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Matthew Roberts on Pagans and Christians

The comments thread on my post Christianity and Liberalism below is unusual, in that it has gotten more, not less, interesting as it has gotten longer. But the longer comments threads get, the fewer people keep reading. So I want to rescue a couple of things from premature oblivion.

First, this: M. A. Roberts writes that "similar debates have been taking place at TakiMag, Chronicles, and elsewhere." He doesn't provide links, but he does quote from his own contribution to the debate at TakiMag. Here's my own selection from what he writes:

"...the daily lives of pagans [were] replete with...mundane deities and ancestral obligations. Their world was animated by a tapestry of spirits interwoven with their own family histories...familial and ancestral duties were everything...pagan religion is not only about a set of ideas, but blood. Their gods were their ancestors...it is one's duty not to let the family line, interwoven with the gods, die out..."

Whereas, by contrast:

"The religion that gave us Chartres Cathedral and Bach today produces...religious leaders from all political persuasions arguing that it's our Christian duty to accept mass immigration from the Third World and liturgies espousing the universal brotherhood of man.

"I suppose the real debate is an academic one: Has Christianity had these tendencies from the beginning (as argued by Alain de Benoist) or are they perversions of the Enlightenment (as argued by Thomas Fleming in The Morality of Everyday Life?

"I tend to side with the latter, but wonder whether these transformations can be undone."

But here's the real kicker:

"Regardless, the future appears bleak...Christianity's real growth will be in the 'global south,' and this future will not be Western in any meaningful sense of the word. I'm reminded of a recent canonization in Mexico where 'dancers dressed in feathered Aztec costumes shook rattles and blew into conch shells...'"

* * * * *

I've often heard it said, lately, that the future of Christianity lies not in decadent "Old Europe" or (North) America, but in the Third World. Is there any truth to this rumor?

Comments (190)

"...the daily lives of pagans [were] replete with...mundane deities and ancestral obligations. Their world was animated by a tapestry of spirits interwoven with their own family histories...familial and ancestral duties were everything...pagan religion is not only about a set of ideas, but blood. Their gods were their ancestors...it is one's duty not to let the family line, interwoven with the gods, die out..."

Hmmm. It would be cool if there were flavors of Christianity which feature a tapestry of spirits interwoven with Christian family (ie ethnic, cultural) histories. What would be even cooler would be if those spirits were the souls of actual people from various ethnys who had, like, walked the earth and stuff. And wouldn't it be especially neat if their bones and the things they had touched had special spiritual significance, so that, like, people could be reminded of the close connection of the people like themselves and the divine by kinda going and, I dunno, venerating them and stuff. Even better would be if those of us still on the earth could, like, talk to the spirity dudes and kinda ask them to put in a good word with the big boy upstairs and stuff. And the spirity dudes could have, like, assignments, too, so that, like, plumbers and travelers and hockey players and stuff could each have a spirity dude especially for them and for them to talk to --- you know so that they could kinda feel the intimate connection between God and earth via the mediation of the spirity dudes especially, like, assigned to people like them.

I guess they'd need a better name than spirity dudes, though.

Since Steve has started a new thread based on the comments at the end of the last thread, I decided to put what I'm about to write here. If it's inappropriate, feel free to delete it entirely or move it to the other thread.

Edward the Lesser writes, "To deny the philosophical tradition of Christianity that draws its inspiration largely from the Greco-Roman world is to force the believer into the most crude form of fideism, a heresy condemned by the entire Christian tradition, the kind of which Tertullian would approve."

To say that it forces the believer into the most crude form of fideism is a little hasty, I think. I imagine Michael Bauman's position may be close to that of O.K. Bouwsma, which I shall summarize as follows:

(1) The best instrument for propagating the Christian faith is the Bible itself.
(2) It is through the God working through Bible, and also His working through the inspirational lives of sincere believers, and the Church, that people are genuinely moved to convert to Christianity.
(3) Individual arguments for the existence of God may be helpful for believers themselves to make sense of their faith, but they are worthless, or perhaps even harmful, to moving people to the faith. The conclusions of arguments, after all, are always contestable (just challenge one or more of the premises), and if your faith depends upon on an argument, it's not really a faith but a provisional "I'll try this for as long as it works" attitude.
(4) This means, at best, that Aristotelian categories are helpful models, and at worst steer you away from what is really crucial in the faith, which is the life of faith rather than the dissection of it (to draw an analogy: to have a good family life, you have to relate to your family members in the right way, do your duty by them, show them love, etc.; what is almost entirely immaterial, and could serve as a distraction, is spending time trying to understand what philosophical categories are best for figuring out what kinds of substances your family members are).

...what is almost entirely immaterial, and could serve as a distraction, is spending time trying to understand what philosophical categories are best for figuring out what kinds of substances your family members are.

Dr. Feser has already explained that it is "perfectly compatible" to determine they are carbon-based life forms.

Yes, but determining that they're carbon-based is a lot less contentious than determining if they're best described by Cartesian dualism, Thomistic hylomorphism, or materialism. The second kind of determination, being more difficult, could be more distracting.

Note that this comes from someone who thinks it's perfectly licit--and unavoidable--to look at the world through philosophical spectacles.

As to the main post here, I think it would be a distraction to bring in the fact that Christianity is still flourishing in the 3rd World while waning in the West. What does that tell us about whether there was something intrinsic _about_ Christianity that has brought about liberal multi-culturalism and the decline of the West? I think, precious little. It's not like it's inconceivable that people of non-Western descent should have a more just appreciation for the treasures of the West than modern, decadent Westerners do. Not at all. I would instance here, Steve, a wonderful post you put up of a Chinese ballet that was indescribably superior to the Western parallel you put up. So here: We Christians will be glad if Christianity is preserved by the Africans and if they, later, are able to re-evangelize Europe. You remember Gandalf on believing that he has not wholly failed in his task if anything endures through the night that can grow, etc.? That's the idea.

Bobcat,

I agree with Edward the Lesser: both Bauman's and Bouwsma's positions are fideist and witheringly anti-intellectual.

And I would add that how one should treat his family definately does depend on what kind of substances they are.


Furthermore, I think Dr. Feser pretty much destroyed Bauman's position; and I don't expect the latter to return fire.

To continue on George R's theme: Bobcat, while it is not significant for 90%, or maybe 98%, of what you do in relating to your family whether you understand them in terms that Aquinas or Descartes would approve, it is not altogether irrelevant either. The other 2 or 5 or 10% can mean all the difference in the world to your kid. If an auto mechanic spends 98% of his time eating, sleeping, and working, and only 2% playing, reading, and talking to his kids, then that 2% becomes VERY significant.

And that's what I would focus on: Apparently Muslims think that God's interaction with us is as master to slave, or master to dog. Or even more distant. A Christian says that God's relationship to us is Father to child. That MUST have a pretty significant impact on how the children view their relationship to their fathers. Same with wives to their husbands.

While it not necessary for each and every Christian to understand in depth the fullest available verbal expression of Christianity in order to live Christianity, it IS necessary for there to be people who DO plumb the depths and are available as the go-to guys when doubts and troubles awaken in our hearts and minds. True it is that factual data without faith won't get us to heaven, but the Christian attitude rests in faith seeking understanding.

Bill, I have the liberal version of an alternate name for the group of those spirity dudes:

The Commune of Saints. Where all worship together, practicing commune-ism.
;-))

Yes, but determining that they're carbon-based is a lot less contentious than determining if they're best described by Cartesian dualism, Thomistic hylomorphism, or materialism. The second kind of determination, being more difficult, could be more distracting.

Who cares if it is distracting? The point is that is unrecognizable to abstract a family member into the category of carbon-based life form. That was how I read Bauman's complaint; the identity of God becomes lost within all the metaphysical mumbo-jumbo.

I guess they'd need a better name than spirity dudes, though.

Indulgence takers.

Thanks for the spotlight, Steve.

Lydia, I don't think anyone doubts whether Christianity will survive, if nowhere else than in the Third World and in a non-Western form. The question is whether the West will survive. Fortunately for the descendants of Numenor, the wisest of the Maiar, Gandalf, sided with the "men of the West." I pray we have such forces on our side....

While most of the "global south" was evangelized by Western Europe and the US, Christianity was present in Ethiopia, Central Asia, and India centuries before it was adopted by the Slavs or Northern Europeans. These things go in cycles. If it takes Korean missionaries to restore the faith to the Church's Eldest Daughter, so be it.

Let us speak frankly. Christianity is a perversion of Conservatism, a subversive superstition, which left unchecked, will destroy the greatest philosophy known to man. The examples are endless. The ancient and honorable institution of Paterfamilias is distorted into a stern, all-knowing, but loving guy in a long white-beard. Noblesse oblige is mangled into "Sermon on the Mount" welfarism for social parasites and the quest for individual achievement, personal success and self-fulfillment are subverted by a feel-good, riddle speaking prophet of delayed gratification and fuzzy Altruism.

Get off your knees, ye Men of the Right, Ludwig Von Mises knew the Enemy and, we have a civilization to save!

[Jesus] rejects everything that exists without offering anything to replace it. He arrives at dissolving all existing social ties…. The motive force behind the purity and power of this complete negation is ecstatic inspiration and enthusiastic hope of a new world. Hence his passionate attack upon everything that exists. Everything may be destroyed because God in His omnipotence will rebuild the future order…. The clearest modern parallel to the attitude of complete negation of primitive Christianity is Bolshevism. (Socialism, p. 413)

Social cooperation has nothing to do with personal love or with a general commandment to love one another… [People] cooperate because this best serves their own interests. Neither love nor charity nor any other sympathetic sentiment but rightly understood selfishness is what originally impelled man to adjust himself to the requirements of society…and to substitute peaceful collaboration to enmity and conflict. (Human Action, p. 168-9)

Jonathan Marcus, either you are an expert in a form of internet satire that is totally beyond my intellectual capacity, or you are the champion of the libertarian kool-aid gallon challenge. What is 'the greatest philosophy known to man'? How is Christianity a perversion of Conservatism? Surely you are not so moronic as to suggest that ideological and political conservatism predates Christianity? What civilization do you want to save? Do you not realize that for over 1500 years, Western civilization was Christian civilization? Your post sounds like the worst kind of Randian intellectual barf, complete with all the buzz-words: "Altruism,""social parasites,""rightly understood selfishness."

The Decline of Western Civilization began during that 'Enlightenment' which you likely deify, the horrors of modernity being a result of the reduction of human relations to 'callous cash payment' which philistines like Rand idealized. What has post-Enlightenment, secular civilization given us besides death and calamity?

I've never read von Mises. Now I'm glad.

Me too, Bill. What poppycock. From the quotation above, I'd have to classify von Mises as a variant of the modern materialist, grounding his doctrine of sociality on the acquisitive instinct. Even Adam Smith's doctrine introduced a pre-rational sociality combining sympathy and imagination.

Zach may be right: only a satirist or a man of almost touching innocence could come here and pronounce that the doctrine of Smith is too otherworldly to be conservative.

I'm going to go out on a limb here and say that I think Mr. Marcus's post is satire. My sarcasm detector's usually pretty good, and there's something about the line "Christianity is a perversion of Conservatism" that rings Swiftian to me.

If I'm wrong, however, and Marcus is serious, the post is one of the most buffoonish examples of Randianism I've ever seen.

What does that tell us about whether there was something intrinsic _about_ Christianity that has brought about liberal multi-culturalism and the decline of the West? I think, precious little.

It tells us that multi-culturalism is most likely a particularly western disease, linked more to modern western values than Christianity itself, since multi-culturalism appeared during the decline of Christianity as the dominate social paradigm in the West.

Mr. Roberts, I, too, have grave concerns as to whether the West will survive. But the original question posed in the other thread, which I take this to be a continuation of, is whether the non-survival of the West, if it happens (God forbid) is somehow the fault of Christianity, a result of a suicidal pacifism and universalism intrinsic to Christianity. My point here is that it is largely or wholly irrelevant to that question whether, given the present state of affairs, Christianity is most likely to survive among people of non-Western descent. It could be said of many fair things previously associated with the West that their "future lies" with people of non-Western descent. This is to be expected if suicidal liberalism is indeed pulling down the West and even more if people of non-Western descent have the wisdom to see and preserve some of the good things. It has nothing to do with whether there is something inherently destructive of Western toughness, etc., in Christianity.

Look, if you look at the top-rated lists of child chess players in the United States and simply note the names, you will legitimately infer that the future of the game of chess in the United States lies with the Chinese and Indians. That doesn't mean there is something about chess that is destructive of the Western will to survive!

I agree with Edward the Lesser: both Bauman's and Bouwsma's positions are fideist and witheringly anti-intellectual.

They're neither. They're a recognition of the fact that philosophical arguments are generally wasted on the common man. The common man is more concerned with what your faith has done for you than detailed, intellectual arguments. The "Protestant low churches" have experienced the most success in the third world precisely because instead of focusing on apologetics, they focus on direct ministry. From that, the targets of their missionary work see the reality of the gospel.

Mr. Roberts, I, too, have grave concerns as to whether the West will survive.

It will survive, but in what form? The history of the West is one of constant violence, oppression and turbulence punctuated by advancement and occasional decency and peace. It is, in that sense, not THAT different from the rest of the world.

The most likely scenario is that Europe will collapse into a period of economic and racial strife that will end with another genocide of minorities; the US will likely break up into several smaller federations.

The wheel will turn, the age of liberalism and even individual liberty in most forms will be over, and we'll have another century of tyranny and strife.

Personally, I think reports and warnings about the death of the West and the dechristianization of the West are exaggerated. Predictions like these are usually made by simply looking at what's happening now and assuming it will continue indefinitely. Yes, Christian adherence is declining, and it looks like it will continue to decline, but then it was practically a certainty last year that we would have $5 a gallon gas at christmas.

I don't think that Africa, South America, and Asia will represent the new Christendom. After all, what most people refer to as Christendom was the time where Christianity had a pretty large political presence, and that doesn't seem to be the case at all in Africa at least. Political structures are usually secular, unless it's an Islamic country.

Africa is notable for moral degeneracy that makes Europe look pretty tame (although I can't for the life of me figure out why people think Europe is a moral and cultural abyss; arguably the US is just as bad or worse). Some 25% of South African males admit to raping someone; and that's one of the more reasonable countries. Then there's the prevalence of AIDS. Well I could go on and on, but the point is that Africans are hardly paragons of moral virtue that put decadent Westerners to shame.

I don't know as much about the other two continents.

Philip Jenkins, mentioned by an earlier commenter, has written extensively on this subject. For those disinclined to peruse his book-length treatment of the matter, an essay published in First Things about two years ago should suffice as an introduction to the empirics of the situation:



Christianity should enjoy a worldwide boom in the coming decades, but the vast majority of believers will be neither white nor European nor Euro-American. According to the statistical tables produced by the respected Center for the Study of Global Christianity, some 2.1 billion Christians were alive in 2005, about one-third of the planetary population. The largest single bloc, some 531 million people, is still to be found in Europe. Latin America, though, is already close behind with 511 million, Africa has 389 million, and 344 million Asians profess Christianity. North America claims about 226 million believers. Now, we need not accept these figures in precise detail, and I personally believe that the Asian figures are too high. Even so, a large share of the Christian world is already located in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Just as striking are the long-term trends. The number of African Christians is growing at around 2.36 percent annually, which would lead us to project a doubling of the continent's Christian population in less than thirty years.

If we extrapolate these figures to the year 2025, the southern predominance becomes still more marked. Assuming no great gains or losses through conversion, then there would be around 2.6 billion Christians, of whom 595 million would live in Africa, 623 million in Latin America, and 498 million in Asia. Europe, with 513 million, would have slipped to third place. Africa and Latin America would thus be in competition for the title of most Christian continent. By 2050, Christianity will be chiefly the religion of Africa and the African diaspora. By then, there will be about three billion Christians in the world, and the proportion of those who will be white and non-Latino will be between one-fifth and one-sixth the total. If we project the largest Christian populations by 2050, the United States will still be at the head of the list, followed by Brazil, Mexico, the Philippines, Nigeria, the Congo, Ethiopia, and China. And even in the United States, many of the Christians will be of Hispanic, Asian, and African origin. By that point, one-third of all Americans will have Latino or Asian roots-roots that will be overwhelmingly Christian. This does not include those Americans of African origin, people who are either African Americans or of more recent African stock.



(The remainder of the essay, Believing in the Global South, may be taken as a summation of his recent book)

Be that as it may, Lydia is certainly correct that the historical fact of Christianity's preservation in the third world, among non-Western, non-European peoples says nothing about the theological or philosophical nature of Christianity, it's inherent cultural or ideological valence. Without any intention of thread-jacking, I approach the issue in the tradition of Richard Weaver, who located in nominalism the fons et origo of Western spiritual decline; nominalist doctrine was not originally a purely philosophical postulate, a position arrived at by means of rational argumentation, but a sort of 'condition of possibility' idea, intended to secure theologically a certain conception of divine sovereignty, according to which God is unconstrained by any conception of rationality, morality, or cosmic order. Whether the Celestial Hierarchies of (Pseudo?)-Dionysius or the teleological ordering of being, as analogy, in Thomas Aquinas, such conceptions, by mediating divine power, were thought to infringe upon the absolute sovereignty of the Godhead. For the nominalists, sovereignty was not unless it was unconstrained by any such systems; to the argument that these hierarchies were rational, and that God is rational, they responded that God was thus circumscribed by a standard of reason theoretically independent of Himself, and that only the origination of these orders in the pure volition of God could preserve his majesty.

I leave it to the reader to infer which non-Western religion posits an identical conception of divine sovereignty. The difference in the social consequences of this doctrine in different environments owes to two principal factors in the West: first, the ennobling of the human person in Christianity, and, second, the imago Dei, by which human nature is conceived as an analogue of the divine nature. In the West, the person could not be submerged in the undifferentiated mass, as in that other religion; and, if God is conceptualized as pure volition, the tendency will be to define humanity in terms of volition, unconditioned by reason, society, tradition, etc. And then we're off the races. But it is imperative to observe that nominalism, in this deep theological sense, is a betrayal of Western thought in its totality, regardless of whether Ockham, or anyone else, got the idea by casting a glance at some other religion.

