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"Substance" doesn't mean what you think it means

Via First Things, I found out about this frustrating piece by Charles Krauthammer. Before I get to a discussion of "substance," I want to pause a bit to talk about just how silly Krauthammer is being. First, as Matthew J. Franck points out, there is no "profound disagreement" about when "ensoulment" takes place which lies behind opposition to pro-life efforts. Nor is there any such profound disagreement in the pro-life camp. As a sheer sociological matter, Krauthammer's reference to "profound disagreement" on "ensoulment" is nonsense on stilts. As Franck says, on the pro-choice side there are "sophisticated pseudo-arguments purporting to complicate the question whether, and when, we can call these human beings 'persons' with a right not to be killed by others." But these do not arise from theological hangups about ensoulment. Far from it. Usually they arise from a naturalistic idea that man is not special but rather is just another animal and that it is "speciesist" to treat membership in the human race as per se conferring value.

Another point that Franck doesn't get to is Krauthammer's weird ideas about democratic process. Krauthammer makes the following convoluted suggestion:

[R]egarding early abortions, the objective should be persuasion — creating some future majority —rather than legislative coercion in the absence of a current majority. These are the constraints of a democratic system.

Thanks for the civics lecture, Dr. Krauthammer, but it seems that it is you who needs a review on the subject of democratic process. Please tell us in what state of the union or under what constitutional provision pro-lifers could possibly engage in "legislative coercion in the absence of a current majority"? How is that supposed to work, precisely? And what is its connection to the lack of consensus in America over legislation and early abortion? Please be specific. Because last time I looked, legislation has to be passed by a majority of legislators, so regardless of whether we are trying to protect unborn children early or late in pregnancy, "legislative coercion" is going to happen only if, y'know, a majority of legislators vote for it. So Krauthammer just appears not to know what he's talking about.

I also note in passing that Krauthammer's airy advice to focus on late-term abortion and "get it banned" ignores the little problem of Roe v. Wade and the Supreme Court. To read Krauthammer, anyone would think pro-lifers have been sitting around like a bunch of dummies for the past forty-one years doing nothing effective because no one ever suggested to them trying to ban late-term abortions. I'm sure pro-life activists will all rise up upon reading Krauthammer's column, slap themselves on the foreheads, and say, "Why didn't I think of that?" Then we can just march on out there and ban late-term abortions coast to coast, and it will all be due to the sapience of Krauthammer. Let me know when to contact my legislator on the proposed ban, Dr. Krauthammer, and then please tell us what is going to happen when the pro-aborts sue under Roe within a nanosecond.

But let's go back to that ensoulment issue. I have recently had a debate in a private forum with someone who isn't in fact a naturalist but does believe that those without "sufficient" brains are not persons and bases this upon something like the "ensoulment" argument. This is unusual, as Franck points out, because, although pro-aborts often try to muddy the waters (as Krauthammer tellingly does) by throwing around the word "ensoulment," real debates about when a soul or mind "enters" an unborn child are rarely actually relevant to the pro-life debate. Most of the pro-aborts don't believe in souls anyway.

It is, in fact, a good thing for pro-lifers to recognize that the "ensoulment" question is for the most part a distraction from the pro-life argument. The pro-lifer should usually be arguing from the fact that the unborn child is a human being and that it is self-evident that all human beings have value and that innocent human beings should not be killed.

But then there are the personhood theorists, a la Peter Singer, who will say that human beings don't all have value. And just once in a great while, one comes upon a personhood theorist who borrows Singer's baloney about "speciesism" but who, unlike Singer, actually believes in the mind or soul and actually believes that early embryos (and some developed human beings) don't have one. Again, it should be a reductio of any position if it entails that it isn't wrong to kill infants, even those with "not enough brain," but if someone is genuinely worried by the metaphysics, it doesn't hurt to have a compelling account to give in reply.

So, as to metaphysics. I myself am not a hylemorphist and do accept that the mind and the body are different "types of stuff," for which the word "substance" might as well be used. Scripture teaches that God is a spirit (obviously, apart from the Incarnation), so entirely immaterial beings are possible. And rocks, presumably, are entirely material entities. So matter can exist without mind and mind can exist without matter. Christian doctrine also teaches that our minds/souls will exist disembodied between our deaths and the resurrection. I believe that my disembodied existence will be my own existence, so apparently I can exist without a body.

So far so good. A problem can arise, however, if one takes this notion that my mind is a different "kind of stuff" from my body to mean that each one of us normal members of homo sapiens is literally composed of two beings--the mind, on the one hand, and the "human animal" or body, on the other. But here the interactive dualist should call foul. "Two substances" is not at all the same thing as "two beings."

By analogy, consider water. Water is composed of hydrogen and oxygen. Hydrogen and oxygen are two different kinds of atoms, and each can exist apart from the other. But water exists only when they come together. Water, a composite substance made up of both hydrogen and oxygen, has properties that neither hydrogen nor oxygen has by itself.

Similarly, a disembodied human mind is, in an important sense, not a full-orbed and normal human being. A disembodied human soul is the soul of a human being waiting for a new body in a state which is not the state God originally intended it to have. (The actual separation of the human mind and body, which we call death, was the result of the Fall.) And a human body without any human soul, all our evidence indicates, simply dies and decays. (Newsflash: Zombies aren't real.) So a human being is a composite entity, like water, made up of two "types of stuff" which are intimately bonded and intimately interact in ways so incredibly complex as to make the chemical bonds that create water look like a baby puzzle by comparison. This interactive composite entity, a man, a human being, is normally able to do all kinds of things--he talks, sings, enjoys food and music, sleeps, contemplates sunsets, helps and harms other embodied beings, and conceives children. And he is enabled to do these things precisely because he is in his natural state an embodied being. The interaction of mind and body brings properties, such as the property of being able to conceive a child in a uniquely human way involving both mind and body, into existence that would not come into being if mind and body were always separate.

