretty standard Christian teaching.

Yes I'm aware of that Joe. I didn't understand why you were asking me to affirm what would seem a tautology for what I've called traditionalists. That's why I said it doesn't "say anything meaningful". It wasn't a denial of what you were saying about intentionality, but I couldn't see where you could go with it.

Especially in light of the bigger problem I was driving at in my terse comment about the content of desire. The influence of the "pretty standard Christian teaching" on the questions you were asking me about the scenario you posited afterwards about "homosexual desires" depends entirely upon the nature of human desire. No understanding of "intentionality" can paper over this. Unless we're ok with locating morality in verbal statements and divine command theory. In the same way the standard Christian teaching you've described is disconnected from what could help a person struggling with such things. This is what I call "moralism". It's no better or different when delivered by a philosopher.

I posted a commentary on Frankenstein recently for a reason. Shelly's point, as the wife of the premier romantic poet, wasn't that technology could be dangerous. Everybody knows that. Her point was that a romantic poet was every bit as dangerous as a mad scientist. Why?

"... with ideal visions ... Mary Shelley acutely sees through the smokescreen of nature piety in Romanticism. She has Frankenstein speak with awe of natural scenery, but he has no reverence whatever for human nature. On the contrary, he is so unimpressed with it that he wants to tinker with it. He refuses to accept the natural limits of humanity; … With remarkable prescience, Mary Shelley uncovers the tyrannical impulses that often lurk beneath projects for improving humanity; whether proposed by modern scientists or Romantic artists."

Today, Christian moralists have a similar disinterest in human nature that Shelly was pointing out. The difference is that they're trying to hold the line on the natural limits of humanity without an interest and even agnosticism on human nature. Will that be any more successful than the romantic project? I'm doubtful. The subject is gone. Where they wander off the moralist script at all it tends to depend on theories of morality from the troubled social sciences, if not idealistic communitarianism. Human nature holds no interest for them. What is desire doesn't matter. I was fascinated as a teenager to observe that at social hotspots the women's eyes weren't drawn to the men to see if they were watching, but the other women. Their rivals. I thought that was fascinating. It still is and I'm fascinated by philosophical accounts of desire but you won't find any such at the SCP. It's not interesting for their best and brightest. That would be fine if life could be reduced to worldview apologetics or defenses of moral absolutes in the abstract. They should just punt on such questions that hinge on features of human nature as outside their field of study–and interest–but they don't. Or they could go outside their field as Christian men like the late Dallas Willard or the aging Gilbert Meilaender but they don't, at least not publicly.

That's why moralists deserve some lampooning.

The idea that philosophers should be interested in human nature is the "bee in my bonnet" in this context that enrages Lydia. No mystery that.

“ … if the test be offence to those whose opinion is attacked, I think experience testifies that this offence is given whenever the attack is telling and powerful, and that every opponent who pushes them hard, and whom they find it difficult to answer, appears to them, if he shows any strong feeling on the subject, an intemperate opponent.” –– J. S. Mill, On Liberty

And here I thought dropping it would be a good idea. Since Lydia doesn't want to have the discussion dragged down this road, I am going o respect her preferences and go along with that. As I said, I am dropping it. Seems a polite enough thing to do.

While I find the entire bureaucratic appeasement to be cowardly and the spiteful overreaction by gay rights advocates to be scandalous, I will also admit I don't understand the use of the term disability in relation to homosexuality. At best it seems to be misguided language if you also try to claim it is predominantly a moral choice and can be successfully cured. While comparisons to diseases of addiction, especially alcohol addiction, are often made to justify using the term, we don't generally tell people with chronic diseases and disabilities their condition is the result of an evil choice if we have some reason to believe there was a genetic or biological cause to their handicap. Even if you discount such factors towards the origins of addiction, once it becomes a full-fledged dependency there is no point at which we can truly say they have been cured of their obsession, it is a lifelong daily struggle they have to try to cope with. So on both counts of moral choice and cure; it seems to me like disability rhetorically undermines your conclusions. Lydia’s point in the OP about heterosexual fornication, reinforced by Jeffrey’s comment about sex addiction, makes its rhetorical function seem even more confusing if heterosexual addictions (disordered desire and sex acts) are not categorized as disabilities.

I myself am not a big fan of the "disability" language, and to some degree for reasons related to those you cite, Step2. I do think that this is answerable, though:

we don't generally tell people with chronic diseases and disabilities their condition is the result of an evil choice if we have some reason to believe there was a genetic or biological cause to their handicap.

If there were something innate that caused an _inclination_ to do something self-harmful (say, cut yourself, or abuse substances, etc.) but also an aspect of free will involved in going along with or resisting that inclination, then it isn't either-or. To say, "Your condition is the result of an evil choice" can be ambiguous if we're talking about a situation/condition that a person has been brought to by a combination of free choice and innate weakness. His _present_ condition may be _partly_ a result of evil choice.

Now, frankly, I think the evidence is rather _dubious_ that there is an innate, inborn cause even of initial homosexual inclinations. It seems too complex a matter for that. But that's an empirical matter.

In general, though, the state that a human being is in is usually the result of a bunch of complex causes, not the result of just one type of cause. This is all the more the case when we are talking about repetitive, destructive behaviors.

I do think that a lot of homosexual inclinations are blamable on the free choices of people _other than_ the person with the homosexual inclination--teachers, etc. So this, even though not biological, is to some extent mitigating. Yet a) free will is still free will and still involved, just as it would be if society and teachers were telling you that it's okay and even a matter for pride if you are out there abusing cocaine and b) the best way to counteract these harmful societal influences is to speak the truth about the whole issue.

Step2 -- I'm sure you agree that there have been genetically-disposed alcoholics who, in the event, never touched any booze. Circumstances just foreclosed against the potential for addiction. Or again, plenty of people who are, physiologically, at risk for severe and destructive opiate addiction never tried heroin, never were prescribed refined opiates, and thus went to their graves unaware of the genetic or physiological dependency. Call it a defect or disability, it need not dominate life.

Likewise, Christianity recommends (among other things) that by not recklessly celebrating homosexuality, many people afflicted by that disorder will never face unbearable temptation, and thus never actually discover their "addiction."

Step 2,

You'll often hear Christians talk about their particular besetting sins as their "crosses to bear." We are born into a fallen world and we all have a tendency to sin, more or less; as Lydia says this is not either or when it comes to nurture/nature.

I actually prefer the language of addiction to disability because addiction suggests some sort of tendency to sin as a particular cross for an individual but doesn't really focus on the why -- the focus is on the treatment and most importantly, on the free moral agency of the individual to take action today to stop using alcohol, drugs, pornography, etc. It also put the focus on Christ (if you are a Christian) as part of the cure -- only through Jesus' death and resurrection can we be saved of our sins:

If someone else thinks they have reasons to put confidence in the flesh, I have more: 5 circumcised on the eighth day, of the people of Israel, of the tribe of Benjamin, a Hebrew of Hebrews; in regard to the law, a Pharisee; 6 as for zeal, persecuting the church; as for righteousness based on the law, faultless. 7 But whatever were gains to me I now consider loss for the sake of Christ. 8 What is more, I consider everything a loss because of the surpassing worth of knowing Christ Jesus my Lord, for whose sake I have lost all things. I consider them garbage, that I may gain Christ 9 and be found in him, not having a righteousness of my own that comes from the law, but that which is through faith in Christ—the righteousness that comes from God on the basis of faith. 10 I want to know Christ—yes, to know the power of his resurrection and participation in his sufferings, becoming like him in his death, 11 and so, somehow, attaining to the resurrection from the dead.