The West is dying because it is betraying itself, because it looks upon its betrayal as its greatest achievement.

Lydia, I think it's great that non-Westerners have absorbed Western elements. I've always liked that the Japanese, for instance, are so fond of Western classical music. If the West falls, I'm sure non-Westerners will continue certain elements of Western traditions (e.g. science), but for all practical purposes the West will be dead. Christopher Caldwell in his new book (Reflections on the Revolution in Europe, which I review in the coming Dec. issue of Chronicles) asks whether Europe will survive with widespread demographic replacement. His answer is a resounding "no."

I just posted some of the articles and links for this debate, but it was held up in the filter (probably because of the multiple links).

Bill's "Spirity Dudes" disquisition makes the point I wanted to make, but in a much better way.

The more I think about it the less the argument that "Christianity creates open borders advocacy" seems worth my time.

The Christian West has been secularizing for two centuries. Wouldn't secularism be a better target for blame?

And what to make of American nativist groups that were heavily and explicitly Protestant, like the Know Nothings and the Klan?

Mike T:

They're a recognition of the fact that philosophical arguments are generally wasted on the common man.

Exactly…which is why the common man ought not be allowed to direct is own life; because he cannot, of himself, know the truth of reality according to which his actions should be ordered.

The common man is more concerned with what your faith has done for you than detailed, intellectual arguments.

Right. He’s more concerned with his animal needs and desires than with truth; he's amenable to almost any rubbish as long as it gets him stuff and makes him feel good. Thanks for pointing that out.

The "Protestant low churches" have experienced the most success in the third world precisely because instead of focusing on apologetics, they focus on direct ministry.

That the “Protestant low churches” know how to rub the belly of the common man is beyond dispute. You’ve hit the nail on the head again, Mike T.

From that, the targets of their missionary work see the reality of the gospel.

I’m going to have to contradict you there, Mike T: "the reality of the gospel” is one thing these victims of christian-flavored liberalism are never allowed to see.

Steve, it depends on whether you think (some) Protestant denominations still count as Christianity, doesn't it? If no Protestant is a Christian, then no, the future of Christianity does not lie in the Global South but in Rome where it always has. If Protestants can be Christians, then the Global South and China are where Christianity's main growth and population-centers will be in the next decades.

As someone who believes (many) Protestants are accurately understood to be Christians and that what superior cultural forms the inheritors of Christendom have (in the West and East, North and South) are due to the widespread presence and activity of the Holy Spirit through the Church over more than a millennium, I do think that if the Global South does not avail itself of the cultural inheritance of the universal Church (in the West and elsewhere), it deprives itself just as any generation does when it rejects the goods of its predecessors.

Nevertheless, if the Holy Spirit is there, fruit will be borne in their culture over time, though undoubtedly bought at a price. I'm more worried about our own culture, which unfortunately is becoming less Christian, rather than more.

Since Matthew Roberts has posted a series of links related to this discussion, I may as well place my own response in this thread. My response is that no form of paganism can possibly serve as the grounds of any fight to preserve Western particularity, in any dimension; the particularism of the pagan consciousness must always include, as a constitutive element, a tragic consciousness, this latter being a direct implication of the historical contingencies to which pagans appeal, and which they strive to defend.

David Bentley Hart:


Totality is, of necessity, an economy, a circulation of substance, credit, power, and debt, a closed cycle of violence, a perpetual oscillation between order and chaos, form and indeterminacy. The myth of the cosmos as a precarious equilibrium of countervailing forces, an island of order amidst an infinite ocean of violent energy - which is also the myth of the polis or of the empire - belongs principally to a sacral order that seeks to contain nature's violence within the stabilizing forms of a more orderly kind of violence: the sheer waste and destructiveness of the cosmos must be held at bay and controlled, by a motion at once apotropaic - repelling chaos by appeasing its chthonian energies and rationalizing them in structures of Apollonian order - and economic - recuperating what is lost or sacrificed in the form of a transcendent credit, a numinous power reinforcing the regime that serves. One could argue, in fact, that all pagan order was just such an order of sacrifice, a system of exclusion, which mactacted the singular so as to recover the serener forms of the universal, making a holocaust of even the desirable and the beautiful as an appeasement of the formlessness besetting the fragile order of the cosmos and city from every quarter. The Beauty of the Infinite, p. 346.

Or, to make this clearer, and to appeal to Philip Rieff, the fundamental motif of all pagan thought is the primacy of possibility, cosmologically, the primordial womb of chaos out of which all being arises, man and gods alike, and to which all return, throughout the endless cycles of regeneration and decay. In such a cosmology, all particularity is eventually reabsorbed into the POP, all contingent, historical, and particular goodness sacrificed by, and for, the continuance of this monstrous, a-rational totality. There is therefore no reason to expect, in the pagan consciousness, that one's people and culture will endure, or even that they should endure. Ought has nothing to do with remorseless fate. To state that it will endure, or should endure, is merely to express a subjective desire that it should continue; in other words, it is to shake one's fist in the face of the Fate that will surely overcome.

Or, to respond to Kurtagic's piece on black and pagan metal - which does, as he asserts, have much more musical depth than most other forms of popular music - by way of the Irish pagan metal band, Primordial:



The sea will be as a desert
When my bones are long to dust
Beneath shifting dunes
And the searing Unconquerable sun

Pile the bodies on the pyre
Warm the old heart of the earth
This is no place for faith, nor for hope
Just a journey through the darkest of nights
To the old heart of the earth



And what is that darkest of nights?

And sister, do not pray for me
There is no forgiveness here
Just the longest and the darkest night
And my people's end

The darkest night is, for a people, their historical end, the demise of their culture as a distinct, vital entity, an entire way of being in the world. And while they may reject Christianity, because Christianity has ostensibly betrayed historical and cultural particularity, there remains no place for hope, only the certainty of the End.

Exactly…which is why the common man ought not be allowed to direct is own life; because he cannot, of himself, know the truth of reality according to which his actions should be ordered.

The philosophical and scientific elites have such a wonderful track record of directing the lives of others!

Right. He’s more concerned with his animal needs and desires than with truth; he's amenable to almost any rubbish as long as it gets him stuff and makes him feel good. Thanks for pointing that out.

As opposed to the intellectual elites who will fill themselves with any rubbish so long as it makes them feel superior to the common man. In the end, both of them seek their own animal needs; basic ones for the common man, validation and pack superiority for the latter. The difference is that the common man who sees a peer genuinely filled with joy and peace, despite whatever his lot in life is, will be more likely to see the work of the Holy Spirit in their life than the intellectual would. In fact, highly intelligent people are more likely to viscerally hate the Word of God precisely because the fundamentals of righting oneself with God could be seen in and explained by a simple thief hanging on a cross next to Jesus.

Paul Barnes, Maximos: many, many thanks for the Philip Jenkins links. Very, very important stuff.

Yes Zach, The Conservatism of hierarchy, patriotism, manly virtue and philosophical vehicle for the harnessing of Nature’s energies and creative economic development all predate Christianity. The Enlightenment was a brave attempt at a glorious restoration. Breaking free of Christianity’s shackles was deemed possible only by soothing a population still under the sway of a preposterous Creation narrative, unnatural injunctions about Loving thy enemy, “turning the other cheek” and the spiritual utility of suffering. Circumstances required men like Locke and Smith to carry out their grand work of liberation by stealth, and in the case of the latter, by paying lip service to ingrained nostrums and mental habits. In retrospect, they were not bold enough – a common malady of those raised on the queer notion that self-interest is a vice, and self-sacrifice a virtue.

Islam’s scabbard looms over the cringing neck of Western Man because the Indo European people were morally disarmed by Christianity, the world’s greatest repressor of passionate spirits. Say what you will of the ancient gods and myths, but the cult of Thor would never fall prostrate before the wretched of the earth. Any parody here is produced by those who protest multiculturalism and open borders while pledging loyalty to a “universal faith” of brotherhood and corporal mercy, and tout the wonders of capitalism even as they sabotage it with their prattling about Good Samaritans and the hellish torments that await the rich man in the hereafter. Suicide of the West, indeed! The choice is before you; the Caliphate, or the Conservatism of giants.

From an Amazon review of Jenkins' book: "Given that population and religious enthusiasm is waning in the northern hemisphere, and just the opposite is going on in the southern one, Jenkins predicts that Christianity's center of gravity will migrate to Africa and Central and South America in the immediate decades ahead. This will result in the emergence of new symbols, new styles of worship, new metaphors, and new ethical sensibilities, all of which mean that Christianity will no longer be dominated by an Eurocentric history and ethos."

new ethical sensibilities,

Hmmm. I'm not sure that means much of anything, but if it does, and if it means what I think it means, I hae me doots. What has actually been happening is that the Third World Christians are more morally old-fashioned than their Western counterparts. Consider the way the African Anglican bishops have chided the British Anglican bishops on active homosexuality and ordination.

new styles of worship

I take it that means we can expect more killing of chickens and stabbing of voodoo dolls than in the traditional Anglican communion service.

@ Jonathan Marcus:

Assuming you can get away with it (i.e., not be prosecuted by the authorities), do you think there's anything morally objectionable about murdering someone so that you can take his possessions for himself, or just because it's fun to murder people?

Jonathan Marcus - thanks for my big laugh of the day!

And, c'mon, everybody - this may be pretty *high quality* parody, but it's still *obvious* parody - and authored, I would guess, by somebody with the initials J.M. ;^)

The quotations from von Mises (which I assume are legit, never having read him) are interesting - though not especially surprising. Jewish intellectuals, whether of the left or of the right, have never had a very high opinion of Jesus of Nazareth or of Christianity - I mean, how could they, and remain Jewish?

And, c'mon, everybody - this may be pretty *high quality* parody, but it's still *obvious* parody - and authored, I would guess, by somebody with the initials J.M. ;^)

Don't know whom you have in mind, but, for the record, I didn't author them.

Oh, and by the way - my last was in response to Jonathan Marcus's post of 11:12 p.m. yesterday.

Fortunately, his post of 3:25 today, which appeared before I finished typing, requires no amendment from me.

;^)

Bobcat,
The corruption of our language by the Bible makes me wary of terms like “morally objectionable”. However, a well-ordered polity based on heroic idealism especially respects property rights, including the legal claim to our bodies. Therefore, barring a compelling cause, like the intrusion of a “compassion-hustler”, or the infidelities of a wife or business associate, murder is banned.

Maximos - I'll take your word for it.

But I bet you *wish* you'd written it!

Very funny, very clever stuff.

Disagree though I obviously do, it is well-written stuff. I do wonder, though, whether the antique pagan sensibility can be equated with the Enlightenment and capitalism. Certainly, one can regard the latter as species of paganism, and plenty of people have done so; but it seems to me that paganism is more protean than that, with most pagan economic structures being either semi-feudal or despotic.

"I take it that means we can expect more killing of chickens and stabbing of voodoo dolls than in the traditional Anglican communion service."

[Shudder]

The Chicken

From an Amazon review of Jenkins' book: "Given that population and religious enthusiasm is waning in the northern hemisphere, and just the opposite is going on in the southern one, Jenkins predicts that Christianity's center of gravity will migrate to Africa and Central and South America in the immediate decades ahead.

How long ago was this book written? This was obvious at least twenty years ago.

i am concerned, however, that what is being exported is not authentic Christianity in some cases, but a spiritual Ponzi scheme on how to get rich a la the Prosperity Gospel. That poverty, which marks true Beatitudinal Chrisitanity, is somewhat harder to find. Part of the reason Christianity is taking root is because not only the Gospel, but wealth is also flowing eastward. Some are finding authentic Christianity, but others are finding the wannabe rich Christianity of the JIm Bakers. On the whole, I think authentic Christianity will triumph, but it is a mixed bag in Africa, Asia, and South America, at the moment.

The Chicken

Maximos, a meritocracy may feel oppressive to the unaccomplished, but a Christian democracy is a tyranny of the weak and resentful organized against men of merit.

Would that be a meritocracy like that of the bankers who just wrecked the economy?

Actually-existing meritocracy has nothing to do with objective merit, and seldom has.

Ouch, I bet that one smarts. Meritocracy is instantiated on Wall Street. The geniuses are now using free money and government guarantees to earn their superiority, in true meritocratic style.

Meanwhile, yes, indeed, the non-Christian world has been truly bereft of accomplishment.

Before you join the rabble in the streets, ponder the wise words of Michael Lewis regarding the plight of your betters;

Today, the sheer volume of irresponsible media commentary has forced us to reconsider our public-relations strategy. With every uptick in our share price it’s grown clearer that we who are inside Goldman Sachs must open a dialogue with you who are not. Not for our benefit, but for yours.

America stands at a crossroads, and Goldman Sachs now owns both of them. In choosing which road to take, ordinary Americans must not be distracted by unproductive resentment toward the toll-takers. To that end we at Goldman Sachs would like to dispel several false and insidious rumors.

Rumor No. 1: “Goldman Sachs controls the U.S. government.”

Every time we hear the phrase “the United States of Goldman Sachs” we shake our heads in wonder. Every ninth-grader knows that the U.S. government consists of three branches. Goldman owns just one of these outright; the second we simply rent, and the third we have no interest in at all. (Note there isn’t a single former Goldman employee on the Supreme Court.)
http://www.thebigmoney.com/articles/judgments/2009/07/28/bashing-goldman-sachs-simply-game-fools?page=full


M. A. Roberts at 11:28 a.m.:

Many thanks for the links. Thomas Fleming's post is particularly interesting - but also frustrating, 'cause he never quotes or links to anybody, so one is left wondering just exactly who he's arguing with, and whether his characterizations of opposing positions are fair, or not.

George R. at 12:00 p.m. writes:

"...the common man ought not be allowed to direct [h]is own life; because he cannot, of himself, know the truth of reality according to which his actions should be ordered..."

And here I thought Jonathan Marcus was the biggest parodist on this thread!

Every ninth-grader knows that the U.S. government consists of three branches. Goldman owns just one of these outright; the second we simply rent, and the third we have no interest in at all.

Now THAT's fun parody.

"The corruption of our language by the Bible makes me wary of terms like 'morally objectionable'. However, a well-ordered polity based on heroic idealism especially respects property rights, including the legal claim to our bodies. Therefore, barring a compelling cause, like the intrusion of a 'compassion-hustler', or the infidelities of a wife or business associate, murder is banned."

First, why are you wary of the terms "morally objectionable"? Do you think it connotes "sinful"? Would you prefer "base"? "Cowardly"? "Villainous"?

Second, a well-ordered polity based on heroic idealism seems like one where there is a ruling class consisting of heroes. Is this what you mean? If it is, how do you define a hero? Is a warrior a hero? Can a scientist be a hero? May one only be disposed to heroism to count as a hero, or must one have an actual heroic accomplishment or set thereof?

Third, you say that a well-ordered polity respects property rights, including the _legal_ claim to our own bodies. This leads me to believe that what counts as property rights in a heroic society is determined by the political structures of that society (rather than it being the case that there are some natural rights). If that's so, then how about this: the heroic caste has property rights and everyone else does too, but if a hero wants access to someone else's property, then he may have it. Or is the idea that a hero wouldn't take the property of someone else in society?

Fourth, you say that the intrusion of a compassion-hustler, or the infidelity of a wife or business associate count as compelling cause for murder, but the mere desire to take someone else's stuff isn't. Does this mean that if a Christian (i.e., a compassion-hustler) tries to convert you, then you may murder him? What if it's a female Christian? Also, if a business associate is cheating on his wife, but not with your wife, are you still allowed to kill him, because he has debased himself?

Finally, although you say that the murder of someone to take his stuff is "banned" in a heroic society, what about how a heroic society deals with other societies? For instance, if you're in a heroic, atheistic society and you know of the existence of Saudi Arabia, a Muslim society that has lots of oil, is it heroic to kill all the inhabitants of Saudi Arabia and take their oil?

If this is a big joke, sorry for being taken in, but I highly doubt you're joking, and I find the view interesting for its naked immorality.

And here I thought Jonathan Marcus was the biggest parodist on this thread!

Steve,

I see you don't agree with my statement; but I suspect you can't refute it either.

George R.,

In response to the claim, "[Bowsma's and Baumann's positions are] a recognition of the fact that philosophical arguments are generally wasted on the common man" you write, "Exactly…which is why the common man ought not be allowed to direct is own life; because he cannot, of himself, know the truth of reality according to which his actions should be ordered."

In other words, you seem to be making the following claim: because common people aren't moved by philosophical arguments, they ought not to be allowed to direct their own lives. I.e., the only people who ought to be allowed to direct their own lives are people who are susceptible of being moved (in the right way?) by (good?) philosophical arguments.

I don't see why I should believe this claim. To be perfectly honest, it seems like a massive exaggeration of the importance of philosophical argument. For instance, I don't think a good philosopher should have authority over how a philosophically insensitive surgeon performs an operation. I suspect you wouldn't agree with that either. So what do you mean by "direct his own life"?

Do you mean that the philosophically insensitive person should not be allowed to make value judgments? No, that's impossible--although we are responsible for the judgments we make, we cannot help but to make judgments.

Do you mean that the philosophically insensitive person should not be allowed to act on his value judgments? Or at least on some of his value judgments? I think this is getting closer to what you mean. In particular, I imagine that you think when it comes to matters of faith and morals, the philosophically insensitive person should not be allowed to act on his independently-arrived-at judgments.

OK, if this is what you mean, then what's meant here by "allowed"? That the state shouldn't permit them to act in any such way except as dictated by the Catholic Church? But the Catholic Church doesn't even require this.

Regardless of the answer to this, what about incredibly clever philosophers who don't agree with you about faith and morals? I don't know you, but I'd wager a lot of money that Nietzsche, Hume, David Lewis, and Bertrand Russell were significantly better at philosophy than you. And yet I doubt that you think that they should be allowed to run their own lives, and I doubt you think they should be allowed to run yours.