This is what I call "taking interaction seriously." Being a substance dualist doesn't have to mean not taking interaction seriously, and it certainly shouldn't mean considering oneself to be literally two entities, two beings, that "just happen" to be connected. The human mind was meant for the human body, and the human body was meant for the human mind. That is why their interaction is, under normal circumstances, so seamless and natural. It is highly doubtful that it would be meaningful to refer to a being that is not only disembodied but was never meant to be embodied in the first place as "me." It is essential to the nature of my soul that it is the type of soul that is meant to be connected to a human body. That is what makes it a human soul rather than, say, an angelic soul or the soul of some disembodied alien species.

Once we take embodiment seriously and take seriously the nature of a human being as a mind-body entity, we should see the problem with worries about "ensoulment" or worries that a person in a long-term coma has "lost" his soul. Such proposals involve ignoring the fact that the unborn child or the comatose patient is a living human being. And if he is a human being, then he is the kind of being that by nature is a mind-body composite.

Here, too, the pro-life arguments from continuity come into play: Since the unborn child belongs to the same natural kind--the species homo sapiens--from the moment of conception throughout its development, it would be arbitrary to pick some magical point along the way and say, "This is the point where it comes to have a soul or a mind." Why think that such an arbitrary point exists, since it is manifestly the same kind of being all along?

Normally the answer has something to do with brain development or the probability of present consciousness. But here, again, pro-lifers have a long-standing relevant comeback--sleep and anesthesia. Evidently present consciousness and brain function sustaining such consciousness are not necessary for having a mind. I have a mind even when the brain function of sustaining consciousness has been switched off by anesthesia. My mind is simply asleep or unconscious--gone off-line, if you will. If brain function is not a necessary condition for having a mind, why should developed specific brain structures be a necessary condition in the type of being that we know to be like ourselves, a human being, hence, naturally a mind-body composite? It is plausible that those who have suffered severe brain damage or unborn children who have not developed very far do not have present consciousness, that they are like us when we are asleep or unconscious. But we have already established that present consciousness is not necessary for being a personal being with a mind. What ought to matter is what kind of being we are talking about. When the kind of being is a human being, there is every reason to take that being to "have a soul" or to "have a mind" throughout his life from conception to biological death.

So if you're one of those rare people whose commitment to the pro-life cause, perhaps for the unborn or perhaps for the severely mentally disabled, is shaky simply because you are worried that maybe this or that human being "doesn't have a mind," I invite you to draw the one reasonable conclusion: He does.

Comments (43)

Usually they arise from a naturalistic idea that man is not special but rather is just another animal and that it is "speciesist" to treat membership in the human race as per se conferring value.

That is a very interesting and compelling point.

Instead of making a claim about non-human persons, the other side makes a claim about non-personal humans. Denying the existence of one of the "substances" that comprise the human being, or denying the unitary nature of the human being, they arrive at the same place.

Someone like Singer, of course, affirms both non-human persons (viz. the Great Ape Project) and non-personal humans. It's part of his package deal. To make Singer himself even more bizarre, he's a utilitarian, so even innocent true-blue persons can be killed in his system if necessary for utilitarian reasons.

Trying to make a point about Obamacare mandating free contraceptives, he inexplicably began speculating that the reason behind the freebie was the Democrats’ belief that women need the federal government to protect them from their own libidos.

So what exactly is the point of the contraception mandate, then, if not to give sexually active women free reign to screw without risk of pregnancy?

Sounds EXACTLY like a case of women needing the federal government to protect them from their own libidos.

Smart man, that Huckabee.

Similarly, a disembodied human mind is, in an important sense, not a full-orbed and normal human being. A disembodied human soul is the soul of a human being waiting for a new body in a state which is not the state God originally intended it to have. (The actual separation of the human mind and body, which we call death, was the result of the Fall.) And a human body without any human soul, all our evidence indicates, simply dies and decays. (Newsflash: Zombies aren't real.) So a human being is a composite entity, like water, made up of two "types of stuff" which are intimately bonded and intimately interact in ways so incredibly complex as to make the chemical bonds that create water look like a baby puzzle by comparison.

Unless I'm misunderstanding something, which I very well might be, this sounds suspiciously like hylemorphism.

Marc Anthony, I and hylemorphists definitely agree on the unnaturalness of a disembodied mind if that disembodied mind is *of a kind* that was intended to be embodied (as in the case of man). We also agree on the intimacy of the mind-body connection for naturally embodied beings. Where we differ is on broader metaphysical questions concerning whether mind and body should be regarded as different "kinds of stuff" and whether the soul should be regarded as "the form of the body." On specifics, we also disagree in our analysis of the metaphysics of plants and other living but naturally non-conscious things. My understanding too is that most hylemorphists (all?) reject the primary-secondary quality distinction regarding matter, so we would also disagree there on questions such as whether color and warmth are intrinsic and primary physical properties. I could say a little more about my disagreements with hylemorphists but actually on this issue of human embodiment I think the _practical_ consequences and conclusions of our views would be nearly or wholly identical. We are just arriving there by somewhat different routes.

I have also seen Ed Feser address the issue of the disembodied human mind after death and I see him as inclined to emphasize its diminished state where I would merely emphasize its unnatural state. The two are not necessarily the same thing. I really don't know what our experiences after death and before the resurrection are going to be like, though I take Scripture definitely to indicate that we will be conscious and that those who go to be "with Christ" will be in a state of great happiness. Will we have utterly new types of conscious experiences that we cannot presently comprehend, types that we would consider "better" or "higher" than sensory experience? Will we have sensory-type experiences which are strictly speaking visions (since neither we nor what we encounter will be literally interacting physically)? Will God set up a kind of Berkeleyan universe for the dead-but-not-resurrected in which we interact with one another in what seems to be a law-like way similar to what we experienced here on earth? We aren't told any of this, and I'm reluctant to speak of our state as diminished or maimed or anything of that sort, though there is an important sense in which we will be missing a part of what our human nature was set up for--namely, our bodies--until the resurrection.

