What’s Wrong with the World

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Not Bad, But Tragic

It is a commonplace observation concerning the American character, and American political culture and statecraft, that Americans are bereft of a tragic sensibility. Most probably, this is a consequence of a profound psychological association between what was once the newness and remoteness of the New World, and its geographic and social openness, and the opportunities this afforded those intent upon forging new lives away from older societies which dissatisfied them in various respects. Americans seem to lack, on the whole, and in the mainstream of thought, a capacity to enter into the tragic consciousness of other peoples, or to assume a tragic posture even temporarily, as a heuristic for the evaluation of their own condition. For example, all such circumstances as that of Georgia are assimilated to a narrative of a plucky people attempting to escape the dead dominion of the Past, represented here by Russia, here assimilated and reduced to its Soviet incarnation. The complexity and, indeed, tragedy of the intercommunal relations and tensions of diverse peoples and their histories and aspirations is compressed into a quintessentially American narrative - the attempt of one people to forge for themselves a version of the New World, a Novus Ordo Seculorum. This, of course, holds true when Americans either have an interest in some foreign region, or are stirred by the press into a state of interest in some region, or are told by their superiors that they must manifest concern for some foreign region; when Americans have no interest in a conflicted region of the world, as was the case during the Balkan Wars, they dismiss its tensions and tragedies, blithely, as just so many ancient, senseless, and incomprehensible tribal feuds. In doing so, Americans ratify their native view of the world: that is the Old World, the old way, in which people continuously reference the past; we Americans, by contrast, are optimistic and forward-lookinig, willing to jettison such atavisms for a prosperous future.

Ironically, a nation bereft of a tragic sensibility will usually manifest tragedy in its dealings with the world, and this is the case, I would argue, where America is concerned. Without intending to dwell at great length upon the theme, American foreign policy incarnates tragedy in at least three related senses.

First, because American grand strategy endeavours to unify material interests and ostensibly noble ideals, Americans tend to be blind to the ways in which the pursuit of either inhibits the realization of the other. The Iraq War represents an attempt to conduct American policy on a firmly idealistic basis, and yet it is proving materially ruinous along any number of metrics. American policy in the Caucasus aims to mitigate what is regarded as an excessive dependence upon Russian energy and energy transport routes, and clearly inhibits the promotion of ostensible American ideals, as the Alievs in Azerbaijan, and the mercurial Saakashvili in Georgia, are scarcely representatives of the ideals we openly proclaim, regardless of the press coverage of the latter, in particular. Moreover, Americans frequently indulge in a measure of self-delusion concerning their own motivations in the conduct of policy, as might be suggested by such examples. Are we promoting a set of political ideals, or rather a set of chess moves in a pointless Great Game? Even on the assumption that we have simply chosen to maintain a national friendship of sorts with Georgia, how credible is it to advance such claims when we apparently permitted enough strategic and diplomatic ambiguity to encourage the Georgians to pick a fight they could not win - ie., one unjust at least in that respect?

Second, Americans tend to envision ideal geopolitical scenarios, or, at a minimum, possible geopolitical worlds, which are objectively preferable to geopolitical reality, or subjectively preferable for some or other group we intend to shower with our favouritism. This is tragic in a double sense: first, there are always unintended consequences, which prompt anguished protests on the part of Americans, to the effect that an ungrateful world does not appreciate the purity and nobility of our intentions, or that we could not have anticipated the fallout; second, few of these entanglements are actually in the interest of the American people, the welfare of whom is the principal obligation of American statesmen. Even on the assumption that the world as a whole is better off, given the conduct of American policy X, the American people themselves are seldom better for it.