[Philippians 3:4-11]

To clarify, in the main post the heterosexual man I had in mind wouldn't have been someone I would have characterized as a sex addict but just someone with somewhat non-monogamous inclinations. I myself would *not* generally say that such a person had a "disability," even though he would have to work harder (than a more monogamously inclined man) to make a happy, chaste marriage. Whereas a person with consistently homosexual inclinations is, by the nature of the sexual acts involved, going to be incapable of begetting children by way of those acts. I think that the "disability" language at least does tend to draw attention back to the _type_ of acts involved and thereby (to some degree) counteracts the determined nominalism of so many who talk "intellectually" about sex in the 21st century.

FYI -- Swinburne's paper is now available on the First Things website:

https://www.firstthings.com/blogs/firstthoughts/2016/10/richard-swinburne-on-sex-family-and-life

Yes, good. I think it is all to his advantage to have it out there. That is indeed the paper of which I have a copy, and readers can check my representation for themselves.

While I find the entire bureaucratic appeasement to be cowardly and the spiteful overreaction by gay rights advocates to be scandalous, I will also admit I don't understand the use of the term disability in relation to homosexuality. At best it seems to be misguided language if you also try to claim it is predominantly a moral choice and can be successfully cured. While comparisons to diseases of addiction, especially alcohol addiction, are often made to justify using the term, we don't generally tell people with chronic diseases and disabilities their condition is the result of an evil choice if we have some reason to believe there was a genetic or biological cause to their handicap.

Exactly right step2. This is exactly my stance and always has been. Rea should apologize to Swinburne for what he's done, but words mean things and as I've said Swinburne's term is unfortunate even in the limited sense that I think he used it in. Did the gay lobby do a hit job? Yes. But Swinburne's terminology was misguided for reasons that you're pointing out.

Philosophers can define or redefine technical terms any way they want as long as they state it clearly, and I think he did that, but using a term long publicly associated with certain things idiosyncratically is just plain dumb. It's confusing to thoughtful people at the very least, and you don't have to strain very hard to wonder if parts of his view on homosexuality weren't an unwise concession to the gay lobby to begin with. It's too bad, but it's a mess of his own creation.

Step2 -- I'm sure you agree that there have been genetically-disposed alcoholics who, in the event, never touched any booze.

Sure? I can't speak for him, but how can you be sure? If it's true that people can be genetically predisposed to alcoholism, I can't imagine why it wouldn't also be true that homosexuality couldn't also be a genetic predisposition, and much other complex moral behaviors as well. AAA, for whatever other good they've done, is entirely invested in the disease model of alcoholism for pretty obviously self-serving reasons and diligently fights empirical attempts to gauge their effectiveness.

The AMA declared genetic dispositions for alcoholism in the 70's I believe, but there's no evidence for it and a great deal of evidence against it. I was told in grade school that American Indians were genetically predisposed to alcoholism. It's pure bunk. It is a huge problem on Indian reservations however.

So Mark, are you disputing for Step2 that there are genetic predispositions? Or are you singling out alcoholism or homosexuality or what? Maybe just shutup and let Step2 answer for himself.

What I know for a fact is that the chemical effect of alcohol on human systems varies enormously across populations. Compare the Irish and the Japanese. Unless presented with solid evidence pointing to a contrary view, I assume the same wide variance of other moral, physiological, psychological defects.

To reiterate the point of my post, though, I'm not sure that either Step2 or Mark is keeping his eye on the fact that, had the language of "disability" been replaced while filling the "lacuna" I talk about in the main post (e.g., the allusion to unnaturalness and the distinction between homosexual and heterosexual acts), would have only created more social "mess," because it would have had to be replaced with words equally offensive or more offensive to the homosexual lobby.

So Mark, are you disputing for Step2 ... Maybe just shutup and let Step2 answer for himself.

I made it quite clear I wasn't speaking for step2 Paul. Quite clear if you'd like to read it again. I was quite clear because I respect step2, and I doubt anyone is persuaded by your faux outrage on his behalf in taking a swipe at me.

are you singling out alcoholism or homosexuality or what?

Or what. If it can be called "singling out", I'm specifying supposed genetic causes for complex moral behavior generally. There is no shortage of genetic causes of behavior. For example I'd think stomach sleeping is genetically caused. The enjoyment in our own fear when scared by others in what moments later can be seen as a playful or non-threatening way. I think there's a predisposition to want to be respected by other people. Thousands, millions, and in fact a virtually limitless number of others could be listed. And not just on the negative side. I'm highly doubtful there's a genetic predisposition to use Oxford commas, the right way of course. Not likely fly fishing either.

The question isn't and could never be whether their are genetic causes for behavior. Of course there are. The question is whether there are genetic predispositions that cause complex moral behavior. I'm doubtful. The positives are no less difficult, but the negatives are easier to communicate. Is there a genetic predisposition to kill a sibling? To rob banks? To force sex on someone to feel your power over them? Or if that's too strong, to steal someone's marbles and such. Is there any evidence whatever for such things outside of the generic sin nature common to all men?

And for those who wish to say "yes", how would you interpret 1 Corinthians 10:13? "No temptation has overtaken you except what is common to mankind." if you thought there were a genetic predisposition to alcoholism or homosexuality or such, is it reasonable to punt to "the will" and claim consistency with Christian moral theology by merely claiming it isn't "irresistible" or "determinative"? If "homosexual attractions" (wave for the sake of argument what desire is) or alcoholism were 100x more likely, or 100x stronger for me than for you, would I be equally guilty of sin if I succumb as if you did, or equally praiseworthy if I didn't? I can't see how. And if that seems self-serving, what reason is there to assume the ration is closer to 1.05? The point being, what reason is there for thinking genetic predispositions to complex moral behavior, if they existed, would be functionally equivalent to non-genetic causes for behavior, whatever you wish to call them?

To reiterate the point of my post, though, I'm not sure that either Step2 or Mark is keeping his eye on the fact that, had the language of "disability" been replaced while filling the "lacuna" I talk about in the main post (e.g., the allusion to unnaturalness and the distinction between homosexual and heterosexual acts), would have only created more social "mess," because it would have had to be replaced with words equally offensive or more offensive to the homosexual lobby.

Didn't we start by a reference to the Stockholm Syndrome? It's not clear at all it would have been worse.

I think my eye has been on the ball in seeing beyond the political skirmish. I began by saying I'm not surprised by the skirmish, as I'm not, but that's because of the underlying issues to which folks such as in the SCP are largely oblivious. One of which is quite substantive, and Lydia you were content to deny anyone outside of the gay lobby thought anything odd about what Swindurne's terminology on it or anything else. I've been objecting to such medical or psuedo-medical metaphors as he used for quite some time now, as I have been with William Lane Craig's. I don't see what more I can do but say the poor guy suffered a political hit job, but that doesn't mean we need to defend his baggage laden and idiosyncratic terminology and wondering about the wisdom of his reasons for using it. Some things are too important to leave to the professionals.