What is your opinion about Stephanie Keene? Surely there should have been no doubt about keeping her alive for as long as was medically possible, since God permitted her to be born and kept her alive for 2 years. It is not possible that she did not have a soul, as "bioethicists" believed, or will not be saved.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baby_K

I'm thinking I'm sensing sarcasm, here?

To answer directly: She was a person with as much of a right to life as you or I. And of course she had a soul. As far as what medical care she should have received, that question depends not on personhood theory nor on quality of life arguments but entirely on the appropriateness of the care received for the patient, whether it was ordinary or extraordinary, whether it was doing harm to her, and so forth. It appears that she needed only temporary ventilator assistance from time to time, that she could be weaned off the ventilator in between incidents and, moreover, that she was not being kept alive indefinitely on machines. Eventually she died of natural causes.

So what's the problem? Well, from the personhood theorists' perspective: A child the personhood theorists disdain as Lebensunwertes Leben actually lived for over two years, darn it! And her mother got to direct her care, not the Controllers who didn't think she was a person. Just think of all the vegan lunch sandwiches the cost of her care could have bought for underprivileged youth if only it had been turned over to the Controllers for Fair Distribution instead.

Not quite sure where you are coming from on this, DZ. At first I took you to be being sarcastic, but perhaps I misread you.

I had been thinking of posting about Krauthammer's article, but you've taken the fun out of it. Krauthammer appears these days to be revered as the wise man of the Fox News talk show lineup, and on some issues he is. Having taken him on before (here, for example, regarding leftover embryos), I'm not surprised to see that he is still comfortably agnostic regarding the existence of God and the value man. Several points:

1. He accuses Huckabee of saying that "the reason behind the freebie was the Democrats’ belief that women need the federal government to protect them from their own libidos. Bizarre. I can think of no Democrat who has ever said that, nor any liberal who even thinks that."

Well of course they don't say or think that. If they did they'd be conservative Republicans. But is what Huckabee accuses them of in fact what they do? Why yes it is. They appeal to the government (rather than their own capacity for self-governance) to facilitate their sex lives, however profligate or moderate, with free contraceptives. Even if we assume that most liberal women are by habit sexually ascetic, it must then be the case that they do not want this activity marred by the appearance of an unensouled, less than human human conceptus, which will be a pain in the ass to raise once it becomes human, whenever that is. Neither motivation is particularly admirable, but Krauthammer expresses no interest in this fact.

2. William May once said something of elegant simplicity that actually opened my eyes to a tactic that might be taken in this debate: "The human body reveals a human person." When I ask: 'how do I know that I am now confronted with a human being, a person?' the answer is: 'there is a living body here.' I do not see a mind, a capacity for consciousness, a soul (or the absence of these), which immaterial phenomena will all depend on theoretical, and often arbitrary, guesswork; I see a body only. It is my only evidence that here is a human being, and to which the only "adequate response," May concludes, "is love."

3. I loved the philosophy stuff in this post.

There is a doctrine, popular among certain kinds of evangelical and fundamentalist Protestants, that teaches that man is composed of three parts, body, soul, and spirit, rather than two parts, the material body, and the immaterial soul/spirit. The benediction in 1 Thessalonians 5:23 in which St. Paul prays that “your whole spirit and soul and body be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ” is the usual proof text cited in favour of this doctrine. Against the doctrine can be cited several verses in which soul and spirit are used interchangeably. There are also verses in which the soul is listed alongside other words like “heart” and “mind.” One can argue, on the basis of these verses, that if “soul” and “spirit” are separate parts of man because 1 Thess. 5:23 lists them distinctly, then “heart”, “mind” and “soul” are also separate parts of man. This would suggest more than two immaterial parts to man which would defeat the whole point of the trichotomist doctrine which is usually that the union of body, soul, and spirit in man is the image of God, a depiction of the Trinity.

I bring this up because it shows that in discussing the immaterial part of man, even if we do not accept the trichotomist doctrine, we have another set of terms with different imagery attached than that of soul and mind, which might be particularly helpful in the abortion debate. The words used for “spirit” in the Bible are usually the same words used for “breathe” and “wind”. The idea behind the metaphor is of an invisible power that moves that which is visible. Although the word for soul, psyche, is often used to mean “life”, it is the presence or absence of the pneuma, that determines whether a body is living or dead. Thus, in Genesis 2:7, we have the statement that God, after forming man from the dust of the earth, “breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul.” Here, interestingly, a soul is what man becomes after spirit/breathe is added to the body formed from the earth. This suggests that “soul”, at least as it is used in this verse, is more than just the “mind”, especially in the modern sense of the word as the rational, calculating, facility, but encompasses the whole of man, both the material body fashioned from dust, and the immaterial animating principle of spirit/breathe.

If the idea of “spirit”, generated by the metaphor of “breathe” and “wind” which are the basic meanings of the Hebrew, Greek, and Latin words used for spirit, is of an invisible force that moves a physical body, and it is the presence or absence of spirit that determines life, then it becomes moot to argue about at what point a mind first becomes present in the developing foetus. The invisible principle, the presence of which means life and the absence of which means death, is clearly present from the moment the sperm fertilizes the egg, showing itself in the motion of cell division and replication. If you add to that the facts that from the moment of conception the foetus is a) human because a human father and mother cannot produce offspring of any species other than human and b) distinct and unique, both of which facts are written in its DNA you have the foetus as a distinct and unique, living, human from the moment of conception.