Bobcat,

I was not suggesting that the common man should be subject to philosophers per se, but to the truth. And since one can not even hope to attain to the truth through one's own efforts without philosophy, if we assume that the common man rejects philosophy, he cannot arrive at the truth that he ought to be subject to. Therefore, he will require that this truth be imposed on him from outside himself.

However, the highest truth is even out of the reach of the philosophers; so even they must have the truth imposed on them. So if the philosophers ought not be allowed to direct themselves, a fortiori, the common people should also be subject.

This argument, of course, assumes that men ought to live their lives according to truth. If you say that men might just as well live a lie, then they might as well direct themselves.

Lastly, most men know how to run their everyday lives; and they should be free to do so.

"And since one can not even hope to attain to the truth through one's own efforts without philosophy, if we assume that the common man rejects philosophy, he cannot arrive at the truth that he ought to be subject to. Therefore, he will require that this truth be imposed on him from outside himself."

First, I'm still in the dark about what it means for the truth to be imposed on someone from the outside. Is the government doing this imposition? The Church (nobody expects the Spanish Imposition!)? The community of right-minded people?

Second, it's not obvious to me that one needs philosophy to attain to the truth. It just depends on what you mean by philosophy. If you mean academic or even Thomistic philosophy, then I shouldn't be shocked if there are lots of Catholics who lead exemplary lives without being very good at all in that kind of philosophy; similarly, there are some Catholics who lead bad lives despite being well-schooled in academic philosophy (me, for example). If by philosophy you mean something broad like "having a worldview", well, OK, you can't arrive at the truth without a worldview, but no one can reject having one of those.

Lydia, I don't really know how "conservative", at least in any Western sense of the word, the new Christianity will be. For instance, here is the description from Philip Jenkins' New Faces of Christianity:

"Named one of the top religion books of 2002 by USA Today , Philip Jenkins' phenomenally successful The Next Christendom permanently changed the way people think about Christianity in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Now, in this brilliant sequel, Jenkins takes a much closer look at Christianity in the global South, revealing what it is like, and what it means for the future. The faith of the South, Jenkins finds, is first and foremost a Biblical faith. Indeed, many Christians identify powerfully with the world portrayed in the New Testament--an agricultural world very much like their own, marked by famine and plague, poverty and exile. In the global South, as in the biblical world, belief in spirits and witchcraft are commonplace, and in many places--such as Nigeria, Indonesia, and Sudan--Christians are persecuted just as early Christians were. Thus the Bible speaks to them with a vividness and authenticity unavailable to most believers in the industrialized North. More important, Jenkins shows that throughout the global South, believers are reading the Bible with fresh eyes, and coming away with new and sometimes startling interpretations. Some of their conclusions are distinctly fundamentalist, but Jenkins finds an intriguing paradox, for they are also finding ideas in the Bible that are socially liberating, especially with respect to women's rights. Across Africa, Asia, and Latin America, such Christians are social activists in the forefront of a wide range of liberation movements. Anyone interested in the implications of these trends for the major denominations, for Muslim-Christian conflict, and for global politics will find The New Faces of Christianity provocative and incisive--and indispensable. "

That could be bad, but it sounds pretty hyped. I'd have to know more. I have a Kenyan friend who thinks "feminism" means "opposition to wife beating." And that's not because she's a liberal kook. She isn't. Actually, in an American sense she is extremely conservative. But in Kenya, it's still a live issue whether a man has a right to beat his wife, whether the wife can get any traction under the law to get him to stop beating her or to get away from him as opposed to being, in essence, his captive, and so forth. And that's the kind of "feminism" she's familiar with--trying to change that sort of thing. So "women's rights" could mean almost anything.

I find the view interesting for its naked immorality.

Bobcat, would you prefer I wear veils of pretense, or as you might say; hide like a wolf in sheepskins?

I don't really know how "conservative", at least in any Western sense of the word, the new Christianity will be.

You can rest assured, Christianity won't ever be conservative. It began as a revolutionary cult that shook the established order in Jerusalem, and managed to weaken and overthrow several empires, including the one built by the nobles of Rome.

I have no need for cosmic consolations about heaven when life provides so much rich entertainment. It will be amusing to watch from the safe distance of my fortified villa, the great unwashed of Africa doing a Zulu war dance on the grave of that tawdry half-way house known as the Gospel of Prosperity and the mega-church merchants of purpose driven lives.

"Bobcat, would you prefer I wear veils of pretense, or as you might say; hide like a wolf in sheepskins?"

Absolutely not. I suspect many people in our society at least agree with elements of your view--take many liberal academics' using a person's philosophical abilities as a proxy for their moral worth--, but aren't clear on how much of it they agree with themselves, or, if they do know, they don't want to express it. You at least know what you believe and what you're committed to, so I find interrogating you quite useful.

That said, I still think your view is immoral, or at least, non-moral--but I don't know that you believe in morality; you may, like Bernard Williams, think of it as a "peculiar institution", and prefer instead something like Aristotelian virtue theory or something significantly more atavistic. If that's right, then I doubt you'd find "immoral" to be a particularly grievous insult.

Nevertheless, I'm committed to the virtue of civility, so I won't let my personal feelings about your views affect the tone in which I interact with you. (And to be honest, it's not like your view angers me or offends me or anything--very few views do.)

It is obvious that there is more than one discussion taking place here right now. I would wholeheartedly agree with both Maximos' thoughts and Thomas Fleming's piece. The fundamental flaw that remains at the heart of the discussion of Christianity and its relationship to paganism is the belief that history can be neatly bifurcated into the pagan era and the Christian era. In other words, there was a moment when everything was utterly pagan and then, in a flash, everything became orthodox Christian. This is nonsense. Christianity grew up along with other philosophical and religious traditions and incorporated into itself much of what was true within them. Moreover, Christianity was made up of converts who were not at all ignorant of the philosophical traditions of their world, in fact, many belonged to these different schools of thought prior to their conversions. Justin Martyr's Platonism and Augustine's Neoplatonism were critical to their understandings of Christianity.

My point is, at least as far as pre-Christian philosophical traditions go, there is no "pure" Christianity that is to be found which is emptied of all the historical circumstances in which it developed. Instead, the reality is that it was the Church's incorporation of certain elements in pagan philosophy that enabled it to defend itself from the many heresies that rose against it.

This is the argument I was making, but it appears to me that it is not exactly the same as the arguments made by those at TakiMag, Fleming, etc. Fleming is primarily concerned with the historical character of the barbarians and their difference with classical civilization, but even he takes up many of my points in the first half of his piece.

Ultimately, though, I think the differences are irrelevant. Both the ethics and metaphysics of Enlightenment thinkers are anathema to traditional Christianity. I can almost hear the voices of those at Vendee laughing at those who think otherwise.

"Both the ethics and metaphysics of Enlightenment thinkers are anathema to traditional Christianity. I can almost hear the voices of those at Vendee laughing at those who think otherwise."

Really? Leibniz, Samuel Clarke, Christian Wolff, George Turnbull, and Thomas Reid were only pretending to be Christians? Or they were confused about the contradictions between their metaphysical/ethical beliefs and Christianity? Or they weren't Enlightenment thinkers? Or even if they are Christians, are Enlightenment thinkers, and weren't confused, they don't represent the real Enlightenment?

My point is, at least as far as pre-Christian philosophical traditions go, there is no "pure" Christianity that is to be found which is emptied of all the historical circumstances in which it developed.

In a certain sense, this is almost oxymoronically true: Christ founded his Church and its religion on the foundation of Hebraic culture and the Jewish religion. It would be fundamentally impossible to divorce Christianity from that background.

Nevertheless, whatever historic and cultural backdrop lies alongside the founding of Christianity, Christ also implicitly gave us the tools to sort out those elements that are merely historically present to Christianity from those elements that are intrinsic to Christianity. Just as an example, Christianity grew up in a sphere in which slavery was a given, taken for granted. Eventually, Christians were able to realize that that particular social thread could be (needed to be) severed from the fabric of life without damaging the essence of the Christian life. But that realization did not happen at once. Did not even happen at the time when Christianity became the religion of the Roman state.

While it would be impossible for any person to state with clarity and complete confidence exactly all of the historical aspects of pre-Christian and Christian cultures that are extraneous to Christianity, and all of the ones that are essential to it, we don't need that level of complete comprehension to be able to speak to certain aspects of history and culture.

Bobcat, while I would certainly not condemn thinkers like Leibniz or Samuel Clarke wholesale (there is much value in them to a certain extent). It is also true, however, that Leibniz's rationalism contains many errors within it and his ethics was largely an attempt to turn morality into a universal, purely rational, and abstract science that was characteristic of so many other early modern philosophers. In this way, yes, even a brilliant thinker like Leibniz was ultimately a modern philosopher.

I cannot speak too much about personal beliefs but only of their thought and where it logically and historically leads. Descartes, after all, maintained that he was a devout Catholic for his entire life, yet his philosophy is usually credited with beginning the revolution that would throw of the Christian tradition in favor of modernity. Honestly, he would probably be aghast to see what came of the movements influenced by him. But, then again, maybe not. I cannot therefore say who is confused or not, but I can say that the bent of the project as a whole, including men like Leibniz and Wolff, helped undermine the foundations of Christendom.

"I cannot speak too much about personal beliefs but only of their thought and where it logically and historically leads."

I don't Thomas Reid's or Leibniz's thoughts logically lead, say, to verificationism. Whether they historically lead to them is a completely different question, but it's not one that makes them a threat to Christianity. Arguably, Christianity historically leads to liberalism, which is an emphasis on some Christian truths and an ignoring or rejecting of others.

That said, Descartes' rejection of forms may more strongly lead to where we are today, at least if Ed Feser is right, but Leibniz, for example, didn't reject forms, at least not if you believe Leibniz (he claimed he believed in entelechies, and I see no reason not to believe him).

From its very first sentence, the movement, the decisive action, in the Biblical narrative is from God outward, whether we are talking creation, covenant, redemption, or incarnation. It is not from us to God, and cannot be. To go that direction is to court slavery and death, and simply to ape the first sin, something we have done in multiple ways in every field of human endeavor -- theology and philosophy included.

Aristotle's entire project, to which I objected in the previous thread, is just such a movement from us to God. It is a jaw-droppingly arrogant attempt to build a comprehensive system of knowledge and analysis from the ground up, one that purports to encompass even God Himself. That shocking arrogance regarding the capacities of the unaided, and presumably autonomous, human intellect is the philosophical equivalent of the tower of Babel. It cannot and it did not succeed. It foolishly proceeds as if we need no revealed word from God, as if we ourselves could build a mental ladder to the heavens, as if we needed no rope dropped to us from above in order to extricate ourselves from the deep well of the noetic effects of sin into which we plunged.

By mainstreaming Aristotle's awful and destructive arrogance, Thomas Aquinas helped unleash within Christian thought a centripetal force away from Biblical theology and its God-centeredness, and toward the leftist individualism that cripples the west today, the leftism that is the Christian heresy about which we debated earlier, and about which Thomists rightly complain -- except when they themselves are its practitioners.

In other words, I'm saying that, concerning Thomas Aquinas and his lamentable addiction to Aristotle, Francis Schaeffer was exactly right: It was the beginning of the end. After Thomas, the genie is indeed out of the bottle.

If it is not yet clear to you, Ed F. and George R., my position has nothing to do with either anti-intellectualism or fideism. They are by no means the only options open to us when it comes to objecting to Thomas Aquinas, even if you can conceive no other.

It foolishly proceeds as if we need no revealed word from God, as if we ourselves could build a mental ladder to the heavens, as if we needed no rope dropped to us from above in order to extricate ourselves from the deep well of the noetic effects of sin into which we plunged.

Michael, I think you're overstating the problem, at least in regards to Christian philosophers. The Apostle Paul makes it clear that some things about God are knowable from human observation, so much so that pagans have no excuse. Of course, even this knowledge is dependent on God's act of creating the natural world and making man in his image.

What human knowledge cannot do without revelation is to reveal God in his fullness. For that, we need His self revelation in Christ.

It doesn't contradict scripture to say that we can know some things about God from reason, but that we need revelation to know the complete picture.

What Paul makes plain is that the truth is shamelessly suppressed, and that suppressing truth leaves you without excuse. He also makes plain that if you want to talk to pagans about "the unknown God" the best way to do it is to talk about Jesus and the resurrection. Aristotle's paganism is part and parcel of the suppression of truth that Paul rightly eschews. Aristotle's pagan theism is compatible with believing in, say, Allah, but not with the Trinitarianism of revealed religion. Christianity is not properly reduced to generic theism, Thomas' enormous miscalculation notwithstanding.

Jesus Himself will tell you that to see Him is to see the Father because He and the Father are one. He gives no hint whatever that when you see Him you see the uncaused cause, the unmoved mover, or that than which no greater can be conceived. That is simply not how the prophets or Christ think or talk about God. We must not read Aristotle into the Biblical text.

Nor have you even tangentially addressed my contentions concerning the content and direction of the Biblical narrative or the corrosive effects on culture and religion of Thomas' mainstreaming of Aristotle's arrogant pagan methods of thought.

"I'm saying that, concerning Thomas Aquinas and his lamentable addiction to Aristotle, Francis Schaeffer was exactly right: It was the beginning of the end. After Thomas, the genie is indeed out of the bottle."

Do you think then that the corruption of Thomistic Scholasticism into the nominalism of the late Scholastics was inevitable? The problem is with Thomism itself, not its decadent nominalist form?

If St. Thomas let the genie out of the bottle, and you have to move further back, so to speak, to escape the Aristotelian influence that he brought into theology, where do you go from there? Pre-Thomistic Christian thought appropriated Plato, both in the West through the Augustinian stream and in the East through the Cappadocians. Moving further back to the NT period, you find a thoroughly Hellenized Judaism, especially among the Diaspora.

So if you're looking for a pristeen, completely Hebraic Christianity totally uninfluenced by Greek thought, where do you expect to find it?

"Christianity is not properly reduced to generic theism, Thomas' enormous miscalculation notwithstanding."

Who here believes otherwise? By saying that Aristotelian theism is in some sense compatible with Christianity does not mean that the two are equivalent. I don't think that anyone here believes that someone can reason their way to the Christian God; He is known only through the revelation in Christ. However, this does not mean that reason cannot bring us to the belief that there is a Creator, else St. Paul's appeal to cosmology makes no sense. Surely you don't believe that St. Paul expected pagans to look at the creation and thus come to a true knowledge of the revealed Christian God?

I linked to this on the other thread, but if you missed it, I strongly recommend you give this article a read:

http://www.touchstonemag.com/archives/article.php?id=16-06-085-f#


Rob,

The double-paganizing of Christian theology by the ancient advocates of Plato and the medieval friends of Aristotle was an unintentional two-pronged assault on biblical theology -- its form, content and methods. It has had an inimical effect on Christian life and thought that is so extensive most of us cannot conceive of the faith without it -- much like leftists and their inability to think of any answer to any human problem that does not center on the state.

For the record, I think none of the things about Paul and his theology that you speculate I might. Nor do I think that the theology of, say, Jesus or Jeremiah was Hellenized. Judging from them, Yahweh is the most-moved Mover.

I didn't miss the link, and I thank you for it.

I would be interested to hear more from Michael Bauman on the notion of the most-moved mover. Sounds like Charles Hartshorne.

I have also some honest questions for him. Is his conviction that human reason uninformed by direct revelation is incapable of apprehension of any truths about God itself a result of ratiocination or of revelation? If the former, how can he rely upon the principle? If the latter, how can he demonstrate his prophetic credentials? If he answers these questions by resort to ratiocination, how can he rely upon those answers? Are his ratiocinations instances of revelation?

Then there is another question: is it really possible for there to be such a thing as an instance of human reason that is not at least minimally informed by prevenient grace? I.e., is there any such thing as an actual being (other than God) that is not created and maintained in being by God, and thus in so far forth (as William James used to say) informed by his revelation, as having been in its first instance, and indeed in all its instants, formed thereby?

In other words, what about General Revelation?

In asking these questions, I'm not trying to catch him out, for I feel sure that he has thought of them, and has a ready answer. It would be most interesting to see how he has dealt with them.

Jesus Himself will tell you that to see Him is to see the Father because He and the Father are one. He gives no hint whatever that when you see Him you see the uncaused cause, the unmoved mover, or that than which no greater can be conceived.

So, Michael, do you deny that God is the uncaused cause? Yes or no?

"It has had an inimical effect on Christian life and thought that is so extensive most of us cannot conceive of the faith without it"

If we grant for a second that what you're saying is true, how to you propose to "de-paganize" it, given the fact that the Creed and the conciliar definitions on which traditional Christian theology is based are, under your claim, tainted?

Jesus Himself will tell you that to see Him is to see the Father because He and the Father are one. He gives no hint whatever that when you see Him you see the uncaused cause, the unmoved mover, or that than which no greater can be conceived.

There are many ways of seeing.

The Chicken

Kristor,
By "most-moved Mover" I meant that, whether we view God in light of the prophets or the incarnation, He is passionate and deeply moved by us. We don't learn from either the prophets or Christ that God is somehow unmoved, dispassionate, or impassible. Of course, that's not the sort of "unmoved" Aristotle had in mind here, but it is the sort of "moved" that's true about God as we know Him in Scripture. We have an effect upon God. He moves and is moved. The thing I am saying here about God is depicted graphically and memorably in Abraham Heschel's brilliant 2 volumes called The Prophets. I recommend them very highly. As for Hartshorne, I cannot say. I don't read him.

I don't mean to say that we cannot know anything about God. I do say that what we can and do know about God is habitually suppressed -- and that is a horrid offense on our part. To employ a sometimes trite phrase, I am talking about the difference between "knowing" and "knowing about." In Scripture, that difference is profound, and rightly so. We know a little about God, and it profits us almost nothing. Indeed, it serves rather to condemn us. What little we know about God leaves us in the unenviable position of having to acknowledge Him as an "unknown God."