Third, American foreign policy is often a reflection of flaws in the American character, in the sense that its formulation and conduct reflects domestic defects with which we have failed to reckon. The two most obvious examples are, in my estimation, first, American involvement in the Middle East, motivated primarily by a concern for the regular and orderly flow of oil shipments to global markets - not "blood for oil", but an acknowledgment that America, uniquely dependent upon those resources for the perpetuation of the American way of life, must be uniquely concerned for the correlation of political forces in the Middle East, that is, with "stability", however differently the Bush administration has elected to define this. The second illustration would be the role of the military in both our foreign policy and in popular culture. Military force has become increasingly emblematic of our foreign policy, largely as an assertion of faith in American ideals, after the tumultuous years of the Vietnam war associated for many a skepticism of American ideals and opposition to war. A readiness to employ military power has become symbolic of an affirmation of Americanism at a profound, subconscious level of the American psyche. Not merely this, but among some quarters, gestures of support for American foreign policy, affirmations of the rectitude of American missions and intentions, have become so fervent - not a bad thing in itself, in abstraction - in inverse proportion to the concrete commitment of the American people to the policies themselves. Laying aside questions of the wisdom of American policy, while there have been many token demonstrations of support for the troops, such as the application of magnetic ribbons to the backs of automobiles, there has been no dramatic upsurge in enlistments, or a willingness on the part of the people to sacrifice materially by paying in taxes what would be required to finance American foreign policy, as opposed to borrowing from foreign creditors. In this, our leadership reflects our own character; we were told, after 9/11, to go shopping, not so much because this was simply the role our leaders felt appropriate for us, but because that was pretty much all we would be willing to do in connection with a war effort.

American foreign policy is occasionally malign in an obvious manner, as in Kosovo; but even in such instances, it is malign, not on account of some nefarious intention, but on account of the profound flaws and lacunae in our own understanding - of ourselves, and of the world. In criticizing American foreign policy, those of us on, or nearer, the paleo right are essentially summoning America to an heroic undertaking, that of self-examination.

Comments (39)

May your call for "heroic self-examination" begin at once.

7 years after 9-11 our borders and ports remain unsecured. We’re bleeding lives and treasure in Iraq and adding to our portfolio of far-off, self-defeating interests.

Enter Mikhail Saakashvili, a man who just last year imposed martial law, jailed and exiled his political opponents, closed Georgia’s opposition TV station, and now has led the military of his nation of 4.4 million against a pro-Russian, ethnic separatist enclave with a population of 50,000-70,000. In the process, his army leveled every building in the capital city of Tskhinvali. According to John McCain’s chief foreign policy advisor, Randy Scheunemann who was paid $400,000 by this “pro-Western democrat”, we’re helping the next Thomas Jefferson.

Who signed up for this lunacy? An Empire cannot guide a country’s course because its vision too distant, its affections too dispersed and its contradictory and extensive foreign obligations too great.

I want my country back.


One of the mistakes made by President Bush:

we were told, after 9/11, to go shopping, not so much because this was simply the role our leaders felt appropriate for us, but because that was pretty much all we would be willing to do in connection with a war effort.

Americans were never expected to consider sacrifice. We had 3000 dead citizens -- action was clearly necessary -- but the American people were told to do nothing. Granted, at that point in time, an economic recession appeared imminent. Going about the business of business might have been good council, but it did NOT prepare the American people to accept a long and protracted sacrifice to achieve security.
In criticizing American foreign policy, those of us on, or nearer, the paleo right are essentially summoning America to an heroic undertaking, that of self-examination.

This is a new phenomenon I believe -- this inability of the American people for self-examination. It parallels the inability of critical thinking -- a by-product, I fear, of the dumbing down of the electorate.

This is good, Jeff. I think the paleo narrative or its successor, in order to gain any serious traction, has to stop buying into the world view of neoconservatism -- even when it comes to neoconservatism itself as the transcendent enemy.

To bring about the complete discrediting of neoconservatism is not to "end evil", it is to bring about an end to a tragic foolish militaristic triumphalism which sprang from a uniquely American idealism - almost a form of Americanist innocence. There are culpable actors, to be sure -- there always are -- but there seems to be a totalizing character to the paleo critique which mirrors the totalizing ideology against which it is set in opposition. That totalizing character tends to make the paleo critique into a parody of itself, and I have enough paleoish sympathies that it is painful for me to watch. (Of course this totalizing character will not be found in every piece one ever reads at Taki, for example; but it is pervasive nonetheless).

That is partly why, to be bluntly honest, the "hegemony" rhetoric makes me cringe. Certainly there is self-interest involved, but honestly, the American population is more moved by an idealism which geniunely wishes the best for others, seeing that as concomitant to what is best for America. Yes, yes, under a perverse understanding of "what is best"; but still, this is fundamentally different from a straightforward desire for conquest.