On the fly this morning, but Bill, your comment made me think of the crass ads that have been run for Obamacare which _expressly_ appeal to sexual libertinism. Also some campaign ads. So what is Krauthammer objecting to in Huckabee's statement? Huckabee is not only right, the Democrats have recently flaunted very much the attitude Huckabee attributed to them. Maybe Krauthammer hasn't heard?

Gerry, I'm very much on-board with arguing from the fact that the unborn child is a living human being from conception to his right to life. Unfortunately, a movement that is having more and more influence is that that simply isn't enough, that living human beings, even for that matter _breathing_ human beings (post-birth) might be "non-persons" and hence able to be killed at will or for the "greater good." In general I think that we should encourage young people who encounter this position to regard it as a reductio of whatever metaphysics or ethical system entails it. If "some living babies are non-persons, and it's fine to kill them" is not an ethical reductio, then what is? And I say that in all seriousness. I suppose some people might pick something else as their place to conclude an ethical reductio, but it seems to me that there is a certain arbitrariness once one has condoned infanticide. But if someone _does_ condone infanticide, he will usually _admit_ that the infant is a living, distinct, unique human being. (And will usually acknowledge the same for the unborn child even back to conception.) Unfortunately, such a theorist just doesn't give a damn. That's not enough for his lofty category of "personhood."

On the matter of breath or spirit--I'm disinclined myself to use *that* concept as pivotal because it has already been co-opted by some to argue that the unborn child is not protectable until he has taken a breath or at least is capable of taking a breath. I believe some rabbis take this position and therefore oppose only late-term abortions, basing their position (wrongly, of course) on the OT use of the word for "wind" or "breath."

No sarcasm at all Lydia. I 'm a little confused why you don't think that ensoulment is a "timed" event - the time of ensoulment being that of the union of the male and female principle and the formation of the unicellular "person" as it were. To go back to your water analogy, there is a precise point where hydrogen and oxygen lose their separate identities to become water. My idea of the soul has nothing to do with the presence or absence of the brain - a fetus at the 2-celled or 4-celled stage has no brain, but does indeed have a soul, so I can't really see why anyone should argue that a brain-dead person, or someone born without a brain should be soul-less in any sense whatsoever.

I don't see why a human being has to be an interactive composite being . Is a 4-celled stage fetus any less a human being than a grown adult? That is an argument advanced by pro-choicers, if I am not mistaken.

You started with ensoulment and went on to the mind...I take the soul to be something in an entirely different category from the mind. As I understand doctrine, the soul is created afresh with every conception by God. The mind is something that develops as a result of the development of a specific organ, the brain, and develops to fullness over time with the growth and functioning of neurons, appropriate motor and sensory organs, developmental stimuli and so forth. Would you agree?

I apologize for having incorrectly read you as being sarcastic, Dan.

My objection is not to there being a time when a new soul comes into being. As you say, since there is obviously a point in time when a new human being comes into existence (namely, at conception), *that* is the time when the new soul comes into existence. My objection to the use of the term "ensoulment" arises from the fact that the "en" prefix is usually taken and/or intended to mean that the human being as an organism exists already for some time period and that the soul is then "implanted" or "added" or "put into" to that human being later on. Since you agree that such is not the case, I would caution that the use "ensoulment" may create a contrary impression with many audiences.

Now, as to a human being an interactive being: 1) We do not know what mind-body interaction may be taking place even at the earliest stages of development. I'm not saying that the earliest embryo is sensing his surroundings. It appears that he isn't. But might he be dreaming? And might that dreaming be in some sense affected by his development or environment? We have no idea. 2) It is "proper to" the human being to be an interactive composite being in the further sense that, absent privation or death before development is completed, it is natural to the human creature that his mind and body will interact in ways we are all familiar with--sight, scent, emotion, and so forth. This point is very far from making the early embryo who (we guess) does not have these experiences "less human." On the contrary, it is important to emphasize the perfections proper to man as part of explaining why we should value even those individuals who lack the expressions of those perfections. For example, Aristotle said that man is a rational animal. It is (in part) because man is a rational animal that as a species human beings are more valuable than bunny rabbits. And an understanding of the value of mankind as a type of being--an understanding now derided as "speciesism"--is part of the reason why we value all human beings, even those who are not presently capable of exercising their powers of rationality or even sensory perception. Knowing what man is meant to be, what he naturally is, what his natural perfections are, is part of getting the "big picture" that informs the pro-life perspective.

Now, as to the mind: No, I don't agree. I take the human mind to be co-extensive with the soul. If, as Gerry Neal suggests, we should literally think of the soul as a different _part_ of man, then the two always come together. I'm inclined myself _not_ to take the soul and the mind to be different parts of man but merely different ways of categorizing the immaterial part of man. Or, to put it differently, the words "mind" and "soul" when it is a human being in question may be taken to refer to different natural aspects or capacities of mankind--e.g., "mind" may be taken to refer to to man's capacity for thought and experience and "soul" to his capacity for communion with God.

By the way, not to threadjack my own thread, but the word "brain dead" should be used only with extreme, extreme care. The word is used indiscriminately in the U.S. as between people in long-term comatose states who are not expected to recover and whose *upper* brains appear to be inoperative, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, patients diagnosed as having *no* brain activity at all, including in the brain stem. Children who are said to be "born without a brain" are in fact not born without brains. They are either microcephalic in the upper brain or else are born without upper brains but with working brain stems. That is why they grow and live at all. Otherwise their bodies would simply decay. Whether *actual* brain death (as that term is used in the extremely narrow medico-legal sense) can be reliably diagnosed is an extremely difficult and controversial question. What is clear is that if any patient's brain stem has ceased to function, the patient is unable to breathe and dies a natural death. Those in long-term comatose states, even those with severe brain damage, can be weaned off a ventilator and breathe on their own and are undeniably biologically alive. The *intent* of the "brain death" strict criterion was to diagnose not merely the cessation of normal brain activity but genuine *biological* death in cases where, allegedly, a ventilator was maintaining cardio and respiratory function in a cadaver. I now have doubts as to whether such a state both exists and can be reliably detected, but since that is the intent of the term, it's useful to restrict the term "brain death" only to cases where that, at least, is claimed.