One can't prove a negative. Would it have been throwing Swinburne under the bus if Rea had simply said “Well I regard homosexuality to be disordered behavior rather than a disability”? Under the circumstances perhaps. But how exactly is a person supposed to find out that he's chosen a term that really makes little sense at all except to him? I mean this if life. Like the rest of us he can reflect on the wisdom of his choice for awhile. Maybe it will be fruitful for him.

I like the term "disordered" not because of any association to sin or wrongdoing, but because it doesn't do violence to reality as I understand it. Frankly I think most people who think homosexuality is wrong would have no trouble with this even if the average post-grad student no longer does. What's bizarre is that these guys are blindsided by what is entirely predictable. I read with alarm years ago WL Craig's comparison of homosexuality with a muscle wasting disease. I'd be more sympathetic if it seemed to me they had arrived at such positions by honestly straining to find words to better express reality, rather than attempting to throw off the problem onto some other specialty as it seems they often do.

What I know for a fact is that the chemical effect of alcohol on human systems varies enormously across populations. Compare the Irish and the Japanese.

Not sure what you mean by "effects" or "populations". Is there any evidence you can cite that shows the effects of alcohol are greater in a measurable way based on any natural human differential characteristic other than weight or gender?

Also not sure how you're comparing the Irish to the Japanese. The consumption rates are dramatically different. Ireland is the world's drunkest country I believe. I've never heard any conclusions about metabolism that were credible as you seem to be suggesting. Russia leads the planet in alcohol related deaths and other negative effects of excess drinking. What are we to make of that?

“Given what Swinburne does elsewhere with things like fornication, and stated instead that there is a special value to individuals and to society from the heterosexual nuclear family and a special value to society and to individuals of the production of children in the old-fashioned way. Hence, God might have believed that more people would be happier if homosexual acts were not normalized, if young people were encouraged to seek heterosexual relationships rather than to experiment with homosexual acts, and so forth. If he had done this, however, it would have changed the content in an interesting way. …it would have removed all hint of any explanation for the underlying reason why so much special happiness is generated by heterosexual nuclear families and by old-fashioned heterosexual procreation… “

I am not so sure about this, it seems that Swinburne could, on the argument suggest advocate a kind of rule utilitarian argument in the vein of say William Paley without invoking a kind of Thomistic natural law theory

On utilitarian grounds one obvious reason why procreation would be promote happiness, is that procreation leads to the existence of people who would not have existed had procreation not occurred. Provided these people lead reasonably worthwhile lives procreation increases the amount of happiness in the world. So if a rule leads people to bring children into existence in happy stable environments where they are provided for, and people wouldn’t have done this without the encouragement the rule provided, the rule has higher utility.

Of course, these benefits could be off set if everyone who would enter into a heterosexual relationship stayed in a heterosexual one and used some form of reproductive technology. However, such technology obviously has costs in terms of finances, medical resources and so on to society above and beyond normal pregnancy, so it brings the same benefit with increased cost. There is also the phenomena discussed by rule utilitarian’s of the cost brought about when one changes fundamental institutions such as parenting and the habitation that’s involved and bringing in technological parenting introduces such changes. Moreover, if we are discussing, as Swinburne is commands God would give all human beings, the commands can be based on the technological advances of one particular society at a particular time they need to involve practices that all people could engage in.

It also would be interesting to see Swinburne’s detractors having something like rule utilitarianism used against them.

Matthew, I guess I should clarify that by "hint of a reason" I meant something deeper than the rule utilitarian type of reason. And I think that can be seen in your suggestion, too. Mere cost-benefit analysis concerning reproductive technology for gays doesn't really get at the way that having a baby the old-fashioned way makes people happy. By which I mean the actual people who do it. I think any couple that has ever had a child of their own within marriage knows what I mean. There is that whole "participation in the mystery of being" feeling. There are all the special bonds between the child and his biological parents--you look like dad, you look like Grandma Jones, etc.

Then, of course, there is the further undesirability of making babies by reproductive technologies. We're already seeing that. Children who don't know who their fathers are and in a functional sense do not have fathers. The danger of siblings and half-siblings marrying. Children with no mothers. Etc.

Also, using a _purely_ rule utilitarian approach would be _different_ from what is hinted at by the word "disability," because the latter hints at something inherently normative about the state itself of having children by the old-fashioned way within a lifelong commitment. Now, someone might not think that this would be a problem, depending on how satisfactory one found the utilitarian analysis, but the point is that it would be a contentful _change_. So it's not as though it would just be a minor _linguistic_ tweak so as to sound less "inflammatory" while conveying the _same_ content.

God might have believed that more people would be happier if homosexual acts were not normalized, if young people were encouraged to seek heterosexual relationships rather than to experiment with homosexual acts, and so forth.

I am not so sure about this, it seems that Swinburne could, on the argument suggest advocate a kind of rule utilitarian argument in the vein of say William Paley without invoking a kind of Thomistic natural law theory

I never quite got the point of this bit. Same-sex sexual experimentation–I would not call that homosexuality or even same-sex attraction–by the young isn't at all rare and never has been. Experimentation of this sort by the young discovering sexuality is isn't inconsistent with Natural Law theory or utilitarian theory. Nor does such experimentation usually lead to homosexuality.

Experimentation of this sort by the young discovering sexuality is isn't inconsistent with Natural Law theory or utilitarian theory.

People actually do wrong things all the time (things that are wrong according to the natural law), and that of course doesn't falsify any theory about _why_ they are wrong. So I'm not sure what the meaning of your sentence is, here. However, as a social fact, it is just common sense that teaching young people that such-and-such sexual acts are normal (as, say, GLSEN or Planned Parenthood's highly explicit sex education material does) will _encourage_ them to experiment with such acts more than they otherwise would.

I read an article some time back about how anthropologists have discovered an entire tribe (in the Amazon, if I recall correctly) that had no concept of homosexual acts. They never engaged in them; they were unknown in the culture. The anthropologists did the best they could to eradicate this innocence as quickly as possible, of course! There is nothing at all inconceivable about that state of affairs. I myself had (literally) no concept of the signature (!) male homosexual act until I was in my twenties and, unfortunately, learned about it.

So whatever your theory about the underlying reason for the wrongness of these acts, it is highly plausible that people are likely to attempt them more if they hear about them more and are told that they are fun, interesting, and normal.

I read an article some time back about how anthropologists have discovered an entire tribe (in the Amazon, if I recall correctly) that had no concept of homosexual acts. They never engaged in them; they were unknown in the culture.

No concept of homosexual acts? I don't believe that for a second. That's not even remotely plausible.

People actually do wrong things all the time (things that are wrong according to the natural law), and that of course doesn't falsify any theory about _why_ they are wrong.

Agreed.

So whatever your theory about the underlying reason for the wrongness of these acts, it is highly plausible that people are likely to attempt them more if they hear about them more and are told that they are fun, interesting, and normal.

Yes, no question.

I was replying to Matthew’s comment that Swinburne could have chosen to emphasize the special value of the family to society and such without any dependence on Natural Law. Maybe I misunderstood him. He wondered what Swinburne’s detractors would say if he had adopted rule utilitarianism. It would seem to me they'd say that rule utilitarianism of the sort he’s described doesn’t rule out same-sex experimentation before marriage. I think Greek society and other would serve as an example. It doesn’t make it right in any case, but many societies have encouraged both same-sex experimentation and raising families with a spouse.