A strong dose of reality in American foreign policy, which would have to include the complete discrediting of the neoconservative project, would not end evil even in the limited sense of ending evil which directly impacts Americans. It would not remove the pursuit of Empire from the world: there are polities with ambitions for empire which are not constrained by American idealism, those polities will continue to have those ambitions, and at times we will need to rise to resist them. America acting like an adult citizen of the world would help others to do so, without doubt; but will not bring about even a geographically limited "end to evil".

Zippy,

You suggest that a dose of reality might help make America "an adult citizen of the the world." I'm wondering to what nation, if any, you might point as a current example of "an adult citizen of the world".

I'm wondering to what nation, if any, you might point as a current example of "an adult citizen of the world".
Malta, maybe? :-)

I don't know of any; certainly not any which have a military might anywhere close to ours.

Jeff:

Below are two misstatements from the first paragraph. There are others.


(1) "Americans seem to lack, on the whole, and in the mainstream of thought, a capacity to enter into the tragic consciousness of other peoples."

If I were to adopt your mode of analysis (I do not.), I'd argue that it is precisely because we enter into the tragic consciousness of other people that we enroll our blood and our treasure on their behalf -- more so than any nation ever. We do this because, as a nation of immigrants, those people at one time or another were us.


(2) ". . . all such circumstances as that of Georgia are assimilated to a narrative of a plucky people attempting to escape the dead dominion of the Past"

"All" is radically overstated, as are the conclusions you wish to draw from it.


On a different note, I oppose the reifications involved in your highly questionable attempt to psychoanalyze the alleged mind of an entire nation and to ferret out the psychological motivations that stand behind American foreign policy -- as if there really were such a thing as the American psyche that one might profitably psychoanalyze -- and as if the diversities of American foreign policy over the centuries have been anything remotely resembling monolithic and arose from the same set of motivations, such that we could use the word "all."


Kevin,

If you want your country back, perhaps you could call on the Russians to help you the way they helped the Georgians get back theirs.

I'd argue that it is precisely because we enter into the tragic consciousness of other people that we enroll our blood and our treasure on their behalf...

The tragic consciousness is not nearly so selective as ours is; we are too prone to apply facile white hats/black hats narratives to foreign policy situations, and tend to adopt the tragic mentality of another people only to the extent that it can be shoehorned into a white hat/black hat narrative of liberation. The present unpleasantness is illustrative of this: Americans, at least some of them, have a small appreciation for the historical sufferings and aspirations of the Georgian people; few, if any, have a similar appreciation of those of the Ossetians, which have brought them into conflict with the Georgians.

On a different note, I oppose the reifications...

"Reification" is often a term of disapprobation applied to a generalization that one does not like. As I am not a nominalist, and do believe that there is such a thing as the character of nations, after the title of Angelo Codevilla's excellent book, I've no objection to such sketches of a national psychology - a subject with its roots in antiquity. Nations simply do manifest differing collective atmospheres, though obviously not in any totalizing fashion, admitting of no exceptions or counterpoints; the questions of national character concern predominant tendencies, main themes, as opposed to subplots.

if the diversities of American foreign policy

My frame of reference is essentially that of post-Wilsonian, but especially post-WWII American foreign policy, in which such narratives are invoked to cover the tensions, or even open contradictions, between idealistic aspirations, material interests, and grubby realpolitik.

Zippy,

If only for the moment, I'll take your word for it that no nation on earth qualifies as "an adult citizen of the world." Not even Malta (wink).

But that makes me wonder:
If no nation on earth is qualified to be considered an adult citizen of the world, then perhaps the qualifications are unrealistic and/or mistaken. If so, who really needs the dose of realism you prescribed above -- the administration you criticize or you?

Please do not misread me here. I am not trying to be cheeky. (Though sometimes I am.) But I honestly wonder if implying that our nation is childish or adolescent on foreign policy is either fair or realistic.

Jeff,
Individual minds exist, no others.