Frankly, I don't think the Greek pagans, the "unknown God" folks themselves, were any better at knowing God than were pagans of other sorts, like the prophets of Baal or the followers of Islam. The Greek pagans, like Aristotle, are little better off, if at all, than the theistic devils who believe there is a God and who shudder at the prospect. It is not wrong to believe there is a God, of course, but I hardly think that theism of that sort is well connected to Trinitarianism -- and that is key. God is the most important fact in or out of the universe. And the God who is is Trinity. No philosophy ever got us there -- ever got us to the only God who is. It gets us instead to generic theism. You cannot reduce the Trinity to generic theism without unspeakable loss and colossal distortion. While some call that loss and distortion compatible with Biblical religion, I do not, any more than I think Baalism is compatible with the worship of Yahweh. It is a compatibility that entails mere schematic agreement at the lowest and most distortive level which, while not nothing, is as close to Biblically useless as one can imagine.

I do not think of any human being as without what we call prevenient grace. I take that to be part of what's entailed in the Logos enlightening every man who comes into the world (John 1:9). But, we seem to do little of benefit to ourselves with that enlightenment, as is typical for us when it comes to the gifts of God.

Best to you, Kristor,
Michael

George R,

"So, Michael, do you deny that God is the uncaused cause? Yes or no?"

I deny that these are proper terms by which to describe Him or know Him. To paraphrase our friend Aristotle, he who would succeed must ask the right preliminary questions -- your question is not one of them.

Chicken,
Yes, there are multiple ways of seeing; I agree. But they are not all created equal, and some of them, perhaps most of them, are not Biblical. Indeed, some of them are not ways of seeing at all, but are ways of distorting, disfiguring, and transforming. "Seeing" God apart from his revelation in history, in Christ, and in Scripture is just such a way, no matter which pagans, Greek or otherwise, come up with it.

"[Jesus] gives no hint whatever that when you see Him you see the uncaused cause, the unmoved mover, or that than which no greater can be conceived."

True enough, but this is because the God Who is the Father transcends the pagan notions of the Creator and by transcending them, subsumes them. The Father is greater than a "mere" unmoved mover not less than or equal to one. The pagan understanding of God, as well as the philosophical one, are wrong primarily because they are incomplete, not because they're inherently incompatible with the Christian understanding of God as the eternal Father.

Rob,
Given the content of Jesus's teaching, what you call "subsumes" I call "corrects," maybe even "rejects."

Rob,

"If we grant for a second that what you're saying is true, how to you propose to "de-paganize" it, given the fact that the Creed and the conciliar definitions on which traditional Christian theology is based are, under your claim, tainted?"


You must outflank from the right these pagan intrusions into the faith. To get back as close as possible to the religion of the prophets and of Christ, one has to go back to the things they said or wrote in Scripture. Revelation is the corrective to our errors, whether new or old.

Wait, wait. Mr. Bauman, are you calling the Creeds and the ecumenical councils -- even through accepted by Catholics, Orthodox and Protestants alike -- "pagan intrusions into the faith"?

Paul,
Some parts of the ecumenical creeds, yes; the Apostles' Creed, no.

What about the Nicene Creed?

I deny that these are proper terms by which to describe Him or know Him. To paraphrase our friend Aristotle, he who would succeed must ask the right preliminary questions -- your question is not one of them.

Yeah, that's how lawyers should advise their clients how to answer questions.

"Mr. Johnson, were you or were you not with the deceased on the night he was murdered?"

"I deny that these are the proper terms by which to describe where I was. I have the right to be asked the right questions; and I'm afraid your question is just not one of them."

George,
Lawyers advise their clients not to answer badly framed, tendentious questions. Indeed, when questions of that sort arise, lawyers object on their client's behalf. In this case, George, I am my own lawyer, and I object to the tendentious way in which the question was framed and the way you decided, ahead of time, how it ought to be answered -- "yes or no." You proceed here as if asking a man if he'd stopped beating his wife -- yes or no -- was a suitable question.

Your question incorporated the very things against which I am arguing. Because it did, it does not get a yes or no answer.

Paul,
I object to the language of essences, substances, and hypostases, etc,. both at Nicea and at other councils.

Wow - what a thread.

I was going to put up a separate post, summarizing, as best I could, the exchange between Ed Feser & Michael Baumann - but it turns out that I'm simply out of my depth, here.

Michael,

Someone who is asked "Are you still beating your wife?" has a straightfoward answer open to him. Here it is: "Your question insinuates that I have beaten her in the past. But I never have beaten her in the past and I am not beating her now." Yes, in a court of law, where the concern is often not the truth but doing what is necessary to achieve acquittal, it might be better not to say anything. But this is not a court of law. So, you know, let your yes be yes and your no no -- and stop fooling around already.

As with the wife-beating question, there should be a perfectly straightforward answer to George's question available to you, and if you are intellectually honest you will try to give it. Maybe your answer would be something like: "The concept of being an uncaused cause cannot be coherently applied to the God of the Bible, any more than the concepts of fragrance and weight could coherently be applied to the number 23." Now the problem with such an answer is that it is not at all plausible. If (following the Bible) we say that God created the heavens and the earth, then we are surely committed to saying that God caused the heavens and the earth -- that is, the world. For creating is a kind of causing. And if we assume also -- as I'm sure you would -- that no one made God, then we have in God something that is surely plausibly called an "uncaused cause." So what's the problem exactly?

Or maybe you think the problem is not coherence. OK, but what, then? Don't just tell us "These aren't the right categories." Tell us why they aren't. Otherwise we will be left with nothing more than what you have already given us many times over -- a string of undefended assertions.

Steve,

I don't think depth has anything to do with it. What it has to do with is a guy who refuses to answer a simple, straightforward question. And who still doesn't know the difference between "different" and "incompatible." Or what a straw man fallacy is.

Please don't put up a separate thread. It would be pointless.

Ed,
A question that presupposes the very thing to which I object will not get from me the yes or no answer demanded by the questioner. I will not accept the premise of George's question any more than George will accept asking it on my basis. If he wants to ask questions about the character of God, on which Biblical theology focuses in both Testaments, and not on the metaphysical characteristics of the generic god of Greek theism with which Biblical theology is supremely uninterested, then productive dialogue is possible, even likely.

That persons disagree with you, Ed, does not mean that they do not know the difference between "different" and "incompatible." Conversely, perhaps you do not understand the Biblical categories of analysis or of theologizing, even when they are identified for you repeatedly. To be specific: Theology is not philosophy you do about God. Because the revelation we are trying to understand and explain is historical and textual (literary), and because our theology ought to be cut from the same cloth as the revelation with which we are working, the two disciplines closest to theology are history and literary criticism, not philosophy. When you start doing historical and rhetorical theology rather than Greek philosophy, then perhaps we can find a common ground on which to begin asking and answering well-formed questions.

At least consider this: A person of intelligence and good will like Steve Burton considers the thread deep and interesting. You seem to consider it a colossal misfire. Perhaps you are missing the point. Perhaps, given your commitments and methods, the points are lost on you. Perhaps the failings aren't all on the other side. Perhaps.

Mr. Bauman, I have difficulty imagining how we could even attempt to understand, say, the doctrine of the Trinity without aid from the language of reason which descends from the Greeks. Even the great evangelical systematic theologians -- I'm thinking of Berkhof and the great Wayne Grudem -- acknowledge the paucity (note: not absence, paucity) of trinitarian theology in the Bible. Similarly with the doctrine of the two-natures-in-unity of Christ. The debt the church owes to the Greek philosophical framework on this is considerable. The problem is not in Scripture, of course. The problem is in the feebleness human mind.

Michael,

First of all, no one is asking you to accept the premise of the question. I am asking you to explain exactly what is wrong with the premise of the question. When George asks "Is God an uncaused cause or not?" and you say "That's the wrong sort of question to ask," fine, then please tell us exactly why it is the wrong sort of question to ask.

Second, my reason for saying that you do not seem to understand the difference between "incompatibility" and "difference" is not that you disagree with me. My reason for saying it is that every time I ask you for an example of an incompatibility, you either do not respond at all or respond with yet another example of a mere difference.

So, let's try one more time. I realize you think that "Is God an uncaused cause?" is a bad question. Great, got it, message received. Why is it a bad question? Don't tell us yet again that biblical categories are different from philosophical ones. We all knew that even before you repeated if for us countless times. Tell us exactly why they're incompatible -- please give us an example of an actual contradiction between biblical categories and philosophical ones, or of some incoherence in the application of philosophical categories to the God of the Bible.

And don't tell us "If you can't see it, then you're too in thrall to Thomism" etc. That's mere rhetoric. Question-begging rhetoric at that.

Don't tell us that Aristotle won't get you to the Trinity. Again, everyone already knows that too. And to pretend anyone claims otherwise is to attack a straw man.

Don't tell us about what your lawyer would advise you to do. This is not a court of law; and someone who doesn't want to answer "Are you still beating your wife?" can at least explain why this is a bad question.

As I have said before, I can give you specific examples of where I think e.g. Lockeanism is incompatible with Christianity, not just different from it, and I gave as one such example Locke's theory of personal identity. Since you had compared my rejection of Lockeanism with your own rejection of Aristotelianism, I challenged you to give your own example of an incompatibility -- not just a difference but an incompatibility -- between some Thomistic claim and Christianity.

Rather than offer a response, you kept mum for several days. Then you came to this thread and, instead of responding to my request, decided just to repeat yet again your usual spiel about how different the Greeks and the Bible are. In the interim a couple of other people tried to offer possible examples on your behalf, but we heard not a peep from you.

So, I'm still waiting for my example. Just one is all I ask. And I'm sure Steve would love to hear it as well.

Dr. Feser,
Do you deny that Aquinas adopted Aristotle's view on delayed ensoulment? If so, explain how he got there from a Christian perspective, keeping in mind that the Orthodox Church never adopted such a stance.

Also, my favorite account of the evolution of God and Jewish mysticism.
http://www.pantheon.org/articles/y/yahweh.html

Another (alleged) example! Thank you, Step2! That's three of you now who've tried to come to Michael's aid. Why can't he defend himself?

As it happens, the example doesn't work. But at least you tried to provide one, which is what matters. We need specifics to chew on.

Anyway, Aquinas did indeed adopt Aristotle's view, and he was wrong to do so. But there are two reasons this is not an example of an incompatibility between an Aristotelian philosophical idea and Christianity:

(a) The view in question is not a philosophical view in the first place, but an empirical scientific one. That is to say, it was not Aquinas's Aristotelian philosophical conception of the soul that led him to believe in delayed ensoulment, but rather his mistaken understanding of embryonic biology. He mistakenly thought you didn't have a human organism until well after conception. When you combine modern biological knowledge with that very same conception of the soul, you get the conclusion that the human organism comes into being at conception.

(b) Aquinas did not in any case draw a conclusion that was at odds with Christian morality. E.g. he did not conclude that abortion was OK before ensoulment. On the contrary, he held that it was immoral at any time, though only after ensoulment did it count as homicide. (Before then it was a kind of contraception, which he held -- as all Christians did at that time, and indeed always did hold back to the beginning of the Church -- to be intrinsically immoral.) Nor was he unusual in this way. While abortion was always condemned throughout Church history, not every Christian writer held the same view about why it was immoral. So, Aquinas's view was in no way "unChristian."

So, nice try, but no cigar. But thank you for playing -- I wish Michael would!

Dr. Feser,
I certainly believe you are mistaken about that. The error, if you think there is one, is a philosophical one about the nature of souls and the combination needed to make a person. Aristotle used the word in two ways, the more general sense being equivalent to something like life force, the other specific sense referring to rationality. Neither Aquinas or Aristotle was so naive as to propose that a flesh and blood fetus was a vegetable organism, they were both describing a progressive development of the rational mind/soul within the fetus.

Ed,
You have not answered any -- any -- of the points in any of the paragraphs in my previous post-- but yet continue to complain about everyone else's shortcomings, as if they, and they only, don't get it and are evading the point. Check the mote in your own eye.

You continually return to your Thomistic procedures, to their mainstreamed paganism, and to its generic theism. You are talking with someone who insists on doing theology in a more thoroughly Biblical fashion than did Aristotle, even if you will not. You resolutely refuse to do theology on a Biblical basis yet charge others with recalcitrance and evasion.

I am asking you to take recourse to Biblical theology. You revert instead to Thomas and to Aristotle, as if the questions, presuppositions and methods they employ are suitable to the task of doing Biblical theology. They are not.

So here's a few question for you:
1.) Do any of the prophets or Christ employ the methods, arguments or presuppositions of Aristotle? If they do not, why do you?

2.) If neither Christ nor the prophets employ Aristotle's theological language and methods, and you do, are your methods better than, worse than, or just as good as, Christ's? If they are better than Christ's, please tell us on what basis you say so. If they are worse than Christ's, then why would you use them? If they are equally as good as His but merely different, demonstrate it.

3.) Christ could have employed Aristotle's taxonomy, methods, and conclusions. Many Jewish and gentile folks in his day employed them. If He did not, why?

Let me explain it again: Because the nature of revelation is historical and textual, Biblical theology is theology done on the basis of the techniques, taxonomy and methods of history and literature. That's how Joshua, David and Jeremiah, for example, do it. When you, Ed, begin to employ the techniques, categories and methods of the historian and the literary critic rather than those of the pagan Greek philosophers, we might be able to make progress. I told you explicitly in my last post that the theology of the Bible is historical and literary in nature. If you think I am wrong, if you wish to dispute that assertion, then have at it. But if you do not, then do not expect me or anone else to junk Biblical theology in favor your baptized version of Greek paganism, its generic god, and its arid metaphysical categories. That you see the god of the Greeks as compatible with the God revealed in Jesus of Nazareth argues strongly that you do not understand Jesus.

When you shift your rubric, your taxonomy, and your methods to those of the prophets and Christ you'll know better what to ask, how to ask it, and how to proceed. When you start to do theology on that more Biblical basis, we can talk. Until then, YOU, not those who do theology on a more fully Biblical basis, have much explaining to do. Thomism is not the default position. But Christ's position is, and it is not Greek philosophy.

Step2,

You are mistaken. First, Aristotle, and Aquinas following him, distinguish three kinds of soul, not two: vegetative, sensory (or animal), and rational. Second, following Aristotle, Aquinas thought that conception involved the mixture of semen and menstrual blood; and he thought that what resulted from this mixture did have to pass first through a vegetative stage and then through a sensory or animal stage before it was ready for a rational soul to be put into it by God, thereby making it truly human (at around 40 days for men, 90 for women -- go figure). Nor was this "naivete" -- just mistaken biology.

We now know that what results from conception is something with full human DNA, and thus (given Aquinas's conception of the soul) something which must have a human soul, and therefore by definition a rational soul, from the get-go.

Paul,
We don't well understand the God revealed in Christ by talking about natures or hypostatic unions. We talk, rather, about character, and about how action reveals character. We tell the story of God in Christ; we talk about the actions of God on behalf of Israel; we talk about the fact that those who have seen Christ have seen the Father because He and his Father are one, and because He does what He sees his Father do and says what He hears his Father say.

Please notice that, when Christ answers the request of his disciples to show them the Father, Christ insists that you know God by looking at the things He, Christ, does, and by listening to the things He, Christ, says. In explaining God -- and no one has explained Him so well, Jesus never takes recourse to Greek philosophy. I do not use the word "paucity" to describe either his theology or his methods. Nor do I think we have ever improved upon them.

Again, talking well and truly about God in a Biblical fashion is to talk about character, not metaphysical characteristics.

Berkhof and Grudem are protestant scholastics, and as such share the manifold weaknesses of scholasticism that I oppose.

Michael writes:

You have not answered any -- any -- of the points in any of the paragraphs in my previous post--

What points? It's just the same old "See how different Greek and Biblical categories are!" stuff, which, as I've said now I don't know how many times, I am happy to concede. But, as I've also had to repeat many times, difference doesn't entail incompatibility. And you have yet to provide a single example of the latter. Not one. Why not?

but yet continue to complain about everyone else's shortcomings, as if they, and they only, don't get it and are evading the point. Check the mote in your own eye.

Let me see if I've got this straight. You swoop in a few days ago, out of nowhere, and threadjack someone else's post so you can riff yet one more time on your pet anti-Aristotle theme. You assure us that most of the history of Christian thought is a deviation from true, biblical Christianity. You tell us that even the major ecumenical councils are defective because of their use of philosophical vocabulary. You compare the Greek philosophers to demons. You repeat the same straw men and non sequiturs over and over and over. You refuse to provide any evidence whatsoever for your assertions; in particular, you ignore repeated requests for a single example of an actual incompatibility between Thomism and Christianity; and you haughtily dismiss those who "can't see" the truth of what you're saying as simply in thrall to philosophically induced delusion. You have suggested that I, personally, simply “do not understand Jesus.”

And then you kindly suggest to me that I might have a mote in my eye.

Buddy, you don't need refutation. You need help.

Still, I've been happy to provide refutation anyway. But I'm afraid helping you is above my pay grade, as is evidenced by:

You continually return to your Thomistic procedures, to their mainstreamed paganism, and to its generic theism.

Fella, I don’t know what fantasy land you are in right now, but I hope you can find your way back. What “Thomistic procedures” are, I have no idea. Nor did I ever make reference to “mainstreamed paganism” or “generic theism.” All figments of your imagination. I'm sure these phantoms are quite strange and wonderful, though, so when you make it back to earth, do give us a complete rundown, OK?

Anyway, what I’ve done, over and over, is ask a question. Here it is again: What example can you give of an actual incompatibility between a claim of Thomism and Christianity? Notice that there is no assertion of “mainstreamed paganism” or “generic theism” here, because there is no assertion at all. It’s a question. Answer the damn question already, Michael.

Michael? Michael, hello, are you there?

I think we’ve lost him…

So here's a few question for you:

Ah, could that be him again? Let's see -- he refuses to answer my question, but sees no inconsistency in demanding that I answer his. Yep, that’s our Michael!