Sorry, totally OT, but I figure somebody or other here, if anywhere, ought to be able to help me out with this...

In the second of the two epigraphs to "Sweeney Agonistes," T.S. Eliot quotes St John of the Cross as follows:

"Hence the soul cannot be possessed of the divine union, until it has divested itself of the love of created beings."

Does anybody around here know whether or not that's a reasonably accurate paraphrase of something St John of the Cross actually wrote?

I agree completely with the clear concept of the soul as an expression of the capacity of communion with God - a (relatively poor) analogy would be the installation of a modem card in a computer.

On reflection, I like your analogy of hydrogen and oxygen coming together to form water - a completely different substance, yet literally containing the elements of its parents. The development of the mind is a completely different situation. Naturally, the presence of a soul is essential for the human mind to develop. But IMO the soul is not "coextensive" with the mind - which needs a multiplicity of organs, developmental stimuli and other mechanical appurtenances not to speak of a functional brain to develop and function. If we continue with the chemistry theme, an analogy for the development of a mind might be the creation of a molecule of insulin, which needs a DNA database, the assembling of the needed amino acids into a precursor protein molecule followed by stepwise modifications of the precursor before the final functional molecule is created. A mind cannot be recreated exactly or duplicated following on from the principle of the arrow of time.

The soul OTOH is simple, just as God is simple. And Christ teaches that the body and soul will be resurrected on Judgment Day. He says nothing about the mind which seems correct, as the mind cannot not be recreated. This is also as far from naturalism as we can get.

Someone like Singer, of course, affirms both non-human persons (viz. the Great Ape Project) and non-personal humans. It's part of his package deal. To make Singer himself even more bizarre, he's a utilitarian, so even innocent true-blue persons can be killed in his system if necessary for utilitarian reasons.

Since learning that Singer is also on board the "well, it's okay to kill things we don't want to take care of when they become inconvenient" train (though the argument I'd read from him on that was about taking care of the infirm elderly, not abortion), I am increasingly amazed by the philosophical distance this is from his arguments about how the only ethical response to poverty is extreme sacrifice. If we aren't obligated morally to take care of the people closest to us, should they become too burdensome, why should we sell everything we have, forgo all our luxuries, and indeed (once again) sacrifice those people closest to us to take care of the theoretical distant poor with whom we have no connection?

I can only conclude from this that Peter Singer is genuinely morally insane. Maybe not in an actively harmful fashion, but definitely insane. I don't see how he can work utilitarianism around to deliver "it's okay to kill these people but if you aren't killing yourself for these other people, it's wrong" as a verdict. Versus "it's okay to kill both types of people to alleviate suffering/because they're inconvenient" or "it's never okay to cause the utility loss that arises from deliberate killing," and while the first one is loathsome it's at least morally consistent.

Well knock me over with a feather, Steve Burton is back :-)

For what it's worth, I just found a free version of Dark Night of the Soul (I love the internet!) and did a word search on the phrase "divine union". This was a phrase St. John of the Cross was particularly fond of -- I got a lot of hits and went though a lot of different references to his discussion of divine union. However, based on my preliminary review, that T.S. Eliot quote is not paraphrase of anything St. John wrote, at least in his most famous work.

Meanwhile, this philosophical discussion is excellent, but I might as well bring another old friend into the mix with some thoughts on interaction:

http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2013/11/some-questions-on-soul-part-iii.html#more

Dan, I probably have a more simple (as you might say) concept of the mind than you do. For example, I think that my mind is carrying out its proper functions even when I'm having very ordinary experiences, such as enjoying my dinner. It is a mental property to have experiences, not just to have "higher" thoughts. Of course, an unconscious person's mind is "off-line," asleep, in hibernate mode, whatever metaphor one prefers, but that doesn't mean he doesn't have one.

Beyond that, though, since Scripture tells us to love God with all our minds, I would assume that even in the "higher" sense we will have mental activities in heaven. Indeed, St. Paul states that we shall "know even as also we are known," which sounds like a beatific vision satisfying the intellect as well as the will and the emotions.

"The reason for which it is necessary for the soul, in order to attain to Divine union with God, to pass through this dark night of mortification of the desires and denial of pleasures in all things, is because all the affections which it has for creatures are pure darkness in the eyes of God, and, when the soul is clothed in these affections, it has no capacity for being enlightened and possessed by the pure and simple light of God, if it first cast them not from it; for light cannot agree with darkness; since, as Saint John says: Tenebroe eam non comprehenderunt. (St. John i, 5.) That is: The darkness could not receive the light."

St JOhn of the Cross, Ascent of Mount Carmel, book I chapter 4.

This "Dark Enlightenment" stuff is going viral among College Republicans

http://www.vocativ.com/12-2013/dark-enlightenment-creepy-internet-movement-youd-better-take-seriously/

Reader, that's all OT.

Maybe indeed. But it still doesn't undercut the fact how popular this stuff is becoming. Read the Vocativ article above. It's like an entire subculture for conservative intellectuals.

If I want to write about that "conservative" sub-culture, I will. If not, not. Stop pushing, or I'll delete your comments.

Dear Steve Burton,

The quote from T. S. Eliot has to be properly interpreted. By, "divested itself of the love of created beings,". St. John does not mean an absolute indifference to created things - that was the flaw of the Quietists. What he means is to love created things as God loves them, which is not so much a divestment as a proper ordering of loves within God. The central background of the quote is found in chapter 4 of the Ascent of Mt. Carmel:

http://www.jesus-passion.com/John_of_the_Cross.htm

4.4. We just asserted that all the being of creatures compared to the
infinite being of God is nothing and that, therefore, anyone attached to
creatures is nothing in the sight of God, and even less than nothing
because love causes equality and likeness and even brings the lover lower
than the loved object. In no way, then, is such a person capable of union
with the infinite being of God. There is no likeness between what is not
and what is. To be particular, here are some examples.