As for having babies "the old fashioned way" and "participation in the mystery of being" as you described, those things hold in polygamous marriages and with concubines too. All were addressed by the law in their societies. The point isn't that this is right or good, it's that Natural Law doesn't in any way naturalize sexual desire or sexuality generally. Such a view isn't even compatible with Natural Law. That is at bottom the problem with medical metaphors for homosexuality that would normally refer to disability and disease.

It would seem to me they'd say that rule utilitarianism of the sort he’s described doesn’t rule out same-sex experimentation before marriage.

I'm not an advocate of trying to do this all the "utilitarian way." I think that leaves a lot to be desired. But if I were trying to do it, and to bolster it, I'd probably supplement it like this: If one thinks homosexual acts are just as good and normal as heterosexual acts, and (this is an important addendum) if one thinks of homosexuality as a kind of identity that people can take on long-term, and if this identity is treated as normal, then fewer young people will be getting married and homosexual experimentation won't be confined to "before marriage," because some proportion of young people will decide to take on this long-term homosexual identity. This has negative effects upon the overall happiness in society, etc.

As a matter of fact, I think it _does_ have negative effects both for individual happiness and for total happiness in society. But I think those negative effects are clues to some kind of deeper metaphysical fact, not just brute facts about happiness (which perhaps could be changed somehow). So I think a better argument tries to talk about the underlying metaphysical facts that _cause_ so much unhappiness from the embracing of the concept of a homosexual identity and from encouraging such an identity in the young.

As for having babies "the old fashioned way" and "participation in the mystery of being" as you described, those things hold in polygamous marriages and with concubines too.

That is true. I didn't intend my comment about the mystery of being and the old-fashioned way of making babies to be a total and complete description of the underlying facts of human nature that make monogamous heterosexuality the only right and good use of human sexuality. Presumably that's also why Swinburne's mention of a disability also slipped in an allusion to a monogamous lifetime union (as well as a union of a type that produces children).

I was replying to Matthew’s comment that Swinburne could have chosen to emphasize the special value of the family to society and such without any dependence on Natural Law. Maybe I misunderstood him. He wondered what Swinburne’s detractors would say if he had adopted rule utilitarianism. It would seem to me they'd say that rule utilitarianism of the sort he’s described doesn’t rule out same-sex experimentation before marriage. I think Greek society and other would serve as an example. It doesn’t make it right in any case, but many societies have encouraged both same-sex experimentation and raising families with a spouse.

Two things:

First, I wasn’t suggesting necessarily no dependence on natural law, rather a different kind of natural law tradition that you see in 18th century (and 19th century) Brittan such as that advocated by Berkeley, and others and exemplified in Paley. This is a voluntarist tradition and grounds moral obligations directly in divine commands, so nothing is wrong antecedent to Gods commands, however it stressed that Gods goal in commanding was to co-ordinate human behavior to promote the happiness of all human beings.
This picture might fit more coherently with Swinburne’s stress on certain sexual practices being extrinsically wrong [ for the record I think Swinburne’s position looks to me a lot like it exemplifies a Scotist understanding of natural law, so I wouldn’t necessarily put it outside the natural law tradition]

It would seem to me they'd say that rule utilitarianism of the sort he’s described doesn’t rule out same-sex experimentation before marriage. I think Greek society and other would serve as an example. It doesn’t make it right in any case, but many societies have encouraged both same-sex experimentation and raising families with a spouse.

I don’t think this would be sufficient. To be able to knock the argument out it wouldn’t be enough to point out that ‘experimentation’ before marriage has been practised in societies, what would need to be shown is that if everyone adopted and followed a code of rules which was permissive, in the way liberal theorists want it to be, the happiness of all people would be promoted to a greater extent, than it would be if people adopted a more traditional one.

I don’t you could do that by waiving your hand and saying his position “doesn’t rule out pre-marital sex”. Nor is it achieved by noting that other societies have done it differently. What you’d need is some reason for thinking these societies promoted the goods in question in a better fashion. Certainly it’s not obvious that having women as concubines and rival wives, promotes their happiness as well as monogamy does for example. Nor is it obvious that the widespread infanticide in those societies suggests they promote the bringing up of children in stable environments where they can be reared well. It seems in those societies children could often be cast aside when they weren’t convenient. Women could be and were dumped and left with the baby often.

For what it’s worth Paley had a pretty straight forward argument that extra maritial sex was ruled out. After noting the utility of an institution where men commit to loving women and bringing up children in a stable environment. He went on to point out that men tend to be strongly motivated to avoid celibacy and will do almost anything to fulfil their sex drive. So adopting a rule where fulfillment of that drive is annexed to certain other duties regarding focusing all your undivided devotion on one women and being committed to bringing up children with her, highly incentivises those goods. If you can get laid easily and effectively without doing those things, without having to care for children or the women in question then you remove those incentives and women and children suffer as a result. I don’t find that obviously implausible.

Nor is it implausible that more liberal norms have lead to this, my wife is a family lawyer and almost every horror story she hears starts with, “I met this guy and two days later we….”

“The point isn't that this is right or good, it's that Natural Law doesn't in any way naturalize sexual desire or sexuality generally. Such a view isn't even compatible with Natural Law. That is at bottom the problem with medical metaphors for homosexuality that would normally refer to disability and disease.”

I don’t think that follows, if you have the kind of natural law theory I am suggesting then the commands God issues reflect Gods purpose or will for human beings, hence certain actions are natural in a teleological sense. Gods telos is for you to coordinate your actions with other people to promote the happiness of all. This includes bringing into existence new human beings in environments where they can be cared for an brought up, and to do this in certain kinds of ways. Failure to do this therefore is to use your life, activity, body and reproductive abilities in ways contrary to your telos, so you still have the “un natural element” but it works out in a different way than it does with Aquinas.

No concept of homosexual acts? I don't believe that for a second. That's not even remotely plausible.

Whether it is plausible to you given a certain framework or context that you are working with, it's just an empirical reality whether they do or not. It's fairly easy to search for information. There are the primitive tribes who have no words for numbers above 2 or 3, there can just as well be tribes that have no experience of or conception of homosexual acts.

http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/12/where-masturbation-and-homosexuality-do-not-exist/265849/

Yeah, I really have no idea why Mark thinks that's so implausible. Lots of people of my generation (I'm middle-aged, in case anyone is wondering), both male and female, had to be told what homosexual men do together. We just never would have thought of it on our own. It doesn't really matter whether you call that "sheltering" or whatever. The point is that the information was socially communicated. It wasn't something people were just dreaming up out of nowhere all over the place on their own, just because.

That's not to say that multiple people _haven't_ dreamt up the idea of homosexual sodomy all on their own or that there had to be some "ur-sodomite" from whom all others got the idea or anything extreme like that. It's just to say that the idea often is taught rather than spontaneously invented. Plausibly, it is promiscuous societies like our own that are _abnormal_, and people raised where these perverted ideas were "in the air" have gotten a bizarre idea that such ideas are lurking around in the minds of all humans or something, like the "innate ideas" the modern philosophers used to argue about! Those of us of an older generation, and those of us who raise more "sheltered" children, find it entirely plausible that there could be entire "sheltered" societies that don't happen to dream up such perversions.