Well, I am happy to answer:

1.) Do any of the prophets or Christ employ the methods, arguments or presuppositions of Aristotle? If they do not, why do you?

No, they don’t. So what? They didn’t use the Internet, drink Starbucks, or carry King James Bibles around either. Nor did they read works of “rhetorical theology.” Nor the works of Michael Bauman, though you might correct me on that one.

This is the best you can do?

The reason I make use of (some) Aristotelian categories and arguments is because they complement the truths of divine revelation quite well. Certainly you have done absolutely nothing to show otherwise.

2.) If neither Christ nor the prophets employ Aristotle's theological language and methods, and you do, are your methods better than, worse than, or just as good as, Christ's? If they are better than Christ's, please tell us on what basis you say so. If they are worse than Christ's, then why would you use them? If they are equally as good as His but merely different, demonstrate it.

They are better for some purposes, worse for others. For example, when spelling out doctrinal formulas like the sort the ecumenical councils were concerned with, technical philosophical language is quite useful. We can be pretty confident that Christ Himself agrees with this judgment. Why? Because He guided His Church to define said doctrines in precisely that way. Maybe not the Church of Michael, but, you know, the rest of the Christian world.

No doubt you disagree that this is what He did. But if so, let’s hear an actual argument for once, not yet another string of bare assertions.

Similarly, “my methods” of communicating – email, comboxes, telephone, etc. – are, for some purposes anyway, “better” than the ones Christ used while He was on earth, when such technologies did not exist. Also, I’ve probably got better shoes and better plumbing. But maybe that sounds blasphemous to you, so I’ll take it back: My plumbing and shoes are worse. Hey, let’s all use only biblical plumbing and wear biblical shoes! Who’s with me and my pal Michael?

BTW, I love that “demonstrate it.” You won’t answer a single, simple question but you want me to “demonstrate” something. Yeah, I’ll get right on that.

3.) Christ could have employed Aristotle's taxonomy, methods, and conclusions. Many Jewish and gentile folks in his day employed them. If He did not, why?

Well, here’s one pretty good reason: He was God. Hence He didn’t need to come up with arguments for His own existence. Plus He could perform miracles – much more effective in convincing St. Peter and Co. than saying “Consider that motion involves the reduction of potency to act. Now…”

We poor souls, though, who do not have our Lord with us in the way the apostles did, and who have to deal with skeptical people who wrongly dismiss the Bible itself as so many fairy tales, we find arguments of that sort pretty useful.

I told you explicitly in my last post that the theology of the Bible is historical and literary in nature. If you think I am wrong, if you wish to dispute that assertion, then have at it. But if you do not, then do not expect me or anone else to junk Biblical theology in favor your baptized version of Greek paganism [blah blah blah]

Like I said, friend, you need help. You are absolutely unhinged. Where are you getting this stuff? Who ever asked you to “junk biblical theology”? When did I ever deny that the Bible is historical and literary in nature? You are fighting, as you have been this whole exchange – and, I suspect, for a long time before it – monsters of your own imagination.

But here's your chance to achieve that moment of clarity. Peace of mind. Just focus like a laser beam on that one, single, simple task. Answer the question already: What specific example can you give of an incompatibility between some claim of Thomism and Christianity?

Come on, Michael. Answer the question. I've answered yours...

Ed,

The incompatibility about which you ask lies in this: The God of the Hebrews is met in history only -- and not in metaphysics. Only, Ed, only. I've said it multiple times to you: Only. Biblical theology permits no other way and practices no other way. No other way is compatible with it -- in either Testament. It is exclusivistic. It has an uncompromisable particularity. Unless you meet Yahweh in the history of Israel or in the life of Christ, you do not meet Him at all. That is not Aristotle's god. In Biblical theology, historical revelation is indispensable, not optional. Aristotle has dispensed with the indispensable. You want me to meet you on your grounds, and I will not. To do so is to junk Biblical theology and its historical and exclusivistic character.

Further, Yahweh is met only -- there it is again, only -- by means of His outgoing efforts, not by our searching, not by or our efforts to climb or build upwards toward Him the way Aristotle's system tries to do. Yahweh reaches out; Yahweh cannot be reached. Unless Yahweh reaches down to reveal Himself to us, He remains unknown and unknowable. For that reason, the God of Israel and the uncaused cause of Aristotle are different gods. One is God; one is not. Just as you and I are different persons, they are different gods (despite the recourse you seem to take in the misapplied concept of compatibility). I cannot be you; you cannot be me. Yahweh is not and cannot be the god that Aristotle's system yields.

Therefore, no, your methods are not as good as Christ's or Jeremiah's, even for some things, unless by "some things" we mean talking about God in ways that are misleaing and false.

Ed, let's take note of this astonishing statement:

Berkhof and Grudem are protestant scholastics, and as such share the manifold weaknesses of scholasticism that I oppose.

For the vast majority of the Christian world, these two gentlemen stand as the exemplars of the theological tradition of solo scriptura. For myself, I have never read a more effective apologia for that position than Grudem's in his magnificent Systematic Theology. But to Mr. Bauman these folks are nothing but dangerous scholastics! I mean, you really can't top that. He has managed to drive Catholic Thomists and Protestant solo scriptura folks into a theoretical alliance. It's an unprecedented achievement, really.


Lois Lane comes to know Clark Kent only - Only! as her coworker at the daily Bugle. She does not come to know him as the fellow in a red and blue outfit who has an 'S' emblazoned on his chest. Therefore, Clark Kent isn't Superman. QED.

Paul,
There are many ways to do reformed theology better, and in a non-scholastic way, than do either Berkhof or Grudem. Gerhardus Vos from the past and, say, Michael Williams from the present -- not to mention John Calvin himself, are examples. So also is Oscar Cullmann. One does not give up or compromise the principle of sola scripture by rejecting scholastic methodology. Indeed, if you wanted to hold on to sola scriptura, you'd do theology the Bible's way, not Aristotle's.

Your contention is that Grudem (I can't speak to Berkhof as knowledgeably) is -- what? A kind of closet Aristotelian?

The God of the Hebrews is met in history only -- and not in metaphysics.

I really don't want to get involved in this argument, particularly on this thread. And Michael, I think you take things a bit too far and state them too strongly. Not that I think you're doing that for effect or something. I know you mean exactly what you say, and for that reason, I'm pretty sure we would have disagreements. (I have no problem with the Greek-ish language of the Nicene Creed, for example.) However, while it may be worse than anything for me to say a little and no more, I have occasionally been concerned about how some of the things you, Ed, have said (some of them not on here but on other blogs) about God's "not being an hypothesis" and so forth are compatible with Scripture's clear and repeated emphasis on God's being known to man through what Michael calls his "outgoing acts," aka miracles, and as Michael says here, through history--through contingent miraculous ways in which God chooses to work in history, without which we could not have known him, or could have known very little about him. I'm pretty sure that's an argument for another day, though, and all the more so as I'm friends with both of you and don't want to go messing with that.

Anonymous,
You missed the point entirely (just as you missed out on the courage to own your ideas publicly).

If there's only one way to know something and you miss that way, then you don't know it, even if you think you do. There is only one way to know Yahweh, and it's not Aristotle's way.

So, prove to me that either Christ or the prophets teach that there are other ways of knowing Yahweh than his self-revelation in history, or his inspired explanation of Himself and his historical activities in Scripture. Prove to me that the pagan god reached by Aristotle's move from the bottom up is the God of Israel, a God Who is apparently known to us no other way than by His historical and textual revelation, by his revelatory movement down to us -- and not by our pathetic, arrogant, and futile attempts to ascend up to Him.

In other words, if you cannot climb up to Yahweh, and if Aristotle tries to climb up to Him, then Aristotle fails. His god is not God.

Paul,
Yes, their methods are often Aristotle's, as are some of their conclusions about God -- despite their assertions of sola scriptura. I think on that count they are quite wrong. So do many reformed theologians. (I am not reformed.)

Lydia,
I accept that you are happier than I am with the "Greek-ish" notions in the creeds. While that might be a point of disagreement, it is never a threat to friendship.

Lydia,
Just for clarification: I'm not saying that the creeds are wrong, or that in the fight with Arius or Apollinarius that the good guys lost and bad guys won. I am saying that the introduction of "Greek-ish" ways and means into Christian theology was a very mixed blessing, even on its very best days.

I'm also saying that I agree with Karl Barth concerning the alleged common ground some say exists between revelation and so-called natural theology. I'm saying too that I agree with Francis Schaeffer that Thomas Aquinas mainstreaming Aristotle was a disaster for Biblical religion and for culture. It unleashed many of the horrors of humanism we face today.

Paul,
Also for clarification: By saying to Lydia that I agree with Barth and Schaeffer (and not with Berkhof and Grudem) I am holding to sola scriptura and doing so without appeal to Aristotle and his methods, which are not only unnecessary, but downright inimical to the principle, as so many other protestants have said, not just I.

Further, I think there's an unacknowledged subtext here. If Aristotle goes so do things like transubstantiation. It's hard to get to transubstantiation and leave Greek philosophy out if it.

Ah, well, I can't imagine Barth and me as having anything in common, even on our best days. Perhaps we'd agree the sky is blue, and that's about it. Actually, I have a Catholic friend who says you can have transubstantiation without Aristotelian metaphysics, but he's never been able to explain it to me so that I understand him.

Michael says:

The incompatibility about which you ask lies in this: The God of the Hebrews is met in history only -- and not in metaphysics. Only, Ed, only.

From:

1. The Bible describes God as revealing Himself in history via miracles and the like, and does not present metaphysical theories.

it does not follow that:

2. The Biblical understanding of God is incompatible with philosophical cocneptions of God.

You are once again simply presenting one of your patented non sequiturs, Michael. Or rather, your only non sequitur, because underlying all the logorrhea is only ever this one constantly reiterated "argument." Need I say it one more time? Difference does not entail incompatibility. We're going on almost a week now and you have yet to provide a single example of the latter. The reason, of course, is that you cannot.

Paul,

Indeed. But Michael has already shown himself willing to chuck out the ecumenical councils themselves, to criticize the Church Fathers, etc., so nothing surprises me anymore. Next he'll chuck out the first chapter of the Gospel according to John because of all that icky philosophical logos stuff.

Lydia,

I have no idea why you say that. Of course God reveals Himself through history and miracles. When have I ever said anything that implied otherwise? Our disagreement has always only ever been about what sort of metaphysics ought to inform purely philosophical arguments for God's existence.

"I agree with Francis Schaeffer that Thomas Aquinas mainstreaming Aristotle was a disaster for Biblical religion and for culture. It unleashed many of the horrors of humanism we face today."

The disaster for Biblical religion and for culture was not Scholasticism, but its decadent form -- nominalism. If someone could demonstrate that the devolution of Scholasticism into nominalism was inevitable, Michael might have a point. So far, I've not read anyone who's made that claim.

Mind you, I'm no Thomist, so I have no particular axe to grind here myself, other than my desire to see the innocent acquitted and the correct culprit get the smackdown.

"It's hard to get to transubstantiation and leave Greek philosophy out if it."

'Fraid not. All transubstantiation is is a philosophical way of explaining a mystery. The Orthodox understanding of the Eucharist is identical to that of Roman Catholicism, and yet we had no need of Aristotelian terminlogy to "get to" it. Neither, actually, did the Catholics. They believed in the Real Presence long before Aristotelian terminology was called upon to defend it against various heterodox groups, and the adoption of said terminology did not change the associated belief one iota.

Well, without getting into it too much, Ed, I have read a couple of places where you have inveighed against "treating God as an hypothesis," "thinking of the existence of God as the best explanation" or words to that effect, and it seems to me that the best way of describing a situation where S comes to know God by seeing, to his surprise, that God performs a miracle, is that God is the best explanation of what has happened. E.g. God's existence and action was the best explanation of the parting of the Red Sea. God's being the one true God and setting the sacrifice on fire was the best explanation of the fact that the altar of Baal didn't light and that fire did come down on the altar of Yahweh. And so forth. I would say that it is incompatible with Biblical theology to hold that God must never be treated as an explanation and that we should never (on pain of having a wrong conception of Him) come to know Him by inferring His existence and action as an hypothesis. Hence, if the A-T view rules this out, it's incompatible with Biblical theology.

I think part of the reason that this discussion is so fruitless is the incommensurable hermeneutical and theological approaches of the two men involved. A Calvinist, such as Dr. Bauman, is always going to claim that God is absolutely unknowable outside of Scripture, and any successful attempt at convincing him otherwise would necessarily entail a refutation of Calvinism, which is the work of many years/lifetimes/centuries.

Lydia,

I have never said, and never implied, that we may never form as a hypothesis the notion that God caused such-and-such an event. We Catholics do that all the time, e.g. when in a canonization process the Church tries to determine whether certain miracles attributed to a person actually occurred.

The remarks you are citing were all made in the context of discussions of how Thomists understand arguments of the cosmological or teleological sort. The point was that in neither case are the arguments to be understood as quasi-empirical hypotheses, but rather as attempts at metaphysical demonstration. But there is no implication in any of that to the effect that we may never appeal in any context to divine action as a hypothesis.

I have also said that Thomists reject the specific way that the concept of God tends to get developed in contexts like Paley's design argument and ID theory. The reason is that the procedure tends to use language about both God and human designers in a "univocal" way rather than an "analogous" way, to use the standard Thomistic jargon. ("Arguing from analogy" in that sense -- that is, by applying to God in a univocal sense terms we apply to human designers -- is thus something Thomists reject, though they have no poblem with "analogous" language. The trouble here is that Paley on the one hand and Thomists on the other use the term "analogy" in very different -- indeed, nearly opposite -- senses, which is part of what makes these discussions so confusing.)

Anyway, in this case it is a certain kind of hypothesis formation that is objected to, not hypothesis formation as such.

Since Michael seems determined not to answer Ed's question, I'll put this scenario before him:

Consider two philosphers. One argues that God is the uncaused cause; the other says that God has caused nothing but is merely a delusion of the mind. Is one more right than the other, or are they both equally wrong?

What was this post about? Treating Christian brothers as pagans? I suppose disagreements on fundamentals brings out strong sentiments.

If there's only one way to know something and you miss that way, then you don't know it, even if you think you do. There is only one way to know Yahweh, and it's not Aristotle's way.

I suppose someone who can neither read nor think, say a brain damaged baby, can't know God, then. I think this argument undercuts both positions, in part. There are ways to know God more fully (who is ever going to know God enough in this life?) that involve thinking or reading, but must one presuppose that God has not provided another way for those who can do neither?

The Chicken

Well, what, indeed, Chicken?

I don't suppose that it would please either Prof. Bauman or Prof. Feser to learn that I'm inclined to agree with the former about Christianity, but the latter about God.

So I guess I just won't mention it.

OK, Michael, let's call a truce and direct all of our firepower on to Steve now...

(Just kidding!)

Well, Steve, you're going to have to post on that. You can't leave us hanging.

Well, I can give you many specific examples of where I think Lockean positions are incompatible with Christianity. To take just one, I think that the Lockean approach to personal identity is incompatible with Christianity, because it entails (whether Locke himself would welcome such an implication or not) that fetuses and severely brain damaged human beings are not persons, so that to kill them does not count as murder -- contrary, of course, to Christian morality.

Dr. Feser- on previous thread.

Aquinas did not in any case draw a conclusion that was at odds with Christian morality. E.g. he did not conclude that abortion was OK before ensoulment. On the contrary, he held that it was immoral at any time, though only after ensoulment did it count as homicide.

Dr. Feser - on this thread.

I will enjoy learning how Aquinas is "perfectly compatible" reaching the same conclusion about homicide as Locke.

Zach,
No, I'm not a Calvinist.
MB

Paul - wanna bet?

In the right corner, my echt-protestant ancestors, the actual text of the Gospels, & Michael Bauman.

In the left corner, Aristotle, Aquinas, & Edward Feser.

I have many faults - but a death-wish is not among them. So I don't think I'll be rushing in between the disputants, here.

Or I might get squished.

What is an echt-Protestant? (It's always useful to admit ignorance. One learns so much that way.)

Step2,

Touche. I should have been more careful in my statement about Locke. So, let's clarify.

First, again, Aquinas's view is not incompatible with Christian morality, for two reasons:

1. While the Christian tradition has always condemned abortion, it has not always regarded it as homicide. So the fact that Aquinas did not regard it as homicide does not by itself entail a departure from the Christian tradition.

2. What led him to his erroneous view was in any event not his philosophical conception of the soul but rather his mistaken biological views.

The reason we now know that abortion is not only always wrong, but also always murder, is due to our imporved biological knowledge. Aquinas's innocent error is not one anyone could innocently make today.

Now for the same reason, the mere fact that a Lockean might not regard an early stage embryo as a human being is -- IF this view resulted from mistaken biological knowledge -- not by itself a reason for judging his view at odds with Christian morality. The real question has to do with what Lockean philosophical claims would entail in light of modern biological knowledge.

And the difference is this: If we combine modern biological knowledge with Aquinas's conception of the soul, we get the conclusion that a human being, and thus (given Aquinas's understanding of the person as the soul-matter composite) a person with a right to life, exists from conception onward.

But if we combine modern biological knowledge with a Lockean theory of personal identity -- according to which a lack of continuity of consciousness entails a lack of personhood -- then we get the result that a person does not exist at conception, and indeed not until well after conception (since no consciousness is present until well after conception). Hence, given Lockeanism, abortion, at least until well into the development of the fetus, would not count as murder.

So, I thank you for pointing out the need for clarification. But the facts remains unchanged: Aquinas's views (a) were not in fact at odds with Christian morality as it was then understood, given the state of biological knowledge at the time, and (b) are perfectly compatible with how modern biological knowledge must lead us to apply Christian teaching on abortion. By contrast, the Lockean view of personal identity is not compatible with Christian teaching on abortion, as understood in light of modern biological knowledge.