It's not a matter of nominalism or realism; it's a matter of fact or fiction. Just as when one wishes to psychoanalyze the old man from The Old Man and the Sea, one runs into this insurmountable problem: the old man is fictional and has no psyche to analyze. Indeed, he has no he. His mind is fictional and does not exist. Hemingway made it up. What Hemingway invented might be realistic, but it's not real. The same hold for the Lilliputians -- and doubly so because not only do fictional minds not exist, but neither do collective minds -- fictional or otherwise. Collective minds are the fiction not of novelists but of social scientists. The collective, the group, has no mind, and it can't be psychoanalyzed. Political theory based on psychoanalyzing collective minds is not theory rooted in reality -- and that is a crippling flaw in the theories of one who one insists that others be more realistic.

In other words, while, like you, I endorse a good deal of what Codevilla endorses, I do not endorse this failing.

"… to ferret out the psychological motivations that stand behind American foreign policy..."

Michael,
A post-Christian mind-set lacks the humility to engage in self-examination.

Our ruling class possesses motives so pure and thinking so advanced and besides, they are simply too busy war-gaming and re-engineering society, to cultivate a spiritual predisposition that includes an examination of conscience.

We see that readily in this most recent example in Georgia. We are told that under the principle of national sovereignty, Georgia can control the territory within its borders. O.k. The Ossetians on the other hand are claiming their right to self-determination. Fine.

In this case we are touting the principle of national sovereignty in support of Georgia. However, the last time around, we hailed the principle of self-determination and waged a bombing campaign in Serbia to help Kosovo secede.

The Russians, Ossetians and Abkhazians wonder why the principle of self-determination is not valid in their case.

They might conclude our lack of consistency is driven by other considerations. Like a large oil basin, an appealing pipe-line and the desire to impose our governmental forms on the rest of the region.

The need for soul-searching is never greater than when one thinks it unnecessary.

It's not a matter of nominalism or realism; it's a matter of fact or fiction.

Actually, it is precisely a matter of nominalism vs. realism, in the sense that certain schools of modern thought remain averse, because of their constructions of individuality, to sociology and related disciplines. Nations do manifest tendencies that are the statistical or aggregate expression of the cultural, religious, philosophical, spiritual, and political traditions that have molded their peoples, and through which those peoples have received and expressed their identities. The folkways, mores, and emotional and intellectual habits of a people will possess a distinct valence, and this will be the object, not of psychoanalysis, but of intellectual archeology, in much the same way that one would analyze the constituent elements thereof, such as a national literature and its atmosphere or tendencies. To posit a collective quality of a people is not to posit some supra-mind, a projection of the individuals who comprise a nation that is somehow capable of intellection apart from them; nations manifest distinct characters because nations have distinct cultures. Even the undertones of this past week's disputations have confirmed this observation, if perversely: Russians, according to some Eastern European politicians, and some commentators, just have it in them to oppress others, while Americans just have it in them to liberate others and defend this or that set of 'fundamental' values.

In other words, Thatcher was wrong when she stated that there existed no such thing as 'society'; society exists, and we can formulate propositions to express its characteristics. And one thing we can say of Americans is that, in the aggregate, they tend to be optimistic - and optimism and the tragic sensibility are an ill fit for one another. One thing that once was said of Muslim populations - though it is not certain that, under the impact of modernity and the return to orthodoxy that it has engendered, this tendency is as intact as it once was - was that they were in the grip of a pervasive, iron fatality; this was actually a cultural expression of Islamic metaphysics. And so forth...

Please do not misread me here. I am not trying to be cheeky. (Though sometimes I am.) But I honestly wonder if implying that our nation is childish or adolescent on foreign policy is either fair or realistic.
Well, whether my own evaluations are fair and realistic or not is always a valid question; and at the same time I would probably be the last person to best objectively answer it, since I render them precisely because I already think they are fair and realistic. So that I leave to others.

On the other hand, as an at least abstract defense of method, my concern is always with objective standards, as opposed to relative, '20% less evil/immaturity than other brands' kinds of evaluations. It would be great to have a particular benchmark to emulate and follow, of course, but the lack of one doesn't reduce our responsibility in the least.