One can see how someone who believes in the "born that way" thesis actually _would_ try to insist that the concept of homosexual acts is a kind of "innate idea." But since Mark emphatically rejects that thesis, I'm not quite sure (and don't really care much) why he also emphatically rejects the claim about the Ngandu people and their fortunate lack of such disgusting ideas.

I don’t think that follows, if you have the kind of natural law theory I am suggesting then the commands God issues reflect Gods purpose or will for human beings, hence certain actions are natural in a teleological sense. Gods telos is for you to coordinate your actions with other people to promote the happiness of all. This includes bringing into existence new human beings in environments where they can be cared for an brought up, and to do this in certain kinds of ways. Failure to do this therefore is to use your life, activity, body and reproductive abilities in ways contrary to your telos, so you still have the “un natural element” but it works out in a different way than it does with Aquinas.

Matthew, are you saying here that the teleology involved doesn't pertain to the individual at all but only to the individual qua member of society, or something of that kind? A notion of "teleology" that is somewhat foreign to me, I must say. It wouldn't seem to have anything to say to a man on a desert island, though it does seem that we could dream up (let's not try to give examples) unnatural acts that a man alone on an island could engage in.


Matthew, are you saying here that the teleology involved doesn't pertain to the individual at all but only to the individual qua member of society, or something of that kind?

I don’t think I was saying that. My point is that simply that on the view I am discussing, God has a purpose he wants humans to bring about through there co-ordinated actions and hence teleology is involved.

Now of course ultimately these commands are addressed to individuals. Suppose God issues commands humans to refrain from sexual gratification outside of marriage. Suppose, he does this because he wants humans to bring into existence new human beings in environments where they can be cared for and a code containing this rule promotes this goal, alongside others relating to human happiness, as well as or better than alternative codes would. This command will be one that all individuals will be subject to, every individual will be commanded to refrain from such actions, and this is because God’s purpose or goal is for every individual to use their sexual organs to promote this goal. So I think the teleology relates to individuals.

A notion of "teleology" that is somewhat foreign to me, I must say. It wouldn't seem to have anything to say to a man on a desert island, though it does seem that we could dream up (let's not try to give examples) unnatural acts that a man alone on an island could engage in.

That’s a really interesting example, of the top of my head I guess I’d say two things.

First, the position I am suggesting is “rule utilitarian” not "act utilitarian". So the question isn’t whether a person on a deserted islands acts would promote the goals in question. It is whether the acts he performs would be permitted by a code of rules such which is such that if everyone followed them these goals would be promoted.

The only way that I could see that this would lead to the conclusion you suggest is that if the rules in question had a "deserted island" exception clause written into them. But there is a familiar point rule utilitarian’s make that, optimal moral codes, shouldn’t have lots of complicated exception clauses specified for every single rare hypothetical situation that might come up. To function as rules for all people, they should be relatively easy for most people to understand, learn, follow, and teach to others. So you want some general rules that cover most circumstances a person is likely to face, and a few standard exceptions which again reflect common situations. (a prohibition on killing and self-defense for example).

Second, it seems to me a person on a deserted island is already in a situation outside of what Gods purposes would be. I assume God didn’t create humans to live in solitary environments, but his goal is for them to work with and serve others, and co-ordinate their activity with them and so on.

"Lots of people of my generation (I'm middle-aged, in case anyone is wondering), both male and female, had to be told what homosexual men do together."

The proliferation of pornography has had a lot to do with the communication of the knowledge of sexually perverse behaviors, including, prominently, those of both male and female homosexuals.

Second, it seems to me a person on a deserted island is already in a situation outside of what Gods purposes would be.

In a sense, that _might_ be true. But we can stipulate that it's through no fault of his own. If one is going to think of a theory as a form of "natural law" at all, it should apply to people who find themselves in weird or bizarre circumstances and have to do what is right and avoid what is wrong in those circumstances. Also, Christian tradition has held that there can be particular people who are called to an unusual life of, say, prayer and isolation or semi-isolation--holy hermits, etc.

OK, but part of natural law - the parts about forming families, societies, and governments - CAN'T be satisfied by a man alone on a desert island. It would be difficult to even state the natural law fully in terms of his situation.

It would be difficult to even state the natural law fully in terms of his situation.

Certain prohibitions would definitely still apply. There would be unnatural acts that he *could* perform but *shouldn't*. As in any situation, there are simply some things that are non-applicable to one's own situation and some things that are. To pick an example that's not too gross, suppose that it's part of the natural law that torturing animals for fun is wrong. Then the guy on the desert island isn't supposed to torture the goats he raises for food.

"Sure? I can't speak for him, but how can you be sure? If it's true that people can be genetically predisposed to alcoholism, I can't imagine why it wouldn't also be true that homosexuality couldn't also be a genetic predisposition, and much other complex moral behaviors as well."

I can't speak before the fact, but after the fact, it is well-known that alcoholism causes measurable changes in the brain - specifically, the pre-frontal cortex, as well as modifies the DNA in the brain when used chronically and in high doses. I am unaware of any research on homosexual acts altering the brain in a permanent fashion, after the fact.

The fact that there are genuine changes in the brain of certain drinkers (and for all drinkers if the drinking is heavy and over a lifetime) means that there are different mechanism of activity between alcohol and homosexual sex and these mechanism can, sometimes, be encoded, genetically (we can, to a very limited degree, test the genetic links to these mechanism). Similarly, is a predisposition to depression genetically encoded? Only some types. In other words, there are multiple routes to depression, some of them using mechanisms that are genetically encoded, some not.

In other words, it is probable that certain routes to alcoholism are genetically primed in certain individuals, while other may become alcoholics from more direct physical effects - once the brain DNA is altered, it appears to be permanent, requiring continuous doses of alcohol to function - this type of alcoholism is not genetic, but an effect, after the fact.

We do not have a good handle on sexual attraction or arousal, neurologically speaking. At this point in history, it is impossible to separate out homosexuality that may be disposed through genetics and homosexuality that results from environmental factors.

I do not like the language of disability. Infertility is a disability - aninability to utilize sex to its proper ends. Homosexuals are not disabled in that sense. Many could become fathers and mothers. Love is no longer seen as an act of the will, but of the affect. Homosexuality is an affective disorder, not an affective disability, per se, since feelings are not the locus of activity for loving behavior - the will is, when properly disciplined by the intellect. Feelings have been elevated to a place they shouldn't go. This may account for some of the vitriol in the responses to Swinburne.

The Chicken

Yeah, I really have no idea why Mark thinks that's so implausible. Lots of people of my generation (I'm middle-aged, in case anyone is wondering), both male and female, had to be told what homosexual men do together.

I don't care what these articles say, I grew up on a farm where you see this all the time. Pets do these things all the time. Not to know this would require complete isolation from other kids that do. Now strictly speaking, I don't call this homosexual activity. That's a loaded term. But it's same-sex stuff either way.