Steve,

You seem to agree with Michael, then, that Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophical categories and biblical ones are not only different (something which, as you know, I've acknowledged many times) but incompatible. Or at least, you seem to think he's made a case for this. Odd, since Michael has given no evidence whatsoever for this claim. He just keeps talking -- and talking and talking -- about how different the categories are (and about how Christ didn't use philosophical arguments, etc.) And he seems to think the difference all by itself entails an incompatibility. Since the non sequitur is blatant and you are a trained philosopher, I know you can see it as well as I can.

So, I am baffled as to why you (apparently) think both Michael and I have made equally powerful cases. In fact, neither of us has made any case at all. All Michael has been doing is repeating the same non sequitur over and over again. All I have been doing is asking him repeatedly to stop doing this and instead to offer an actual example of an incompatibility. Others have tried on his behalf -- unsuccessfully, but at least they've tried. He keeps dodging the question, hoping, apparently -- and utterly vainly -- that the ever-bigger clouds of pompous rhetorical dust he keeps kicking up will keep anyone from noticing that he is dodging it.

It played, Michael. Oh my goodness gracious, it is so so played. Give it up already...

I appreciate your clarification above, Ed, about "treating God as an hypothesis." I would have to dredge up the quotation I had in mind from you on that subject (it was somewhat critical of Richard Swinburne, and I believe it was on Bill Vallicella's blog) to see if that Explains All for me, but I'm really pleased to hear that you aren't opposed always to treating God as an hypothesis.

Re. Locke, you describe his views and say that according to them,

a lack of continuity of consciousness entails a lack of personhood

It's been many years since I read those sections of Locke, but I know that at the time I understood them not to be answering the question of when a person exists at all but rather to be answering the question of when a person conscious at two different times should be treated as *the same person*. I was passionately pro-life at the time, as now, and never understood him to be saying anything even remotely relevant to the question of when personhood begins uberhaupt. Rather, he seemed particularly concerned with jurisprudential questions like the justice of punishing a man for a crime he doesn't remember (because he committed it when he was insane), and he solves this problem (incorrectly, in my view) by concluding that the man should not be regarded as the same person at the two different times. But that just seems entirely orthogonal to the question of whether a human being without continuity of consciousness is a person *at all*.

Hi Lydia,

You are correct that Locke's own intent was juridical. What I had in mind was the way his position has historically been interpreted as, or at least developed into, as a full-blown "theory of personal identity." Hence my use of "Lockean" rather than reference to Locke personally. I also am happy to concede that the claim I made is one that would have to be developed and defended at greater length in order to deal with possible replies a Lockean might give. The point of raising the example at all, back when I first brought it up (in another thread, I think), was to indicate the sort of thing I was asking for in requesting a specific example of an incompatibility between a philosophical view on the one hand and Christian teaching on the other. That is, I was saying to Michael: "Here's a specific putative conflict between Lockean views and Christian ones. Can you give me an equally specific example of a purported contradiction between Thomism and Christianity?" I don't claim that I have conclusively established, in my combox remarks, the point about Lockeanism. It's just an illustration.

Michael Bauman says:

1.) Do any of the prophets or Christ employ the methods, arguments or presuppositions of Aristotle? If they do not, why do you?

Dr. Feser replied no. Too quickly, I think. St. John's Gospel starts out "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God..."

I think that is a pretty blatant use of the Greek philosophical language. I would not grant the question to Michael's corner. Of course both Ed and Michael are well aware of this passage. What I am saying is a little more than that it is Greek: Even if there is some manner in which John intended that usage to reflect Hebrew thought informed by God's Revelation to the Hebrews from ancient days before the Greeks (is there any such interpretation out there?), the man John could not possibly have been unaware of its Greek-sounding connections, and could not possibly have chosen to use it in the historical setting he had at hand without giving a nod to its Greek philosophical meaning as well.

Secondly, way back about a hundred posts ago, Michael objected to calling God unmoved, He is the most moved mover. Yes, there is a basis for saying that. On the other hand, there is ALSO clear basis for saying that He is not - the Bible says He does not change. Now, I grant you that these are not absolutely contradictory tenets. But what they constitute is a absolute demand for the work of a theologian to distinguish, clarify, and analyze. If this cannot be done without using the presupposed language and conceptual structures granted to us by sound philosophy, then it cannot be done at all, for the Bible itself does NOT resolve its own problematic antitheses.

John also said that if he were to recount all the things Jesus said and did, the books would fill the world. So there is stuff out there that is true but not explicit in the Bible. True philosophy that provides the groundwork for true theology is part of that. I hope that Michael is not suggesting that there is no such thing as true philosophy, or (worse yet) no such thing as true theology other than simply repeating various parts of the Bible.

And even at that: translating the Bible correctly requires of itself a sound theology and philosophy that aid in representing the ideas from one language into closest-possible referents of another language, even though sometimes there is no exact one-for-one translation. So, unless we must all read the Bible in the original languages, there is an undeniable place for both philosophy and theology. And if so, then there is an obvious place for the Greek philosophy that John gave a strong nod to.

I am afraid that Michael's position does sort of sound like it resolves to fideism and an anti-rational stance.

Tony,

Opposing the introduction of Aristotle into Bible-based theology is not anti-rational any more than opposing the introduction of, say, Heidegger, Marx, or Locke into theology is anti-rational. Nor is it fideism. Rather, it's an attempt to be true to the theological content and methods of the Bible and to reject those things that are contrary to them. Neither the prophets nor Christ were anti-rational, even though they weren't Aristotelian.

Yes, I have often noticed that John employs the Stoic concept of the Logos in his explanation of who exactly Jesus was and what He did. Naturally, I have no objection at all to his doing so. His use of the Stoic Logos in conjunction with his reference to the Genesis account of creation at the beginning of his gospel does not contradict the nature or flow of Biblical action and revelation -- which is from God to us, and not from us to God. Aristotle's bottom up methods do contradict them.

To be more specific, just as a man remains a mystery to us as long as he remains silent, and just as a man begins to be known to us once he speaks, so it is with God. For us to know God, He must reveal Himself to us. If He does not, He remains for us both unknowable and unreachable. But, thank God, silent He has not remained. He has spoken. (To quote the title of an important little book by Francis Schaeffer, He is There and He is not Silent.) God's utterance, his speech, his logos, his Word, is his Son. The Son is the utterance or eloquence of the Father to us, indeed to all creation, because it was by this utterance -- the Word -- that the world itself was spoken into existence and God Himself was revealed. That creative and revelatory flow, you'll see, is entirely from God to the world, from God to us. The Son is the creative, revelatory, articulation of Yahweh; He is the loving eloquence of a gracious Father to a fallen world. Employing the Stoic logos in this way complements, not contradicts, the content, methods, and flow of Biblical theology.

Of course, what I am saying here is not new. Indeed, it is not even Protestant. It is Roman Catholic, at least by origin, and comes from Erasmus, whom I consider the greatest theologian Christianity ever produced. He was a rightly ardent opponent of the scholastics, but also a warm advocate of what's called the rhetorical school of theology. If you want to see in detail what I mean, then I highly -- highly -- recommend Marjorie O'Rourke Boyle's wonderful book, Erasmus on Language and Method in Theology. It is, in my view, exactly how theology ought to be done. Because Erasmus considers them and their ways to be contrary to the content and methods of Scripture, Aristotle and the scholastics play no part in it.

In other words, the Renaissance happened for good reason.

Oops! My mistake then, Dr. Bauman.

Yes, I have often noticed that John employs the Stoic concept of the Logos in his explanation of who exactly Jesus was and what He did. Naturally, I have no objection at all to his doing so.

????

Well, you could knock me over with a feather. I must say that I am stunned that you would say this, Michael. I expected you to deny any Greek philosophical reference here at all, and to try somehow to assimilate the logos concept entirely to Hebrew sources.

So, good for you. Except that now it seems to me that your position is not only ungrounded, but incoherent as well -- which is why I was sure you'd deny any Greek philosophical influence. Because you've now not only failed to give any actual evidence for your position -- my main beef with you so far -- but you've actually provided an outright refutation of it.

Consider: You've been going on and on about how the Greek philosophers are like the demons who believe, comparing their systems to pagan idolatry, attempts to get to God from the bottom up when God only appears to us from the top down, etc. Furthermore, you've been telling us that the Bible doesn't use philosophical categories etc., so that we shouldn't either. And now you not only acknowledge that the Stoics, at least, got something about God right, but that the Bible itself confirms this.

And make no mistake, that is indeed what you've committed yourself to. For if you say that John was right to use Stoic concepts about God to convey something about God to his readers, then that entails that the Stoic concepts -- which were, of course, developed in the course of what you call "bottom up" attempts to get to God -- must indeed be at least partially accurate. And it also entailos that all the "only, Ed, only" stuff was bluff -- for even you are now admitting that the Bible itself -- not the Church Fathers, not the councils, not Thomas Aquinas, but the Bible -- explicitly allows that philosophical speculation about God can sometimes get us somewhere after all.

So, overall your position as presented in the course of our long exchange seems to be as follows:

1. Biblical categories and philosophical ones are completely different.

so

2. They are incompatible.

except

3. Actually, sometimes they're not different.

so

4. Actually, sometimes they're not incompatible after all.

Just for the record, that's one non sequitur and two contradictions.

I've checked the calendar and it isn't April 1 yet, so... what gives, Michael?

Tony,
With reference to your important observation regarding translation, let me add this to what I said above:

It's precisely because of his understanding of the logos that, when he published his Greek New Testament in 1516, Erasmus also published a Latin translation of it on facing pages, which allowed him the chance to correct some of the shortcomings of Jerome, a decision that cost him endless harassment by the scholastics of his day.

John 1:1, the passage about which we are talking at the moment, Jerome translated (I am working from memory) as "In principio erat verbum." Erasmus considered "verbum" a horrid, almost ignorant, choice. To Erasmus, "verbum" meant a part of a sentence, a mere particle of speech. Jesus most definitely was not a "word" in that sense, Erasmus thought. So he decided it was far better to translate John as saying "In principio erat sermo." "Sermo" seemed much better because "sermo" implies eloquent and persuasive utterance from God, and, in light of the creation account in Genesis (in which God actually speaks the world into existence), and in light of the works and teachings of Jesus, Who is the personal revealer and embodiment of God in the gospels, "sermo" is a far better way to think of Him and to translate John in reference to Him. Thought of that way, John's use of the Stoic logos made perfect sense to Erasmus and did not contradict the teaching and methods of Scripture elsewhere.

But God thought of Aristotle's way -- an unspeaking, unhistorical, impersonal cause or mover that is known or reached by our strivings up to it, and not its articulations to us, does not suit the Biblical account of creation by a speaking God who is known to us only by his doings, not ours, and by incarnation in a historical person. Indeed, it goes contrary to them and cannot be reconciled with them.

In other words, there's a very good reason why John would employ the logos notion of the Stoics and reject the uncaused cause and unmoved mover of Aristotle. The former fits, the latter does not. The scholastics still haven't gotten that important point.

Ed,
"Ungrounded", "incoherent"?

Did you ever stop to think that you don't actually understand my position?

Perhaps it's your misunderstanding of what I'm saying that is ungrounded and incoherent. In other words, perhaps you've screwed up someone else's views and then attributed to them the ungrounded incoherency of your own invention. Maybe, Ed, just maybe, those who disagree with you are not, to quote another word you've used here, "unhinged." It's a possibility.

Michael refers to Francis Schaeffer, who was greatly influenced by the work of Rousas Rushdoony. Rushdoony was a disciple of Cornelius Van Til, who definitely was a type of fideist (although Van Tilians won't own that). I'm inclined to think that Dr. Bauman is a Van Tilian or some other variety of presuppositionalist, or at least has been influenced by that stream of thought.

By the way, I'm still waiting for an answer as to why he thinks Thomism per se is the culprit here, and not nominalism.

Mr. Bauman --

I think really you have introduced some striking ambiguity here, by embracing, at least in part, a different school of Greek thought, along with a different later scholar of Greek thought (namely Eramus). Your response to Tony certainly threw me for a loop.

I took you to be arguing, very stridently, that we should not use Greek philosophical categories, frameworks, concepts, even terminology. Period. Full stop. Now it appears that your are only arguing against a specific class of Greek philosophy.

So you've left a lot of us perplexed.

I guess Michael's position is that concepts from Greek philosophy may be used *only if* the Bible explicitly and undeniably incorporates them into doctrine. It sounds to me like a particular type of biblicism but not, or not necessarily, internally inconsistent. That wd. be my impression, anyway.

Lydia,
Not exactly. I'd say use them only if they don't contradict the Bible.

And if one thinks that Aristotelian natural law, far from contradicting the Bible, is actually the most compatible philosophical system?

Rob,
You're moving too fast, and drawing false conclusions.

You'll notice that I mentioned my support of Barth and not of Van Til. Putting me in the line of Van Til is a mistake. You'll recall that Van Til wrote a book called Christianity and Barthianism because he thought they were two vastly different things. I disagree with him.

You'll also noticed that I said I supported Schaeffer's view that Thomas was the root of the arrogant secular humanism that now racks the modern world because Thomas mainstreamed Aristotle's efforts to reach God by unaided human reason, as if human reason were safely and properly autonomous. I think FS is right about Thomas and about Aristotle. I also think he is right about "The God Who is There" and that "He is There and He is not Silent." I think he has well traced the West's "Escape from Reason," and placed Thomas Aquinas in that doomed glide path to destruction. More than that concerning FS I have not said.

Paul,
For the reason I just mentioned above to Rob (i.e., human reason thought to be safely and properly autonomous such that it can reach up to God), the original culprit is Thomas's realism. Thomas let the genie out of the bottle. It didn't go wrong after Thomas. Thomas himself was wrong. By saying so, I am not saying the nominalists were right (or wrong, for that matter).

Dr. Feser,
Needless to say I think you need much more argument to produce the sort of claims you are making that it should be self-evident that Aristotle's mistaken biology was the main reason for a belief in delayed ensoulment (after all, it does admit to material combination from both parents) or that human DNA is the marker for a rational soul instead of what I previously described as the more general sense of life force.

Lydia,
The problem with Michael's position as I've seen it so far is that it places an exclusive burden on God to reveal Himself to mankind before anyone could be justified in faith. So God has allowed vast stretches of human history and geographies to proceed in false beliefs because God chose to be unknowable or inaccurately known to them.

Paul,
I think you misunderstand Erasmus.

Erasmus was a man who valued much of what the ancient Greeks and Latins said, but he was not, say, a Platonist, Aristotelian, Epicurean, Stoic, or Pythagorean. He eschewed the scholastics' adherence to such things and ridiculed them mercilessly for it. There's no Greek philosopher who stands for him in the position Aristotle did for Thomas: "The Philosopher."

Erasmus advocated instead what he called the "philosophia Christi," something that grew out of his early education under the Brethren of the Common Life, and which stands behind his lifelong move to interiorize piety and to take it away from the externals he thought had deformed the religion of Christ in his day (including the sacraments as normally administered). Think here of books like The Imitation of Christ, which graphically depicts a Christ-centered piety and which seems to adhere to no one school of Greek thought. If somehow you forced Erasmus to pick one ancient Greek thinker, I suspect he'd pick Socrates (whose views he seems to distinguish from Plato's) -- which is partly why he once famously wrote, "Sometimes I can't help but say 'Saint Socrates pray for us'." He liked Socrates' admission of ignorance, and the wisdom to which it led.

But Erasmus is not a Platonist (or any other kind of -ist) in the way his friend John Colet is. Nor is he an apologist or advocate for any one school of Greek philosophy.

Did you ever stop to think that you don't actually understand my position?

Sure. It seems so hopelessly muddled that, applying the principle of charity as any good philosopher should, in interpreting it I seek to find some coherent interpretation. And that's precisel why I keep asking you to claify your position by answering some basic questions. And yet you consistently refuse to answer them. Therefore, I conclude, quite reasonably, that the reason your views seem hopelessly muddled is that they really are hopelessly muddled. (The principle of charity does not require us to assume that a speaker is reasoning coherently full stop. It tells us to assume this unless we have special reason to think otherwise. And you have given us ample reason to assume otherwise.)

Hence, for example you still -- breathtakingly -- refuse to offer a single example of any actual incompatibility between Thomistic philosophical claims and Christian ones. You just keep ignoring the question. But you nevertheless keep repeating the ungrounded assertion that they are incompatible. This is, I submit, powerful evidence that you do not in fact have any good reason for your position.

Then, most recently, you contradict yourself by suddenly allowing that some Greek philosophicl categories are OK after all -- despite all that "only, Ed, only" stuff about how it's always top down from God to us, never us to God, the Greek philosophers being like demons, etc. Again, powerful evidence that your view is simply muddled.

And now, rather than say "No, Ed, let me carefully and clearly explain (a) exactly what examples of actual incompatibilities lead me to say what I say and (b) exactly why I am not really contradicting myself, appearances to the contrary" -- instead of this, you just whine once again about how I'm being mean and uncharitable to you.

Well, I'm sorry if it seems I'm being mean to you, Michael. But if you're going to go around making these sweeping, pompous, arrogant claims about the history of Christianity, the deficiencies of the Church fathers, ecumenical councils, Aquinas, et al., you'd better be prepared to back them up. Otherwise, don't be surprised if someone calls you on it.

Step2,

When did I say it was "self-evident"?

Lydia,

If Michael hadn't gone on and on about the "only, Ed, only" stuff -- about how it's necessarily top down from God to us and never from us to God, about how the ideas of the Greeks are no better than those of demons who believe, about how the great difference between biblical categories and philosophical ones entails incompatibility, etc., then your charitable reading of Michael's position might be pausible. But, sadly, he did say all these extreme things. So, he simply has no coherent account to offer. If all this stuff doesn't rule out the Stoics, why should it rule out Aristotelianism?

Maybe he thinks there's some special incompatibility between Aristotelian concepts like "pure act" and Christian theology. But we'll never know, because, as everyone knows, poor Michael's hands apparently freeze up every time he tries to type out an answer to that clear, straightforward question.