After the self-examination, a commitment to reform
from Andrew Bacevich;

"America doesn't need a bigger army. It needs a smaller - that is, more modest - foreign policy, one that assigns soldiers missions that are consistent with their capabilities. Modesty implies giving up on the illusions of grandeur to which the end of the Cold War and then 9/11 gave rise. It also means reining in the imperial presidents who expect the army to make good on those illusions. When it comes to supporting the troops, here lies the essence of a citizen's obligation."
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JH16Ak02.html

Kevin: "I want my country back."

I'm with you Kevin about this. I want my country back too.

To heck with the Empire.

To Perdition with ZBig's grand chessboards, Friedman's Flat Earths, or whatever else they're calling the Hyper-Globalist-Hegemony Monstrosity nowadays.

Prof. Bauman rules.

Here is a question for Maximos:

Does honor require that we defend a small country simply because we said we would?

Note: This is a yes-or-no question.

Here is a another question for Maximos:

Does honor require that we defend a small, belligerent country when our military is stretched past its limit and when no ironclad assurances were offered by anyone?

Dr. Bauman said: "Just as when one wishes to psychoanalyze the old man from The Old Man and the Sea, one runs into this insurmountable problem: the old man is fictional and has no psyche to analyze. Indeed, he has no he. His mind is fictional and does not exist. Hemingway made it up."

It's a wonder why people are so obsessed with analyzing the minds of Shakespeare's characters!

"The motivation for Hamlet is thus..."

This is a great argument why high-school students should simply do away with all the Brit. Lit. that is commonly thrown at them by the likes of such teachers who commit their students to such study!

Ari,

Much of what passes for the study of English literature is anything but English literature. University English departments across the country have been overrun by feminist criticism, post-colonialism, structuralism, deconstructionism, Marxism, etc -- you know the list. They seem not to care that when you reduce English literature to, say, politics, you have impoverished yourself, your heritage, and therefore your students. If, like them, you hate the western tradition, that's not a loss. If, like me, you value it, the loss is incalculable.

There's a great deal in Wordsworth, Hopkins, Milton, Sidney, and De la Mare, for example, that doesn't come within a hundred miles of politics.

One of the first essays I published after I finished my dissertation on the theology of John Milton was about why Freudian criticism was intellectually bankrupt. You can see it here:

http://www.michaelbauman.com/vsFreud.htm


Now, back to the communists who still occupy the Kremlin (wink).

Step2,

Assuming those are the circumstances, perhaps honor would not require us to defend it. But the question is this: Generally speaking, if we tell a small country that we will defend it, ought we not do so?

"But the question is this: Generally speaking, if we tell a small country that we will defend it, ought we not do so?"

Kuwait, anybody?

Aristocles,

As I said above, this is a yes-or-no question. (I know it may be a qualified yes or no; but let's forget that for now.) So, can you, or anyone else, answer this question:

Does telling a small country that we will defend it morally bind us to do so?

It isn't really a yes or no question though. The question is ambiguous enough that it could encompass any number of quite different concrete situations.

If we signed a treaty ratified by Congress binding us to do so, then yes, we have an obligation to do so. (That says nothing of the wisdom or even morality of entering into a particular treaty; nor does it suggest that once we've ratified a treaty we will forever be bound by it).

Do we have an obligation to follow secret back room handshakes and winks, like the sort that arguably got Britain into WWI? No.

George,
Part of the reason I rephrased the question was to show that it did not align with the reality of this particular conflict. On general principle I think we do have an obligation to defend countries we pledge to defend, which means we should be much more selective about handing out those pledges.

I can't think of an accurate analogy to a military alliance but it is a formal agreement that obligates both parties to an extensive sacrifice, in some respects like a marriage does. The situation in Georgia is like getting engaged to a woman not because she is your beloved with mutual goals and interests, but mainly for the reason that she is blond and you like blonds. Don't forget all the unresolved issues with her ex either.

The situation in Georgia is like getting engaged to a woman not because she is your beloved with mutual goals and interests, but mainly for the reason that she is blond and you like blonds. Don't forget all the unresolved issues with her ex either.

Let's go even further:

Say you got married to a woman whose abusive ex-husband is still madly in love with her and wants to seize her children; do you simply give up the children (which, in the reality of the matter, perhaps is the best course of action; i.e., South Ossetia to Russia) or do you, in addition to the children, kick your wife to the curb?