Facts of sex, not necessarily homo of course, for men even who aren't shown anything about masturbation there are at least dreams that make for ... do I really have to say it? Where do those dreams come from? Who whispers it in their ear? Sex is all around us. We can't avoid it.

tell is also a fact that nocturnal

To be able to knock the argument out it wouldn’t be enough to point out that ‘experimentation’ before marriage has been practised in societies, what would need to be shown is that if everyone adopted and followed a code of rules which was permissive, in the way liberal theorists want it to be, the happiness of all people would be promoted to a greater extent, than it would be if people adopted a more traditional one.
I don’t you could do that by waiving your hand and saying his position “doesn’t rule out pre-marital sex”. Nor is it achieved by noting that other societies have done it differently. What you’d need is some reason for thinking these societies promoted the goods in question in a better fashion.

I generally don’t have a problem with utilitarian arguments within certain limits for societal concerns within a framework of certain political and moral absolutes. To the extent that society does it's fine by me and even good. But outside of such a fairly well-known limiting frameworks, and certainly in terms of individual and personal ethics, utilitarianism is an egregious abomination that has very few adherents today, because of the well-known reason that it can justify virtually anything. So the “if everyone did that” argument may have some merit, but I was addressing two issues in the two main paragraphs of my comments here. They were individually addressed, the first to Matthew’s remarks and the second to Lydia’s.

The first (preceded by “replying to Mattthew’s comment”) was to Matthew’s point and the second (preceded by “As for having babies ‘the old fashioned way’”) was about Lydia’s point. In the latter, my use of the term Natural Law shows I didn’t take myself to be addressing utilitarianism in any way.

It’s highly problematic to say what is essential about parenting is:

There is that whole "participation in the mystery of being" feeling. There are all the special bonds between the child and his biological parents--you look like dad, you look like Grandma Jones, etc.

The examples of polygamy and child rearing were about that. The examples were to answer in terms of whether inheritance forms an essential feature or highest form of family life, and those features aren’t unique to the two parent household. I do believe the two parent family is the superior one, the ideal, but the point is whether or not we could give arguments for why this is the superior form without running afoul of a view if it went so far as to claim that is what’s “really real” or the highest form of human nature in parenthood and family has to do with recognition of children’s inherited characteristics. I'm not saying anyone is saying that, but I'm saying we ought not to and can't in fact say that.

So the question is whether or not we could argue for such a view of parenthood and family at the same time, rather than on one occasion for one and then on another occasion for the other, in each instance leaving unspoken the particular assumptions that inherently contradict each other if the two were to be considered together. I don’t see how. Nature is to naturalism as science is to scientism, and I’m not going to repeat Aquinas definition of NL. I’m anything but a Natural Law zealot. I don’t think it solves so much as most people referring to it tend to think, and I think so much accretion has been glommed onto it later by the manualists and more recently others trying to claim the mantle of Thomism that make Aquinas’ originally minimalist view out to be some massive body of doctrine. The only real points I’ve made about NL per se here have to do with what it can’t be.

I don’t think that follows, if you have the kind of natural law theory I am suggesting then the commands God issues reflect Gods purpose or will for human beings, hence certain actions are natural in a teleological sense.

This isn’t saying much, since natural law even encompasses non-moral (scientific) law strictly speaking. But private versions of natural law theories don't interest me. It's like a private language. They are mythical beasts.

It’s highly problematic to say what is essential about parenting is

Because I *totally* said that that is "what is essential about parenting." Why, I'm sure I even said somewhere that that is *all* that is essential about parenting, right?

Oh, wait, no, I said exactly the opposite. I said,

I didn't intend my comment about the mystery of being and the old-fashioned way of making babies to be a total and complete description of the underlying facts of human nature that make monogamous heterosexuality the only right and good use of human sexuality.

>> Calm down Lydia. I read that. Note that I said "I'm not saying anyone is saying that, but I'm saying we ought not to and can't in fact say that."

This isn't about you, believe it or not.

Whether it is plausible to you given a certain framework or context that you are working with, it's just an empirical reality whether they do or not. It's fairly easy to search for information. There are the primitive tribes who have no words for numbers above 2 or 3, there can just as well be tribes that have no experience of or conception of homosexual acts.

I should have googled first? Ay Caramba. It makes not a whit of difference if they have a word for it or not. And just because anthropologists haven't gotten their subjects to admit that something happens after years of research doesn't mean it doesn't happen. And have we forgotten the lesson of Margaret Mead's Samoan studies?

But now that I have read it, first I note that even the researchers offer this disclaimer:

"... it's entirely possible that homosexual desire does exist in these groups, at least for some of their members (so to speak). ... When I put this to the Hewletts, they replied that indeed, the desire may exist in some individuals in these groups, but we simply do not know. They added that although the Aka and Ngandu live in small groups, "They travel extensively and our studies suggest each person knows about 400-500 individuals," which means that, theoretically, a person with homosexual desires might find another person with the same. But in a culture in which the general idea of a desire doesn't exist, such a desire might remain unarticulated, even if two people who share it find each other."

But okay kids, let's have another go at this. I took the statement about not having the “concept of homosexual acts” (as opposed to “homosexual behavior” or “homosexual sex”) on its face as meaning the idea of either sexual experimentation or even the idea of a person’s bringing pleasure by genital stimulation. In the latter case, this fact is known by the same means by which one learns of it oneself. I took the statement to mean mere same-sex stimulation that brings pleasure, and it was a claim that no concept for that would exist without explicit teaching or imitation. Maybe others are reading the original statement to say more than I did. Unsurprisingly, after having now looked at the article I can see it equivocates on the meaning of ‘homosexual’.

Genital manipulation brings pleasure, and if that isn’t noticed or observed even accidentally rubbing up against things would bring this about. I’ve seen four year old girls touching themselves in public. I seriously doubt they're imitating mom or dad. They learn their parents scold them for doing it, and they stop when they’re around at least. This isn’t sexual activity per se since they’ve no knowledge of what that is. Girls and boys as siblings take baths together until a certain age, and they notice differences as they play and splash together. This isn’t sexual play per se either. But it’s pleasurable nonetheless. But again they learn that parents scold them for doing this, and of course eventually they won’t be taking baths together. But I’m supposed to believe that between when they learned these things about humanity and themselves and when they start to become aware of their sexuality, they don’t connect the knowledge of ones from early childhood to the later ones? Well some might actually not, but the idea that this information and the stories told about it and scoldings not to do such things just vanish from their world in a few years seems pretty odd and to me incredible.

Or the idea that kids coming of age don’t associate what is happening to them with the sex acts they witness in animals on the farm or in the wild? One would have to claim it would never occur to them that it's even possible to get stimulated by another person of the same sex? So a monkey can find out how to get an inanimate object out of reach on a high shelf just for the sheer fun of it by getting a box to stand on, or just for the fun of seeing if this is the object that will fit in the hole of the other object he’s been given (if that isn’t suggestive enough I don’t know what to tell you). But on the other hand a curious human adolescent coming of age can’t even imagine other possible experiences, let alone be curious about them unless they have explicit teaching or modeling to inform them? We’re talking about the same rational beings that enjoy the feeling of experiencing their own fear?

But on the other hand a curious human adolescent coming of age can’t even imagine other possible experiences, let alone be curious about them unless they have explicit teaching or modeling to inform them?

Nobody said "can't". And all the hullabaloo about "homosexual acts" vs "homosexual sex" aside, Lots and lots of people do in fact have no notion of sodomy until it is actually detailed to them when they are adults. If it is possible for many people to reach mature years without the concept, it is possible for a society to do without the concept also.