It is, perhaps, put into better context in the Sayings of Light and Love and the Spiritual Maxims:

http://www.jesus-passion.com/Minor_Works_StJohn.htm

In particular, one can look at:

25. Withdraw from creatures if you desire to preserve, clear and simple in your soul, the image of God. Empty your spirit and withdraw far from them and you will walk in divine lights, for God is not like creatures.

and

30. I didn't know You, my Lord, because I still desired to know and relish things.

49. The soul that desires God to surrender Himself to it entirely must surrender itself entirely to Him without keeping anything for itself.

In the Spiritual Maxims, no. 98., we read:

The soul that labours to divest itself of all that is not God for God's sake is immediately enlightened, and transformed in, God, in such a way that the soul seems to be God a Himself, and to possess the things of God. (Cf. Ascent 2.5 and 2.7).

Hope that helps.

The Chicken

Should read:

In the Spiritual Maxims, no. 98., we read:

The soul that labours to divest itself of all that is not God for God's sake is immediately enlightened, and transformed in, God, in such a way that the soul seems to be God Himself, and to possess the things of God. (Cf. Ascent 2.5 and 2.7).

iPad auto-correct mistake.

If you want a more in-depth study, let me know. I haven't looked to see if that exact quote can be found in St. John's writings, but different translations make that somewhat difficult. The best modern translation is by Kavanaugh and Rodriguez, but it is only in book form. There are earlier translations on-line, as well as the original Spanish.

The Chicken

This is where Latin can be very useful, because of the changing uage of words such as mind or soul in contemorary parlance. The Latin for soul - "anima" - from which we derive animal and animate - denotes a living thing. At the moment of conception, the human being is animate - with a living principle - as it undergoes continual self-directed development. It is a living human being, not just a collection of "inanimate" material. The contemporary confusion of equating mind-with-soul-with-reasoning ability blurs this fact.

The problem with _that_, however, is that a bunny embryo is also a living mammal, growing and developing in accordance with, if you will, its internal biological programming. In that sense, if "soul" just means "animating principle of a living thing," the bunny embryo has a "soul." It is alive. That doesn't mean that it's evil to kill a bunny embryo. It isn't even evil to kill an adult bunny. So we need something more robust than that for the unborn child.

The bunny embryo is alive and does have a bunny soul - the reason it is not immoral in most cases to kill the bunny embryo is because it is a bunny soul that animates it. It also will have a bunny mind and use bunny reasoning. But it can still be killed in some circumstances because it is a bunny. There is no special value attributed to bunny beings.

The reason a human embryo should not be killed is because it is animated by a human soul - it is a living human being, and we ascribe (or at least should ascribe) different values to human beings and bunny beings. The "something more robust" is simply the fact one is a human, and one is not. Requiring something more than that seems to play right into the hands of Singer types. That's where we get into all this fuzzy land trying to demarcate among mind, soul, reason, etc.

I was just pointing out the limits of etymology. That is, the "livingness" implied by "anima" is not really what is doing the ethical heavy lifting. It's the humanness of the human soul that is the important point. I myself don't find it fuzzy to ascribe a mind to a human embryo, since it is natural to a human being to have a mind, though I think it is reasonable to think of it as a mind asleep.

Oh absolutely, Lydia. I agree that the mind is involved in all manner of activities (indeed the fact that we dream while asleep should put paid to the notion that our minds switch off, at least in part).

I don't fully agree with your second point. As a God-created soul must be eternal, souls after death must continue to be, in some sense, awaiting Judgment Day, when they will be connected to a resurrected body, Christ assures us that we will be reborn in body and soul, and the resurrected body will have a mind as all bodies do. It just won't be the same mind that the person died with - or with the same experiences. That seems to be an impossibility. The newly resurrected person, composed of body and soul, with its mind, will be new, sinless, without memory of the earthly association of the soul with its previous sinful body.

As for this

I myself don't find it fuzzy to ascribe a mind to a human embryo, since it is natural to a human being to have a mind, though I think it is reasonable to think of it as a mind asleep.

Perhaps it is more reasonable to think in terms of a potential mind? I'm unclear how a single cell, or a two cell embryo can be said to possess any attributes of a mind at all, whether thinking or unthinking. As for being analogous to the sleeping state of a person after birth - an analogy should have some points of similarity.

Jeffrey S., Brock, Chicken - many thanks. You've been very helpful. I'm currently teaching an intro phil course, & doing my best to explain to my students the many interesting parallels between Socrates & Jesus of Nazareth - especially when it comes to their shared rejection of the material world in favor of an immaterial afterlife.

But this is Lydia's thread.

Dan, even in the one or two cell stage, that living human being has the interior principle directing that living thing toward the development of the mature physical organism, and the mature physical organism is one that exhibits mind and mental activities. So right from the one-cell state, the interior principle has all that it needs to accomplish the maturity of a mind-ful being. That's a more definite sense of being than mere potentiality. The inherent power, or virtue, of mind is present in the conceived embryo.

It just won't be the same mind that the person died with - or with the same experiences. That seems to be an impossibility. The newly resurrected person, composed of body and soul, with its mind, will be new, sinless, without memory of the earthly association of the soul with its previous sinful body.