In other words, do you honor the marriage contract or not?

In other words, do you honor the marriage contract or not?

If you knew all this going into the marriage, yes. If she deliberately concealed this in order to dupe you into getting entangled in this soap opera, no.

The main problem is that you have a relationship built upon such a shallow premise you probably deserve to be duped.

So, in other words, arbitrarily regard the marriage contract as 'null' and kick wifey to the curb?

I can't say that I'm shocked considering the staggering number of divorces that occur annually within the United States alone which would perhaps attest to such a notion.

Agreements between countries are not indissoluable marriages.

On general principle I think we do have an obligation to defend countries we pledge to defend, which means we should be much more selective about handing out those pledges.

At least Step2 accepts the principle.

Do we have an obligation to follow secret back room handshakes and winks, like the sort that arguably got Britain into WWI? No.

[Look at me, I'm George R., and I'm stupid enough to try to put words in Zippy's mouth. No really, I'm that much of a fool.]

The marriage analogy, however, doesn't work.

...Nor did the engagement analogy provided by Step2, but I felt the need to indulge in such digression due to it.

Thanks for the digression, feel free to provide a better analogy.

"Arbitrary" is a strange word choice for a deception that fundamentally changes the relationship/alliance you believed yourself to be in. So what counts as a reasonable reason to null the contract?

Zippy,

Although I agree with your statement here:

"Do we have an obligation to follow secret back room handshakes and winks, like the sort that arguably got Britain into WWI? No."

In cases wherein this had been the case, there is definitely a point to be made (especially considering the historical blunders made) in this regard; however, I cannot see how this might actually have been such an instance.

For example, kindly consider (mind you, I am in no way advocating George R's position; just merely asking your opinion here):

http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/102834.htm

Fact Sheet
Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs
Washington, DC
March 31, 2008


The United States and the South Ossetian Conflict

U.S. Policy and Role

The United States supports the territorial integrity of Georgia and a peaceful resolution of the separatist conflict in South Ossetia. The United States views Georgia’s autonomy proposal as an important step in a peace process that should be marked by direct and frequent negotiations between the two sides. The U.S. encourages the sides, with the help of the international community, to intensify their efforts to find a sustainable and peaceful solution to the conflict.

Thanks for the digression, feel free to provide a better analogy.

Actually, I just felt the need to provide an equally-flawed analogy; its purpose had already been served.

Aristocles: The text you quoted does not seem to be any sort of pledge on our part to intervene militarily.

[Look at me, I'm George R., and I'm stupid enough to try to put words in Zippy's mouth. No really, I'm that much of a fool.]

Whoever redacted my statement and wrote this, tell me, what words have I put in Zippy's mouth? Now perhaps I misinterpreted his words. If I have, tell us how.

I redacted it. You want to try again? It is all the same to me either way.

Zippy,

Two questions:

1)How have I put words in your mouth?

2)Assuming I have, how does that justify you calling me "stupid" and "a fool".

Zippy,

Given that 'The United States supports the territorial integrity of Georgia' and this other excerpt below, also from the State Dept.:

"Contributions to the Campaign Against Terrorism. The former President of Georgia, Eduard Shevardnadze, immediately condemned the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, and offered “airspace and territory” for U.S. coalition operations in Afghanistan. Georgia was among the countries in 2003 that openly pledged to support the U.S.-led Operation Iraqi Freedom. In August 2003, Georgia dispatched 69 troops to Iraq, boosted them to over 850 in March 2005 (making Georgia the second largest per capita contributor), and increased them to 2,000 by September 2007. Georgian troops serve under U.S. command. Many have provided security in the “Green zone”in Baghdad, the town of Baqubah northeast of Baghdad, and in Wasit Governorate, along the Iranian border. As of May 2008, there have been four casualties and 18 wounded. Georgia has the fourth-largest number of troops in Iraq, after the United States, the United Kingdom, and South Korea. Troop numbers soon will be reduced when Georgian forces are sent to assist NATO in Afghanistan."

Given the above, at the very least, is there not a Gentleman's Agreement that we should return a favor in kind?

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