But this is all neither here nor there for the point of Lydia's post, nor critical to her point in commenting about people having no concept of the signature male homosexual act. I suggest we drop this and talk about something substantive:

The point isn't that this is right or good, it's that Natural Law doesn't in any way naturalize sexual desire or sexuality generally. Such a view isn't even compatible with Natural Law. That is at bottom the problem with medical metaphors for homosexuality that would normally refer to disability and disease.

Mark, I don't get what you mean here. Can you elucidate what you mean by using "Natural Law" here? Or, "naturalize".

Well I'm of the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition. I just found it to be the most helpful. It mirrors my own experience on many things that have no other good explanation that I know of.

Though all are appetites, the sexual appetite has a more complex structure than the appetites of eating and drinking. Sight is involved far more for one. The sight of arousing objects can initiates the appetite but can also be enough to give pleasure.

By "naturalize" I mean to reduce something complex to something less so. A reduction of a complex phenomenon to it's underlying biological proximate cause. Obtaining pleasure and I would think especially the avoidance of discomfort from sexual uh, tension seem to me very primal things. Things we share with the animals. So to "naturalize" sexuality or sexual desire in my view would be to reduce the process or habit by which people come to select objects of erotic appetite down to the biological urges that are fulfilled by them.

On this view, "homosexual desire" is technically a misnomer, as is "heterosexual desire". It's just erotic desire fulfilled in different ways. It's like saying "hunger for pasta". Is there a hunger for pasta? Isn't it hunger that habit or conditioning makes us fulfill in various ways according to our imagination, custom, or habit? As far as I know, the ancient view (Aristotelian) isn't that we eat what we like, but that we come to like what we're in the habit of eating. In other words, all foods are acquired tastes. They aren't inherently pleasurable in themselves, aside from the alleviation of hunger pangs which would again be the lower level biological aspect.

This can easily be demonstrated, or known simply by reflection, but people cling so tightly to their preferences and these ancient ideas are no longer known. So people imagine that they their food choices are natural to them. Many people get downright hostile over the suggestion that their preference for blue cheese over yellow is technically arbitrary. "No, no. I just like it. I just do!" They think if it were true that would take something cherished away from them. It might, but it'd be the habit not the cheese itself.

A large part of the reason people believe their desires are natural, and probably also why the ancient views on such things went bye-bye in my view is what the Christian philosopher René Girard calls "The Romantic Lie". The most concise explanation of I know of is in this video between min 9:15 - 18:45. The lie is essentially "that our desire and purposes arise from some creative inner depth within ourselves".

So having in mind what I mean by "naturalizing" sexuality or sexual desire (or any other), the only view of NL I'd really ever care to defend can be found here in the two sentences beginning with "Because the rational creature's relation to the eternal law is so different from that of any other created thing ... NL is nothing else than the rational creature's participation of the eternal law". I hope this explains what I mean in saying "naturalized" desires aren't compatible with the NL. Naturalism naturalizes, and a naturalized man isn't a rational man. That's the best I can do. I'm not going to argue this, just stating it. It's a minority view now of course.

I will say that the above view is what postmodernism is here to save us from. I think the narrative thing misses the point. They think we've lost our bodies and our emotions in the Enlightenment. The emotions in fact have a deep and rich tradition in the Aristotelian-Thomistic understanding, but the caricature of philosophy accepted by the pomos is roughly I suppose what Etienne Gilson called medieval "logicism", which was typified probably by Abelard and quite unbalanced and misguided. Postmodernism is comfortable with naturalism and romanticism. Feminism and romanticism are the two views that claim to correct our supposed lack of emotional understanding or feeling in the modern world. Something like that.

By "naturalize" I mean to reduce something complex to something less so. A reduction of a complex phenomenon to it's underlying biological proximate cause.

Thanks, Mark, I think I begin to see your point of view. I never would have been able to pull that sense out of “naturalize” without your explanation, I was thinking along 2 or 3 other possible senses for it that have nothing to do with what you are using it for. Thanks for the clarification. Let me offer a slightly different picture, one that overlaps with yours to some degree but comes at it from a different angle. As you did, I am not arguing for this, I am merely painting a picture of the position.

In considering man’s nature as rational animal, we could say man’s “sharing with the animals” various appetitive faculties is more of an analogy than a simple congruence. We can perhaps speak of the desire for food with maybe less angst than dealing with sex to get a handle on the idea. In the higher animals that we are most familiar with, such as dogs, cats, horses, etc, there is an appetite for food that seems to regard food as desirable mainly under 2 different sorts of aspects: to fill the belly, and to satisfy the taste. Each of these can be observed in various behaviors: an animal usually will stop eating roughly when it is full, or maybe a little past full, more or less (the stomach is adjustable in size, so it’s a relative sort of limit). Also, an animal will display a definite preference for one food over another food even when the animal will readily eat either one. (By which I am not in the least proposing that it's preference for the one is a "natural" desire).

Humans appear to share with the animals similarities, in terms of the desire to feel a full belly, and the desire for foods that taste good. What makes these analogous desires rather than desires of the same kind simply is the integration of rationality in man. For the rational nature subsumes these so that they become reason-oriented-desires, not merely brute desires IN a rational being. What’s the difference? I think that it may be easier to see the difference clearly by speaking of man as he was without original sin, because sin damaged us just there in that difference. In Adam, the desire to have a fully belly and the desire for good-tasting food would have been ordered under a rational principle, so that the foods desired and the amounts desired would have been such foods and such amounts as served for the whole good of man – and, particularly, would have been desired precisely insofar as fitting for the man as a whole.

We still see remnants of this in man even as vitiated by original sin: when a host and hostess set out a well-planned banquet for a group of friends, they consider healthful foods, and amounts, of course, and they choose foods that everybody will like, but they go farther than that. They choose individual foods that complement each other’s tastes, so that the accumulated tastes of the whole dinner are, to the comparing ad critiquing faculties, more than the sum of the individual good-tasting foods. And, they prepare a beautiful setting, as well as choosing the foods and drinks – wine, beer, liqueurs – that not only satisfy the palate, but also serve to make the event more convivial, so that the act of dining together cements the group as a community of persons regarding the welfare of the whole as ordered to man’s ultimate good. And what serves to highlight the rationalizing (rather than the inadequate “naturalizing”) aspect of this is that the conscious recognition of the food serving – all at the same time – as healthful energy, filling the stomach, piqueing the tastebuds, engaging the higher comparing and critiquing faculties, and building the good of the community, all for the greater glory of God, is ITSELF a cause of joy and delight in the diners.

To reduce this all to merely the desire to fill the belly and to pique the palate is to do a disservice to the nature of the appetite as present in man.

So, while man does prefer a full belly over an empty belly, all other things being equal, and does prefer good-tasting foods over ill-tasting ones all other things being equal, the man in whom reason rules properly DOES NOT prefer the feeling of a full belly when a full belly is deleterious to his true welfare – such as when he is entering a strenuous athletic competition. In most of us, who have not fully trained our faculties to be submissive to the will and to reason, this feeling is at best contentious within us – our members fighting the will – but in the man of well-seated virtue, the appetite _itself_ is regulated so as to follow the reason docilely, and the appetite in operation consists in desiring well the good things it has as its object, including desiring them in respect of the limits that limit how they impinge on his true good.