This runs exactly and directly counter to all that everyone who believes in a soul means by that soul, including those who do not believe in God, and Buddhists, and Hindus, etc: the soul is the principle of integrity and unity of the being. Given that, the persistence of the soul through death and into new life implies the unity of the being itself: it is John himself who lives again, not someone else with the same name. But mind, being at the bottom not a physical aspect of man (though certainly using man's body), is one with the soul, so the persistence of the soul implies the persistence of the mind. From there to persistence of the experiential past that produced the virtues and excellences of THAT soul and THAT mind is not a long leap.

To posit that our mind will be cleansed of all earthly association makes that earthly past completely irrelevant to the mind, which implies that the experiences in this life is not significant in any final sense. Suggesting a more straightened form of dualism even than Descartes, I think. It also rejects such things as Jesus Christ judging each person on the basis of his acts in this life, as He indicates in the Gospel.

Yes, there are Scripture passages that suggest memories from this life. E.g. Those who are rejected say, "Lord, did we not prophesy in thy name?" As Tony says, the Son in the parable reminds both the "sheep" and the "goats" of what they have done for him in this life. The souls of the martyrs under the altar cry out, "How long, O Lord?" which seems to have a connection to their memories of this life. The rich man in hell remembers his past life and discusses it with Abraham. Jesus tells the thief on the cross that he will be with him that day in Paradise, implying that they will recognize each other. The angel says to St. John, "These are they who have come out of great tribulation. They have washed their robes in the blood of the lamb," which is naturally taken to imply that they remember their tribulation as a foil or backdrop to their current bliss. And why should our memories be erased? If anything, for the saved, memories should be redeemed. We should be able to look back upon our lives and see, better than ever before, the hand of God working in what has happened to us, be grateful to him for redeeming us by his blood and forgiving our sins, love those whom we knew in this life, and so forth.

I always took the personhood argument to be a parallel of an ensoulment one. What, from a purely material perspective, is this magical "personhood" that we're all supposed to defer to? It seems to represent nothing more than a convention or legal fiction designed to prevent us from being logically consistent with our materialism. Which is fine, as far as it goes, but all pro-choicers have to realize somewhere in their minds that it is bogus.

I have to quibble here though: "sophisticated pseudo-arguments purporting to complicate the question whether, and when, we can call these human beings 'persons' with a right not to be killed by others." Actually, the pro-choice position is not that a fetus can be killed by anyone, but only by the mother. Assault a pregnant woman and cause a miscarriage, and you'll find yourself facing a pretty serious charge.

As for "legislative coercion", two possibilities. Either Krauthammer really meant something like "legal coercion", perhaps mandated by a court ruling, or he is doubting the ability of the election process to produce a representative legislature. The latter would certainly be an interesting position for a mainstream commentator to take.

I have to quibble here though: "sophisticated pseudo-arguments purporting to complicate the question whether, and when, we can call these human beings 'persons' with a right not to be killed by others." Actually, the pro-choice position is not that a fetus can be killed by anyone, but only by the mother. Assault a pregnant woman and cause a miscarriage, and you'll find yourself facing a pretty serious charge.

I don't see the problem here with what Franck said. "Others" of course means the abortionist at the behest of the mother. That's "others." I take "others" simply to be a generic term for "those other than the unborn child himself." I would use the same expression if we were talking about a five-year-old child and if the courts had ruled that the parents, but only the parents, could take the five-year-old to a "clinic" to be "terminated." This would amount to a declaration that the five-year-old "does not have a right not to be killed by others." It doesn't have to mean "all and any others."

I always took the personhood argument to be a parallel of an ensoulment one. What, from a purely material perspective, is this magical "personhood" that we're all supposed to defer to? It seems to represent nothing more than a convention or legal fiction designed to prevent us from being logically consistent with our materialism. Which is fine, as far as it goes, but all pro-choicers have to realize somewhere in their minds that it is bogus.

What, from a purely material perspective, is this magical "justice" that we're all supposed to defer to? It seems to represent nothing more than a convention or legal fiction designed to prevent those who have what they want losing it to those who those who don't have what they want. You cannot taste it, touch it, see it, or hear it. It cannot be seen under a microscope, weighed on a scale against grams or ounces (in spite of the blind scales of justice), nobody can assign its color. It is a fiction, a bogus con that pro-choicers (and other liberals) should realize somewhere in their minds is nothing at all.

What, from a purely material perspective, is this "mind" that pro-choicers supposedly have so that they can make up to "realize" that personhood is bogus? Why, it is in the same category as soul, personhood, and justice. It is just as bogus as the rest of them.

Actually, the pro-choice position is not that a fetus can be killed by anyone, but only by the mother. Assault a pregnant woman and cause a miscarriage, and you'll find yourself facing a pretty serious charge.

Actually, there are a great many different pro-choice positions, not just one monolithic position. Some pro-choicers support abortion in the first trimester and not in the second or third, others support it all the way along.

But leaving that aside, the question is not, if you intentionally attack a pregnant woman and cause a miscarriage, whether you will be charged with "something pretty serious", but will pro-choicers expect that you should be charged with a crime against the life of the fetus or not. If not, if the pretty serious charge is only in pursuit of the mother's goods (including her choice of whether to carry the baby to term) nothing in the law speaks to the LIFE of the fetus as a matter of legal protection for its own sake, nothing speaks to the fetus's right to life.

Tony, thanks for your thoughtful comments. An architect's plan, and the bricks and mortar piled up on a building site are not the same as a constructed house. As for memories persisting after the death of the brain, it seems that empirical evidence is against this. After recovering from a stroke when parts of the brain may die, many people lose memories completely, and do not regain them. Its hard to see how memories could be imprinted on the soul for transmission after complete death, if they cannot reliably survive a partial death. The views of other, false religions cannot be brought into this argument.

But mind, being at the bottom not a physical aspect of man (though certainly using man's body), is one with the soul, so the persistence of the soul implies the persistence of the mind. From there to persistence of the experiential past that produced the virtues and excellences of THAT soul and THAT mind is not a long leap.