George R,

I was not suggesting that the common man should be subject to philosophers per se, but to the truth. And since one can not even hope to attain to the truth through one's own efforts without philosophy, if we assume that the common man rejects philosophy, he cannot arrive at the truth that he ought to be subject to. Therefore, he will require that this truth be imposed on him from outside himself.

The example of the thief on the cross who recognized all of the essential truths about Jesus without any philosophy at all contradicts that point. The truth that the common man needs to be right with God is attainable without philosophy precisely because if it were dependent on philosophy the common man would have a good excuse in the afterlife for not knowing the truth and acting on it.

Step2,
I wouldn't quite put it that way myself regarding God's unknowability, or the idea that most persons have no knowledge of God.

Like John, I'd say that the logos enlightens everyone who comes into the world; that the enlightenment He brings is real; and that it comes directly from Christ Himself. Revelation is a matter of grace, and grace is inescapably Christo-centric (on that point Barth is exactly right): Christ the logos spoke the world into existence and He revealed God to us so that He could be known. Part of that revealing He Himself still does in human hearts around the globe. God in Christ is still reaching down to us, enlightening us and saving us. He enlightens everyone who comes into the world. But I also would say that much of what passes for enlightenment in some circles is not, and here I am speaking specifically of Aristotle. I could speak of others, but they are not the topic of debate. I'll just say that something might be both revealed by God and suppressed by us. We have Paul's word on it.

If we have a knowledge of God, it comes to us from God Himself, and can be gotten by no other way or means. It is a grace. Grace is a movement from God to us, not from us to God. Again, the Stoic notion of the logos works well in conjunction with what we know about God in other parts of the Bible, but Aristotelianism does not.

"Thomas mainstreamed Aristotle's efforts to reach God by unaided human reason, as if human reason were safely and properly autonomous"

Even if this is true, which I don't believe it is, Thomists and other realist Christian philosophers do not believe that unaided reason can get you to the Christian God. It can get you only as far, so to speak, as a "generic" Creator. What you seem to be saying is that since reason cannot reach all the way up to the Trinity, it cannot reach up at all. This flies in the face of St. Paul's appeals to cosmology for the existence of the Deity.

Vladimir Lossky called the Trinity "a cross for human reason," and he's correct, I believe. Note that it's the Trinity, not the existence of God, that serves as that cross. The implication is that reason can bring one to the sheer fact of God's existence, even if at that point He is only imperfectly or incompletely known by the reasoner. Haven't you heard of people who became generic theists of one sort or another before they became Christians? C.S. Lewis is a good example, and I've known a few people myself who made that same trajectory.

No one here is claiming that such knowledge of God is salvific -- that's up to God, and is something we can't really speculate on. But that doesn't mean that the knowledge isn't real or true as far as it goes.

Ed.
What's been repeatedly explained in detail you have repeatedly ignored, and just as repeatedly accused others of being the ones who ignore. I have articulated many times and in many ways the incompatibility about which we speak. I have explained it in terms of methods, directions, flows, grace, revelation, divine or human action, and the noetic effects of sin. I have explained it in terms of a comparison between Stoic notions that are compatible with the content of Scripture and Aristotelian notions that are not. Yet, to my continued amazement, you feel ignored.

Maybe it's not that my hands freeze up, Ed, as you insultingly surmise, maybe something else is freezing up. But until you come to realize that, Biblically speaking, knowing God is a result of grace and only a result of grace, that grace is a movement from God to us and not from us to God, and that Aristotle claims to know God by means that Biblical revelation itself does not permit, then you'll see why Aristotle and Scripture teach incompatible things on this point.

There -- I've said it again. You cannot say you are ignored, though you'll likely continue to say so. My fingers did not freeze, though you'll likely continue to employ other ridiculous insults. I have explained why, given the nature and function of grace in Scripture as the necessary and indispensable means of knowing God, and given the futile, arrogant, humanistic, from-the-bottom-up, method employed by Aristotle, a method that does not take into account the devastating noetic effects of sins, a method that shockingly assumes that by unaided human reason God could be known (in contradiction to all that Scripture teaches on the point) why Aristotle's program cannot succeed and is incompatible with the Bible.

Mr. Bauman --

I wasn't making any particular claim about Erasmus, whose work I am unfortunately deficient in knowledge of. But as you present his thought, it certainly seems to me that he was engaged in an activity of theological reasoning which employed philosophical materials to do its work. Your presentation of him inclines me to feel that with Erasmus we are in the presence of a subtle and admirable philosophy. I want to know more.

The thing is, your comments upthread tended toward so thoroughgoing a diminution and even denigration of philosophy, unless said philosophy derives constantly and unmistakeably from Scripture, that I am still very much left with my perplexity. If even Wayne Grudem is engaged in perilous scholasticism, because his explication of Scripture is too dependent on non-scriptural concepts, then all of philosophy -- not just Aristotelian or Thomist philosophy -- is radically demoted.

Rob,
You say:
"Thomists and other realist Christian philosophers do not believe that unaided reason can get you to the Christian God."

There is no other God to get to.

It sounds to me like a particular type of biblicism but not, or not necessarily, internally inconsistent. That wd. be my impression, anyway.

Lydia, consistency has nothing to do with it. Michael’s entire position is a bluff, since he refuses to answer pertinent questions. My questions have only required one-word answers; but instead of responding he pleads the fifth. It’s ridiculous.

While I agree with Edward Feser that this really hasn't amounted to much of a discussion, since only one side seems willing to engage with specific issues rather than vague generalizations, I would like to address one specific issue that Mr. Bauman has repeatedly raised, namely, whether or not we have knowledge of God through reason.

Philosophically speaking, man cannot know God in precisely the same way Mr. Bauman thinks. Of course we cannot derive all of Christianity's claims by the light of reason, and nobody here is denying the proper limits of reason's capabilities. Scripture and revelation are, therefore, absolutely essential to authentic religion. Aquinas himself, most people seem to be ignoring, was a master of Scripture and of biblical theology. So far, I think I have said things to which both Edward Feser and Michael Bauman would assent.

In a certain sense, Mr. Bauman is right that we cannot have knowledge of God except through His revelation of Himself to us. Man cannot directly know God's essence without God's aid.

With that said, though, we must understand properly what it means to have knowledge of God from the philosophical perspective. The term "knowledge of" is not being used univocally, and it is believing otherwise, I think, that is causing Mr. Bauman to make the claims he does. Aristotle, and also Aquinas, arrive at God as a cause because they sought a comprehensive understanding of his effects. This is the central idea to all philosophical knowledge of God: the world must needs be secondary, derivative, or, more congenial to our Faith, philosophical investigation ultimately reveals to man that the world in which he lives is essentially a created thing. In other words, the world is an effect of a cause. This claim, which even Mr. Bauman would, I hope, agree is a central tenet of Christianity, is truly all the philosopher can go by. Everything said about God through philosophy is said through the consideration of the world as not existing in its own right but existing because of something else. All knowledge of God obtained through reason, then, is essentially an answer to the question "What must the cause of the world be like?"

As long as Mr. Bauman agrees that the world is a created thing, he has left the door open to the entire philosophical project of St. Thomas Aquinas. If he denies this, he has denied Genesis.

Hi Ed,

Here's the incompatibility between Thomas and Christianity that Baumann sees:

(1) Thomas says that we can come to knowledge that God exists through unaided reason.
(2) But according to Christianity we cannot come to knowledge that God exists through unaided reason.
(3) Therefore, thomism and Christianity contradict each other.

I get this from his latest comment, wherein he writes, "Biblically speaking, knowing God is a result of grace and only a result of grace ... grace is a movement from God to us and not from us to God, and ... Aristotle claims to know God by means that Biblical revelation itself does not permit."

What about Romans 1:18-23? There, Paul says "what can be known about God is plain to [men], because God has shown it to them. Ever since the creation of the world his invisible nature, namely, his eternal power and deity, has been clearly perceived in the things that have been made. So they are without excuse".

In Bauman's favor, he's got the claim that we can know about God we know because God has shown it to us, not because we reasoned unaidedly. Against Bauman's interpretation you can point out that by "God has shown it to them", Paul means only that God has created the world in such a way that people can look at the world and see that it's a divine creation. He's shown that fact to them via the orderliness of his creation, for example. So using natural theology doesn't contradict the claim that what we know about God we know because God has let us know.

Paul,
When it comes to knowing God, philosophy is demoted.

Regarding Grudem's scholastic shortcomings, I'd recommend this exercise whenever the chance arises: Read Heschel's The Prophets and then read Wayne's section on the attributes of God. See if you think he's missing something, that something being the personality of the living God Himself. When you read his (or Berkhof's) section on the attributes of God, see if you say to yourself, "My, that sounds exactly like the God revealed in Jesus of Nazareth!" or not. The difference I suspect you'll see is the difference between character and metaphysical characteristics. Wayne goes for the latter; Christ and the prophets go for the former. But if you deal with the generic god of metaphysical speculation, and not with the God who speaks and acts in history, that's all you can get. For example, one can hardly conclude in favor of the doctrine of God's impassibility in light of the prophets or the incarnation, though most protestant scholastics do precisely that.

Then C.S. Lewis's journey to faith in the Christian God via a "generic" theism was a sham?

What about a personal friend of mine who was raised as an atheist, and has come to believe in the existence of God through a miraculous answer to prayer, but has yet to come to the conclusion that Christianity is true? (this person's knowledge of and belief in God came through Alcoholics Anonymous).

Bobcat,
You are right. Paul says exactly that. He also says that we shamelessly suppress that knowledge, so that it does little else than render us condemned and without excuse. I place Aristotle's efforts into that category. Ed is far more confident of their utility than I am, or than I think the Bible permits.

Bobcat,
No, Lewis's conversion wasn't a sham. Of course not. But the fact that God uses a thing doesn't imply that it was correct, true, or wise. God brings good out of evil, and I'm enormously glad He does. But his using a thing is not a moral or intellectual endorsement of that thing.

Grudem's discussion of God's communicable attributes seems to fit the bill, Michael.

You are right. Paul says exactly that. He also says that we shamelessly suppress that knowledge, so that it does little else than render us condemned and without excuse. I place Aristotle's efforts into that category. Ed is far more confident of their utility than I am, or than I think the Bible permits.

Yes, we suppress the knowledge that God exists, but this is a separate willful act from reasoning from the facts of the world to god. If 'unaided' reason were unable to arrive at knowledge of god's existence, then there would be no reason for suppressing anything, because there would be no knowledge to suppress. Paul is saying that unaided reason can get close enough to Christianity that there is no excuse for those who don't believe. It can't go all the way to the particulars of special revelation, but that was never in dispute.

Dear All,

I feel like a child watching his parents fight.

Let me throw my childish two-cents worth in:

Rather, it's an attempt to be true to the theological content and methods of the Bible

Who said we had to be true to the methods of the Bible? Even granted that, what exactly are THE methods of the Bible? Who said we could not use other methods as an aid or to clarify? Did not the apostles EXPECT man to grow in knowledge, over time and therefore see more deeply into their words with each generation? Basically, the idea that we must use the historical-grammatical method, would mean that almost no one could interpret Scripture properly, except by accident until that method were widely disseminated (perhaps, in an embryonic form by Erasmus, himself). I strongly doubt that any apostle would agree with that claim. As I may be misinterpreting what "method" means, I'll wait for clarification on that.

.For us to know God, He must reveal Himself to us. If He does not, He remains for us both unknowable and unreachable. But, thank God, silent He has not remained. He has spoken.

On the other hand, St. Paul says [Rom 1: 17- 25]:

For in it the righteousness of God is revealed through faith for faith; as it is written, "He who through faith is righteous shall live." For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and wickedness of men who by their wickedness suppress the truth. For what can be known about God is plain to them, because God has shown it to them. Ever since the creation of the world his invisible nature, namely, his eternal power and deity, has been clearly perceived in the things that have been made. So they are without excuse; for although they knew God they did not honor him as God or give thanks to him, but they became futile in their thinking and their senseless minds were darkened. Claiming to be wise, they became fools, and exchanged the glory of the immortal God for images resembling mortal man or birds or animals or reptiles. Therefore God gave them up in the lusts of their hearts to impurity, to the dishonoring of their bodies among themselves, because they exchanged the truth about God for a lie and worshiped and served the creature rather than the Creator, who is blessed for ever! Amen. [RSV, my emphasis]

The bolded words in the passage show that even though God wrote the book, men must pick it up and read it. They read it with their senses, first, before they read it with the mind. St. Thomas does not say, as Bobcat quotes someone earlier saying:

Thomas says that we can come to knowledge that God exists through unaided reason.

That is not what what St. Thomas says. Vos makes the distinction between faith, which is one type of knowing, and the preambles of faith, which is another type of knowing. St. Thomas says that one can know that there is A God through unaided reason as a preamble to faith. St. Thomas does not say that one can know THE God through unaided reason. Reason can take one as far as faith, but then faith must be granted by grace and is a separate type of knowing that surpasses reason, so the word, "Know" in Bobcat's analysis, above, is not the same in (1) and (2). The first concerns a preamble to faith as a type of knowing, the second concerns faith, itself as another, superior type of knowing.

Here's the point: faith and reason do not contradict each other, so, properly done (and Aristotelian reasoning is fairly properly done), the preambles-to-faith methodologies cannot contradict the post-faith methodologies, since grace builds on nature (if grace builds on nature is not an accepted axiom, then I suggest that we all abandon discussion, because there can be no resolution is such a continuity is rejected).

I guess I'll let the parents go back to talking. If you must yell at me, remember, I'm just a philosophical kid, so be kind (don't yell too hard- would not want to scar me for life) and use small words. I'm going back to my play-pen and get my blanket. I am firmly convinced that you philosophers need blankets. I have no idea what that means, but, I'm a kid and I don't have to make sense.

The Chicken

Bobcat,

Here's the incompatibility between Thomas and Christianity that Baumann sees:

(1) Thomas says that we can come to knowledge that God exists through unaided reason.
(2) But according to Christianity we cannot come to knowledge that God exists through unaided reason.
(3) Therefore, thomism and Christianity contradict each other.

Thomas may be correct in that we know can know for certain that there is a creator, and by creator I mean something which purposefully created the universe. However, the only value there is that that defeats raw atheism. It does nothing to bring us beyond that point to the truth. At some point, the actual nature of God truly matters. If you cannot transcend that point, you're worshiping nothing at best, and demons at worst. One of the implications of Paul's writings in Romans 1 is that if you are worshiping pagan gods and idols, you are suppressing the truth with your sinfulness, that that is not an innocent act, and that those who do this will go to Hell because they implicitly denied God.

The distinction between preambles to faith and faith I am referring to was made in the Summa, but I am paraphrasing Arvin Vos: Aquinas, Calvin, and contemporary Protestant thought : a critique of Protestant views on the thought of Thomas Aquinas ; with a foreword by Ralph McInerny. Washington, D.C. : Christian University Press ; Grand Rapids, Mich. : W.B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., c1985

The Chicken

An outraged Michael sputters: "My hands aren't freezing up, Ed!" and "My fingers did not freeze!" And yet in doing so he yet again fails to answer the very question I said his hands freeze up over -- namely "Are specific Aristotelian categories like 'pure act' incompatible with Christianity?"

???

Michael, do you read what you write before pressing "Post"? Is this some kind of weird joke? Because I find your behavior simply bizarre.

Look, here's one more chance, and then I'm done, because this is becoming -- if it hasn't already become -- a gigantic waste of time. Here goes. Let me be as specific as I possibly can be. Here's my question:

"Is the concept of God as 'pure act' incompatible with the Christian view of God or not?"

It seems to me there are four possible ways to respond.

1. You could say "No," but I assume you would not, because that would conflict with everything you've been saying so far. (But since you've already backpedaled somewhat anyway, maybe you would say it. But if so, why didn't you just say so a week ago?)

2. You could say "Yes." But in that case you owe us an explanation of why they are incompatible. And as you know, merely noting that they are different does not suffice. Show us an actual contradiction.

3. You could say "It's a bad question." But in that case you owe us an account of why it is a bad question. Exactly what mistaken assumption does the question rest on? What sort of category mistakes does it embody? Etc.

4. You could say "I don't know." But in that case, you need to explain where you get off confidently assuring us that Aristotelian philosophical concepts are incompatible with Christian ones.

Since you have assured us that your fingers are not frozen, we are all eagerly awaiting your answer.

Prof. Ed - Yes/No mistake on your last comment fixed, I hope.

As for your challenge to me, way up-thread: I have yet to see *anybody* - Prof. Bauman or anybody else - demonstrate any (strict, logical) incompatibility between the God of Abraham, Israel & Jesus of Nazareth, on the one hand, and the God of Aristotle on the other.

But you've got to admit that there's a vast intellectual & cultural gulf to be bridged between the two - as witness the present...ummm...frank exchange of views, 2,000 years later.

For the sake of clarity:

Following Barth I have asserted the futility of natural theology as a means of knowing God.

Following Erasmus I have asserted the preferability of the Stoic notion of logos to the uncaused cause and unmoved mover reached by Aristotle's bottom up procedure as an explanation of God's revelation in creation and in Christ.

Following Schaeffer I have asserted that Thomas unleashed a terribly destructive force when he employed Aristotle's unaided and autonomous human reason as a way of building from the bottom up a system that claimed to encompass even God Himself.

I did not assert that the Stoics, by their Stoicism and its notion of the logos, came to a knowledge of God. No philosophy can do that.

Along the way I cited books by numerous authors that amplify or illustrate my point should one wish to follow it further or to trace it back to its origin.

Neither the views I advocate, nor those who hold them, are "ungrounded," "incoherent," or "unhinged," despite Ed's graceless comments to the contrary. Nor have these views gone without explanation of many sorts and from multiple angles, as others on this thread have noticed, and in some cases even tried to explain to Ed as well, whether or not they agreed with my explanations in the whole, in part, or not at all. They sometimes asked clarification of my comments, or posited ideas they thought followed from my explanations, but they saw that explanations were given.


Mike T,
I think you are quite right.