However, our language and terminology may lag somewhat behind our understanding in this: we generally use the same WORDS for the appetites that we humans have as for what the animals have, regarding food and other sensible goods. So, if we speak of the “appetite” itself, as such, without regard to whether it be well-regulated or unregulated, we might speak of the appetite as being “for food” undifferentiated, and thus we might think that the appetite is simply “for food” without any further teleological determination than that. But that is reductive: the reality of the appetite is that in man it has a teleology different than what it has in animals, and thus its proper END is different than the end of the appetite in animals: it is not really the “same appetite” after all.

Man as a rational animal isn’t man who has reason added over and on top of animal goods (i.e. the cleverest ape able to use reason to meet the needs of the belly); no, he is man whose reason lifts and ennobles the sensible goods to a new order – the rational order pointed at a higher end than that of animals: the contemplation of God.

The same principle holds for the sexual appetite: the appetite in man has a teleological determination in love of persons in community, directed to (again) love of God. Pope Saint JPII made this point extensively in Familiaris Consortio. The man of good habit does not just have sex only with his wife; he desires only to have sex with his wife, and only in such manner and such times as is fitting to the good of the persons involved – including the person(s) who may be conceived therein, to be born into a permanent community of love.

Tony,
This was excellent.Very much appreciated.

Man as a rational animal isn’t man who has reason added over and on top of animal goods (i.e. the cleverest ape able to use reason to meet the needs of the belly); no, he is man whose reason lifts and ennobles the sensible goods to a new order – the rational order pointed at a higher end than that of animals: the contemplation of God.

Not clear on the validity of distinction you're making. Rational animal was a term in use since before the birth of Christ for a reason. It means what it says. It isn't as though people were squeamish about that.

Moral excellence is rare. That is its nature. Those displaying less than moral excellence, and that may be all of us, and if not it has been all of us, are not less than men/women/human. Characteristically human acts are not just those that are morally excellent, though it includes them of course. I mean yeah, people may say "now that's a real man!. Meaning better than the average man or excellent. And yes, it means rising above his animal instincts and such. But in what way and how? It doesn't get at a definition of what is unique about man in the most general terms. What types of actions and behavior distinguishes humans from other beings? I can't do better than the wikipedia page:

Aristotle states that the human being has a rational principle, on top of the nutritive life shared with plants, and the instinctual life shared with other animals, i.e. the ability to carry out rationally formulated projects, That capacity for deliberative imagination was equally singled out as man's defining feature in De anima III.11. While seen by Aristotle as a universal human feature, the definition applied to wise and foolish alike, and did not in any way imply necessarily the making of rational (poor word choice here I think) choices, as opposed to the ability to make them.

We can say humans were made to glorify God. But all creation was made to do that, so what is it that enables humans to glorify God according to their nature? Whether on thinks it is the beatific vision or enjoying God forever in heaven, those are ends rather than means.

Not clear on the validity of distinction you're making. Rational animal was a term in use since before the birth of Christ for a reason.

Sure, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle were talking about it 400 years BC. Nothing I said was intended to refer to anything that changed with the coming of Christ. Nor based on revelation.

It means what it says. It isn't as though people were squeamish about that.

Aristotle held that man’s highest act was contemplation of God, to know God in a higher way than animals can know him. St. Thomas said this about it:

Final and perfect happiness can consist in nothing else than the vision of the Divine Essence.

What distinguishes man from the other animals is man’s reason. As a result, the behavior of man that is distinct to man as man is, in sum, the kind of behavior in which man by reason freely chooses and directs himself to proximate and intermediate ends oriented toward his final end, so that the man is, under his own capacity to deliberate, prioritize, and choose, making his whole life suit his final end. (Animals operate to serve their final end not by knowledge of it and free choice of it, but by instinct or other non-free-will operation).

That is to say, man isn’t man primarily in cleverly orienting proximate behavior toward
an end like food as if that were a final end. Man acting specifically as man occurs when he chooses, consciously and by reason, to order his intermediate ends, and then his proximate ends, to the due distinctively human final end. By doing so his whole life becomes the life of reason, i.e. the kind of life suited to a rational animal.

Moral excellence is rare. That is its nature. Those displaying less than moral excellence, and that may be all of us, and if not it has been all of us, are not less than men/women/human. Characteristically human acts are not just those that are morally excellent, though it includes them of course.

I agree, sort of, but I would distinguish: the behavior that properly characterizes man distinctively as man is the kind of behavior that says what man does when he is functioning and operating properly, i.e. to succeed in being man fully. Behavior that approaches to this partially but not fully is behavior that is, perhaps, typical and common, but is not “characteristic” of man as such. It is, rather, approaching toward the fully human. What specifies a thing’s nature is what it looks like when it is successful, when it is doing what is needed for it to be in act what it is made to be. In beings that do not have free will, such as rocks, plants and animals, their behavior will usually look like what their behavior ought to look like, i.e. what it looks like when the animal is being successful as that kind of animal, but the same cannot be said for morally free agents. With us, what we do typically cannot be treated as directly indicative of what it means to be successful as man, i.e as what it is our nature to be. What is normative to a moral agent might not be typical behavior.

I mean yeah, people may say "now that's a real man!. Meaning better than the average man or excellent. And yes, it means rising above his animal instincts and such.

Or, rising above the instincts of animals to meet human standards that fit with human nature.

But in what way and how? It doesn't get at a definition of what is unique about man in the most general terms.

In general: By using reason to deliberate on, and then using the rational appetite of free will to choose, the proximate and intermediate ends that properly serve the due final end of man. In particular: choosing acts of eating, sleeping, working, playing, studying, and praying that proximately are considered and chosen so as to fit into a life ordered to that final end of man – all of which cumulatively constitute the specifically human life lived well because it is human life lived under reason from top to bottom.

What types of actions and behavior distinguishes humans from other beings?

Eating with reason orienting that to the final end, playing with reason orienting that to the final end, working with reason orienting that to the final end, etc. Doing the things animals must do to live and live well, and doing them so that they are reason-imbued behavior.

We can say humans were made to glorify God. But all creation was made to do that, so what is it that enables humans to glorify God according to their nature? Whether on thinks it is the beatific vision or enjoying God forever in heaven, those are ends rather than means.

Lions glorify God by being good hunters, rabbits do it by hearing well and running fast, etc. Humans do it by knowing and choosing well: knowing the principles of things, and (especially) in knowing the cause of causes. And in choosing well: in willing freely to do what is suited to his rational animal nature: choosing to love God and to love men as reflecting God. The two wholly intellectual powers are reason and will, and man's excellence is the operations of these facutlies.

I know nothing about the website this appears on, but it looks like a relatively accurate copy of Gerard Manley Hopkins' sermon notes for "The Principle or Foundation." Tony, I thought of it when I read your post of Oct. 9, 9:52 p.m.

https://thevalueofsparrows.com/2012/10/11/god-101-instructions-the-principle-or-foundation-by-gerard-manley-hopkins/

"But amidst them all is man, man and the angels: we will speak of man. Man was created. Like the rest then to praise, reverence, and serve God; to give him glory. He does so, even by his being, beyond all visible creatures: 'What a piece of work is man!' But man can know God, can mean to give him glory. This then was why he was made, to give God glory and to mean to give it; to praise God freely, willingly to reverence him, gladly to serve him. Man was made to give, and meant to give, God glory."

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