I think Lydia (or maybe Dr Feser) pointed out somewhere that the mind and body that are two aspects of the same substantia that makes one human - I really like that formulation. Whereas the soul, as the animating principle brought down to the human conceptus (perhaps through the Holy Spirit), is a different concept.

As for recollection of the memories of experiential life, I agree that God will certainly know these completely, as He knows everything that has ever happened, and that the resurrected soul participates in this memory because of union with the the Divine Spirit. I add Aquinas' views on this matter.

http://www.newadvent.org/summa/5087.htm

But Aquinas specifically denies that the soul has any material content, it is the idea of the form of the body whereas the concept of mind must be associated with the physicality of the body.

http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1075.htm

I answer that, The soul has no matter. We may consider this question in two ways.

First, from the notion of a soul in general; for it belongs to the notion of a soul to be the form of a body. Now, either it is a form by virtue of itself, in its entirety, or by virtue of some part of itself. If by virtue of itself in its entirety, then it is impossible that any part of it should be matter, if by matter we understand something purely potential: for a form, as such, is an act; and that which is purely potentiality cannot be part of an act, since potentiality is repugnant to actuality as being opposite thereto. If, however, it be a form by virtue of a part of itself, then we call that part the soul: and that matter, which it actualizes first, we call the "primary animate."

Secondly, we may proceed from the specific notion of the human soul inasmuch as it is intellectual. For it is clear that whatever is received into something is received according to the condition of the recipient. Now a thing is known in as far as its form is in the knower. But the intellectual soul knows a thing in its nature absolutely: for instance, it knows a stone absolutely as a stone; and therefore the form of a stone absolutely, as to its proper formal idea, is in the intellectual soul. Therefore the intellectual soul itself is an absolute form, and not something composed of matter and form. For if the intellectual soul were composed of matter and form, the forms of things would be received into it as individuals, and so it would only know the individual: just as it happens with the sensitive powers which receive forms in a corporeal organ; since matter is the principle by which forms are individualized. It follows, therefore, that the intellectual soul, and every intellectual substance which has knowledge of forms absolutely, is exempt from composition of matter and form.

Also, the soul is incorruptible. Whereas matter (whether body or mind) certainly is, as we know from personal experience.

I answer that, We must assert that the intellectual principle which we call the human soul is incorruptible. For a thing may be corrupted in two ways--"per se," and accidentally. Now it is impossible for any substance to be generated or corrupted accidentally, that is, by the generation or corruption of something else. --- Granted even that the soul is composed of matter and form, as some pretend, we should nevertheless have to maintain that it is incorruptible. For corruption is found only where there is contrariety; since generation and corruption are from contraries and into contraries. Wherefore the heavenly bodies, since they have no matter subject to contrariety, are incorruptible.

Sorry about the long quotes.

I think Lydia (or maybe Dr Feser) pointed out somewhere that the mind and body that are two aspects of the same substantia that makes one human - I really like that formulation. Whereas the soul, as the animating principle brought down to the human conceptus (perhaps through the Holy Spirit), is a different concept.

You are using words differently from the way that they are commonly used. For example, while it is true that "mind vs. body" is a common polarity, so is "body vs soul," as well as "flesh vs spirit." But there is never any opposition posed between mind and soul, or mind and spirit. Indeed, mind refers to man insofar as he is intellectual, and Aquinas says

we may proceed from the specific notion of the human soul inasmuch as it is intellectual.

So, if you want to make up definitions that contrast with the way everyone else uses the words, it won't be surprising if your expressed conclusions sound different too. Now, I am OK with positing (to begin with) that "mind" means something different from the term "soul", and indeed this is consistent with the way many use the terms. What I am not OK with is, specifically in reference to man, simply positing (without any argument, in particular) that the mind of man is not to be found with his spiritual soul, and is instead some other (bodily?) part or faculty. No, when man's immortal soul departs his body in death, his mind persists because the mind is spiritual just as the soul is spiritual. (Or even: the soul is spiritual because it has mind, which is intellectual rather than corporeal, in that it grasps universals.)

After recovering from a stroke when parts of the brain may die, many people lose memories completely, and do not regain them. Its hard to see how memories could be imprinted on the soul for transmission after complete death, if they cannot reliably survive a partial death

It is not in the least bit difficult to "see" how this may happen: miraculously, of course. Just as the resurrection of the dead is a miraculous event itself, requiring the supernatural power of the Divine Lord. God can cause the perfection of the memory of the person just as he causes the re-constituted perfection of the body.

In the dead person who is not yet resurrected from the dead, the problem is more thought-provoking, because memory and imagination are (in man) faculties that are seated in physical organs. Yet God, who knows even particulars, can miraculously suffice for the dis-embodied soul to apprehend what it needs of the particulars so that it has ready to hand some kind of knowledge of its particulars, even as angels have some kind of knowledge of particulars. This operation would be non-natural to man, of course, as is the very state being a human disembodied soul.

After recovering from a stroke when parts of the brain may die, many people lose memories completely, and do not regain them. Its hard to see how memories could be imprinted on the soul for transmission after complete death, if they cannot reliably survive a partial death.

I do not think this is a good argument. If that were a convincing argument, we would be forced, in consistency, to extend it to consciousness itself. While man is embodied, it is possible for his brain to be so damaged that he is completely unconscious, perhaps even unconscious until the day he dies. Some people lose consciousness completely and do not regain it. If consciousness cannot survive such a so-called "partial death," and if the inability to survive brain damage is evidence that the faculty will not return after death but rather will be destroyed by death itself, that would be an argument that we will be unconscious for all eternity! Since it obviously isn't a good argument for that conclusion, it also seems to me to be a poor argument for a similar conclusion concerning memories. Obviously, what brain damage can do to an embodied person simply isn't a measure of what he will be capable of when a) disembodied and b) embodied after the resurrection.

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