This is a quote from Schaeffer:

"In Aquinas's view the will of man was fallen, but the intellect was not. From this incomplete view of the biblical Fall flowed all subsequent difficulties. (Francis Schaeffer, Escape from Reason, p. 11)"

Here is Aquinas himself:

"As a result of original justice, the reason had perfect hold over the lower parts of the soul, while reason itself was perfected by God, and was subject to Him. Now this same original justice was forfeited through the sin of our first parent, as already stated (81, 2); so that all the powers of the soul are left, as it were, destitute of their proper order, whereby they are naturally directed to virtue; which destitution is called a wounding of nature ... [T]hrough sin, the reason is obscured, especially in practical matters, the will hardened to evil, good actions become more difficult and concupiscence more impetuous." (St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Article 85, Question 3)

"Hence we must say that for the knowledge of any truth whatsoever man needs Divine help, that the intellect may be moved by God to its act ... We always need God's help for every thought, inasmuch as He moves the understanding to act." (Summa, Article 109, Question 1)

In other words, Schaeffer's view of Aquinas is more than a mistaken characterization, it directly contradicts Aquinas' own words. Relying on such ill-informed opinion, Mr. Bauman, can only lead to error.

Also, you keep identifying Aristotle's method as "bottom up." I take it that by this you mean the process of using human reason to discover truths about God. There is one problem with this description: no Christian believes that you can arrive at divine revelation through reason alone. This is why Edward Feser keeps asking you to answer his question. No one is saying that the same knowledge is being known in two ways. What Christian tradition says is that certain things can be known about God through human reason, other things cannot be, and some are known through both. What reason can know is by no means comprehensive and, again, it does not purport to exhaust God's nature or essence in full.

As I said before, natural theology begins by understanding that the world cannot exist by its own power and must come from something else. Either point out an error in this process or stop merely asserting that nothing can be known about God through human reason. To persist in referring to Aristotle and Aquinas' method as arrogant is to fundamentally misunderstand what they are saying.

Thanks for the correction, Steve, and the clarification. Do note, however, that vis-a-vis the issue of the compatibility of the Bible with philosophical concepts, I've got the Church Fathers, the ecumenical councils, the great Medieval theologians and philosophers, and the Catholic, Orthodox, and much of the Protestant traditions on my side. Also, by Michael's own tacit admission it seems, the first chapter of the Gospel of John and the beginning of the Epistle to the Romans. I am by no means whatsover conceding the rest of the Bible to him -- that's ours too, according to... well, according to pretty much all the sources just named.

Michael, on the other hand, has got the patented Michael Bauman interpretation of the Bible, minus John 1 and Romans 1. Also, if he thinks about it, minus Acts 17 and a few other things that don't fit in too well with his position. Also minus any actual arguments for his position. Plus the inconsistencies and/or cases of special pleading. I'll also concede that there are, here and there, a few other people in the world who agree with him.

Yeah, that sounds like a real toss-up to me too...

Michael says:

For the sake of clarity:

...I have asserted...

...I have asserted...

...I have asserted...

For once we agree. You have asserted, and asserted, and asserted.

What you haven't done is actually given any evidence for the assertions. That's why I say your view is "ungrounded."

Also, some of your assertions are inconsistent. That's why I say your view is "incoherent."

Also -- incredibly, but by now not in the least surprisingly -- you still have not answered my direct question. Still!

But then, maybe it is "graceless" to keep pointing out that the emperor is naked, especially when he's the only one who doesn't know it. So I'll shut up now. Bye Michael, enjoy your parade!

Prove to me that the pagan god reached by Aristotle's move from the bottom up is the God of Israel

This isn't what's being asserted. I wouldn't presume to speak for Dr. Feser, but this isn't the claim I'd defend at all. What I would defend is that some of what Aristotle asserted in his "generic theism" accurately describes the true God.

For instance, I've been told I resemble Shaquille O'Neal, but I am obviously not Shaq. Nevertheless, some of the things you could say about him would apply to me (big, bald, black). Similarly, Yahweh is not Aristotle's god, but some things you can say about Aristotle's god can be accurately applied to Yahweh. You seem to take the position that we must run away from any Greek-ish description of God simply due to its Greek-ness, without pausing to consider whether the description is accurate.

Mike T says

However, the only value there is that that defeats raw atheism. It does nothing to bring us beyond that point to the truth.

That's a puzzling thing to say: that knowing that atheism is wrong doesn't bring us "to the truth". You must mean that it doesn't get you to the FULL truth. Oh, but that's ok, neither does Erasmus' philosophy, or anyone else's, or (for that matter) any portion of the Bible. And since we humans can only think thought followed by thought discursively, even if you know the whole Bible by heart as did Jerome and Augustine and Thomas, you can't THINK the whole Bible all at once. So for us humans, in this life, we never "know" the whole truth at one time. When we get to heaven, that's another story.

But Aristotle's vision of God is as pure act, which means that he is the summit of the good, not merely the summit sitting there alone, but bringing about the good everywhere you see good, both as agent cause, final cause and as exemplar. These do not simply "defeat raw atheism." Are these somehow incompatible with the vision of God the Christian comes to through Revelation? Of course not. It cannot be wrong to see God as exemplar cause and then say "Be you perfect even as your heavenly Father is perfect." It cannot be wrong to view God as agent cause when God himself makes that case to Job definitively.

And since that God seen by philosophy - the final cause - is one ("Hear oh Israel the Lord thy God is one"), this is not merely compatible with, but even suggestive of, the community of saints enjoying God in union (though this cannot be proven without revelation), I really don't see where Mr. Bauman finds an incompatibility.

I suspect that he is primarily affronted with the method of philosophy precisely because it cannot produce saving knowledge, or faith, or hope or love. True. Neither does a knowledge of plumbing. But that doesn't make a knowledge of plumbing (or its proper method) incompatible with the Bible. It would only become an incompatibility if one were to propose that this philosophy were sufficient for salvation, were sufficient to know God in the intimacy of his own life. Sort of Pelagian, I suppose, though for the intellect rather than the will. But if philosophy does not claim that sort of knowledge of God, but rather says that it can deliver a sort of plumber's type of knowledge of God, and if you want more you need to go to the right source for more, THAT'S not incompatible with the Bible either.

It is irrational to call Aristotle's method of using creation to find the God of nature anti-Biblical, (the so-called bottom-up method from man to God). Since God is the source of that natural world, that method finds its source in God also. As long as one doesn't use the philosophical method to intentionally obscure or replace the revealed method, then the two work hand in hand. That is exactly what Paul means by telling Christians to be ready to give an account of your faith. As a Christian, you cannot give faith to another, but you can give an account of that faith, and prepare the soil for God to give the faith. You cannot call the pre-faith tilling anti-Biblical, even if you aren't using the Bible because your hearer won't accept it (not yet having faith in it).

I should just note that I agree with Feser in all this rather than Bauman, but my post above was meant merely to articulate in more typically analytic language than Bauman uses, Bauman's claims.

Hi Bobcat, I meant to reply to your earlier comment, but given your latest I think I'll rest content with our agreement and pour myself some vino instead -- it's been a long day and my brain is fried. I'll pour one for you too. And drink it.

I think I've discovered an incompatibility. To accuse one's opponent in debate of needing help, of being unhinged, incoherent, hopelessly muddled, and bizarre; to indulge a relentlessly supercilious condescension, an equally relentless tone of mockery, egomaniacal superiority, and a pathetically juvenile snarkiness -"it is so so played. Give it up already" - is incompatible with the practice of charity and civility toward a Christian brother, and is very nearly disgusting to witness.

Just guessing, but if one wanted to inspire a zealous Protestant to give Aquinas a fair hearing, and, ultimately, to incline his heart sympathetically toward the Catholic heritage, that kind of language probably won't do the trick.

William, I am afraid I think you have a point there. The tone has been somewhat sharp.

In the article I linked to above, Fr. Reardon says this in his introduction:

**I take it as obvious that philosophy, if left to its own devices, will ultimately prove deceptive, for the simple reason that the thoughts of man’s heart are prone to evil from his youth. In this respect it is surely significant that the only time the word philosophy appears in the New Testament, it is coupled with the expression “empty deception” (Col. 2:8). Nonetheless, in asserting that philosophy, left to its own lights, will finally prove deceptive, we should not imagine that all forms of philosophy are equally deceptive, and theology will have performed an adequate service to philosophy if it can indicate which philosophical paths are especially deceptive.**

If Dr. Bauman believes that Thomism is one of these deceptive forms of philosophy, fine. But he needs to indicate in some substantive way why he thinks so; so far he's not done that -- he's simply made assertions.

Tony,


That's a puzzling thing to say: that knowing that atheism is wrong doesn't bring us "to the truth". You must mean that it doesn't get you to the FULL truth. Oh, but that's ok, neither does Erasmus' philosophy, or anyone else's, or (for that matter) any portion of the Bible. And since we humans can only think thought followed by thought discursively, even if you know the whole Bible by heart as did Jerome and Augustine and Thomas, you can't THINK the whole Bible all at once. So for us humans, in this life, we never "know" the whole truth at one time. When we get to heaven, that's another story.

No, not the full truth, but the essential truth which is embodied in the person of Jesus and which can be seen in the way that the repentant thief relates to Him. That is the truth and behavior which is necessary for salvation.

The point is that worshiping pagan gods or Allah is not the same thing as worshiping Yaweh, especially not in the sense that Jesus revealed in His person. It is not compatible with saving grace, but rather is itself a manifestation of damning sinfulness (Romans 1).

It just comes down to the fact that it takes atheism off the table, which while a big deal, leaves far too many paths that lead to the same destination (Hell).

Tony,

I suspect that he is primarily affronted with the method of philosophy precisely because it cannot produce saving knowledge, or faith, or hope or love. True.

I suspect it has more to do with the way that most people react when a product is overhyped and turns out to be nowhere near as good as claimed. Philosophy can make atheism untenable, but it cannot so easily make Islam untenable. If a man converts from atheism to Islam, he's still going to Hell.

Neither does a knowledge of plumbing.

Plumbing also makes no appeals to knowledge or wisdom outside of simple engineering and fluid dynamics.

William Luse,

I don't expect you or anyone else to go back and scroll through the very long exchange between Michael, myself, and others, that has occurred in this thread and others, over the last week. But if you did, I think you'd find that I was quite restrained at the beginning and that Michael was quite haughty from the beginning. My comments have become sharper, no question, and if they have gotten too sharp, I regret it and apologize.

But here's the thing. When a man loftily and pompously assures us that the Church Fathers, the ecumenical councils, the great medieval doctors, and the tradition of the Church have all gotten it seriously wrong, that the Greek philosophers for whom the Church has always shown such esteem are comparable to demons, that in general Christianity has been gravely corrupted for almost its entire history, etc., then he'd better be prepared to back these bold claims up. And he'd better show some humility in doing so. If instead he repeatedly refuses to answer direct requests for evidence, repeatedly attacks straw men, repeatedly dismisses those who challenge him as too much in thrall to error to see the sublime truth of his views, repeatedly contradicts himself, shows no willingness whatsoever to admit that he just might be wrong, and on top of all this accuses others of being arrogant -- then, yes, I admit that I have a tendency to think that such a person deserves to be called to account. And yes, I have a tendency to think that that can justifiably include sarcasm. Nor, if you study the history of the way some of the great saints have sometimes dealt with haughty and obstinate critics of the Faith, will you find that I am alone in that judgment. Since you are a Catholic, I would hope you'd be especially senstitive to the arrogance of someone who pretty much condemns the entire history of the Church and then refuses to back his assertions up.

Having said that, perhaps I have nevertheless been too sharp, and if so I apologize. But it takes two to tango, and I most definitely did not start this particular dance.

Hi Ed,

I think it would be good to talk about the place of rancor, sarcasm, etc., in the way one deals with people one disagrees with. From a naive Christian point of view, I would think "turn the other cheek" would encourage moderation of tone no matter how provocative one's interlocutor is. But generally when I say such things I am corrected and told things like:

(1) although everyone is created in God's image, this does not mean that everyone is equal before God (this refers to the Christianity and Liberalism discussion we had on this site)
(2) at least some kinds of torture are not intrinsically evil (this refers to an old Right Reason post of yours; I may be misremembering it)
(3) factory farming is not at odds with Christian morality (this refers to another discussion on this site, although it's less recent)

The point is, I suspect my naive understanding of Christianity is just that: naive. I used to think, for example, that the "take all you have and give to the poor" parable recommended that everyone take a vow of poverty. That resonated well with my idealistic, Kierkegaardian attitude to Christianity and my tendency to favor dramatic, romantic philosophical theses (like Singer's poverty relief claim). That said, I read the parable more closely and I realized that clearly the parable wasn't recommending that everyone give away everything. That would be an incoherent recommendation. When I looked closer, I saw something much more subtle. (No need to get into what I saw; my powers of Biblical interpretation are significantly weaker than most of the people on this site.)

The point is, when I list (1)-(3), I am not--consciously--being sarcastic against my own admonition. I really, truly wouldn't be shocked if there were a strong Christian case recommending sarcasm and rancor as a way of responding to claims that are provocative. So if there is such a case, I'd love to hear it. If there's not, though, then why write, "But it takes two to tango, and I most definitely did not start this particular dance"? That seems somewhat crudely retributive (I'm a retributivist, but I hope I'm not a *crude* retributivist) as a justification. Perhaps you weren't invoking it as a justification but rather as an explanation?

Sorry for this meandering post.

That seems somewhat crudely retributive (I'm a retributivist, but I hope I'm not a *crude* retributivist)

Ha! LoL.

I took it to be an explanation rather than a justification. I know that on occasion I have been overly sharp with someone I thought was not debating in an acceptable manner. And realized later that my tone was unhelpful to the debate.

Hello Bobcat,

Thanks for that. It's not so much a matter of retribution as a matter of tactics, though it has a retributive element. I see the situation as parallel to that of a just war. We must never initiate force against an innocent person. But when someone commits aggression, we are not only justified, but sometimes even morally required, to fight back. Similarly, if someone merely disagrees with me about some philosophical or theological matter, my presumption is that it would be wrong to treat them with derision, sarcasm, harsh rhetoric, or what have you. But if someone is himself unrepentantly arrogant, aggressive, insulting, etc., then I think one sometimes may, and indeed sometimes should, fight fire with fire. This is especially so when the ideas the person is defending are themselves intrinsically gravely immoral (e.g. Peter Singer's views on necrophilia and infanticide).

Now I would not for a moment compare Michael to Peter Singer. But his views are certainly, from the point of view of Catholicism, not only wrong but outrageous. Indeed, they are seriously heretical -- even from the POV of most Protestants -- because he even dares to criticize the ecumenical councils. Even that would not by itself have led me to take a sarcastic tone with him. But coupled with his arrogance and dismissiveness of serious and well-intentioned criticisms and requests for evidence, it seemed to me he was "asking for it." And as 've said, I didn't start out our exchange that way. I deliberately tried my best to engage in a serious and respecful exchange with him. But he did not respond in kind. Hence I decided "OK, if that's the way you want it..."

I've written several times on the appropriateness of polemics under certain circumstances, e.g. here:

http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2008/09/philosophy-and-polemics.html

http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2009/01/walters-on-tls.html

http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2009/02/tone-deaf.html

And this is, from a theological point of view, by no means a novelty on my part. Christ could be very harsh with the Pharisees. Elijah was a model of un-ecumenical sarcasm when dealing with the priests of Baal. Same with many of the saints. See here for examples, and for a Catholic defense of polemics under certain circumstances:

http://www.ewtn.com/library/theology/libsin.htm#20

http://www.ewtn.com/library/theology/libsin.htm#21

In short, the "let's always be meek and mild" stuff is, no less than pacifism, a perversion of Christian morality IMHO.

And I do find it interesting that some of the people criticizing my tone here (I don't mean you, Bobcat) can be extremely nasty when they want to be. Shoe on the other foot, and all that.

Hi Ed,

I'm thinking about writing some papers about this, so I look forward to reading this posts. I think I may have _some_ disagreements with you about Bauman's tone, though. Too subjective to be worth bringing up, though.

..."perhaps I have nevertheless been too sharp, and if so I apologize."

Well, you surprise me. I don't see many apologies on the internet. Michael will no doubt appreciate it.

"I don't expect you or anyone else to go back and scroll through the very long exchange..."

I followed it. The whole thing. Yes, it was long.

"Michael was quite haughty from the beginning."

The thing is, he's always like that when certain subjects are on the table. I've called him on it, but he doesn't see it. He asked you check the mote in your own eye, but can't see the one in his. Which makes him pretty much like most people I know, all laboring beneath their defects.

"...can justifiably include sarcasm."

Of course. "Unhinged" isn't sarcasm.

"Since you are a Catholic, I would hope you'd be especially senstitive to the arrogance of someone who pretty much condemns the entire history of the Church and then refuses to back his assertions up."

As much as anyone. But anyone could see the strength of your argument, and it was enough of a club.

"And I do find it interesting that some of the people criticizing my tone here can be extremely nasty when they want to be."

Now, I'd thought that the habit of pointing to the sins of others to excuse one's own was the province of children. I don't know if this was meant for me, but if it was it's no doubt true. What I discovered is that it has never won me an argument - or a friend. (In fact, I've lost a few.) If shouting worked, I'd have made Lydia Catholic. It doesn't work.


Hello William,

Thank you for your polite reply. I wasn't trying to excuse myself, just trying to get those who criticized my tone to consider, from their own experience, why I thought it appropriate. As I've said, I do think sarcasm -- and other strong words too (even calling someone unhinged if he seems to me to be going way over the top) can be justified. And I gather you agree with the general principle. Still, especially in combox situations, one can go too far in doing so, even if one sincerely and rightly believes he has reason to engage in it. You've suggested that I did not need to go as far as I did, and maybe you're right. Certainly it is better to err on the side of caution. So if I did go too far with Michael, I apologize to him. And I thank you for your word of caution.

Best,
Ed

I hope that, on that note, we can bring this long, strange thread to a close.

Hey. It wasn't strange. The subject was worthwhile.

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